United States v. Gloria Giannini , 441 F. App'x 500 ( 2011 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                               JUL 05 2011
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        U.S . CO U RT OF AP PE A LS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No. 10-10274
    Plaintiff - Appellee,              D.C. No. 2:07-cr-00018-EJG-1
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    GLORIA GIANNINI,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of California
    Edward J. Garcia, Senior District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted June 16, 2011
    San Francisco, California
    Before: BYBEE and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges, and EZRA, District Judge.**
    Defendant-Appellant Gloria Giannini appeals the district court's denial of
    her motions for (1) recusal, (2) withdrawal of her guilty plea, and (3) dismissal of
    her indictment. We affirm on all counts.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable David A. Ezra, District Judge for the U.S. District
    Court for Hawaii, Honolulu, sitting by designation.
    A defendant's motion for recusal under 28 U.S.C. y 455(a) should be
    granted if 'a reasonable person with µnowledge of all the facts would conclude that
    the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned.' United States v. Holland,
    
    519 F.3d 909
    , 913 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). Here, however, the district
    judge's negative comments were drawn from 'facts introduced or events occurring
    in the course of the current proceedings,' and therefore fail to support the recusal
    motion. Liteµy v. United States, 
    510 U.S. 540
    , 555-56 (1994).
    Although '[a] district court may permit withdrawal of a guilty plea prior to
    sentencing upon a showing by the defendant of any fair and just reason,' United
    States v. Signori, 
    844 F.2d 635
    , 637 (9th Cir. 1988), a district court can also
    consider whether withdrawal of that plea would result in prejudice to the
    government, see United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 
    471 F.2d 294
    , 294 (9th Cir.
    1973). Because one of the government's µey witnesses had died, granting
    Giannini's request to withdraw her plea would have resulted in prejudice to the
    government. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
    denied her motion to withdraw her plea.
    Finally, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Giannini's earlier
    plea agreement's reference to the previous 'investigation' unambiguously limited
    additional prosecution only for the specific crimes at issue in that case. See United
    2
    States v. Clarµ, 
    218 F.3d 1092
    , 1096 (9th Cir. 2000). The 2004 plea agreement
    could not immunize Giannini for the ongoing fraud in which she was engaged, and
    in which she continued until 2006. Moreover, as the district court found, 'the
    fraud for which the defendant was indicted . . . was not reasonably encompassed in
    the Northern District investigation' and 'includ[ing] the ü4 million fraud charged
    in this case is 'patently unreasonable'' (quoting 
    Clarµ, 218 F.3d at 1096-97
    ). The
    district court did not err in subsequently concluding that the present indictment was
    not barred by the earlier plea agreement.
    AFFIRMED.
    3
    FILED
    United States v. Giannini, No. 10-10274                                      JUL 05 2011
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    MURGUIA, Circuit Judge, dissenting:                                      U.S . CO U RT OF AP PE A LS
    I would reverse the district courtùs decision denying Defendant Appellant
    Gianniniùs motion to dismiss her indictment and remand for an evidentiary hearing.
    The plea agreement in this case is distinguishable from the agreement at issue in
    United States v. Clarµ, 
    218 F.3d 1092
    (9th Cir. 2000). Unliµe the Clarµ
    agreement, Ms. Gianniniùs agreement was oral and its terms were ambiguous.
    Specifically, the plea agreement was ambiguous on the issue of whether evidence
    uncovered in the investigation could be used as the basis for future charges in a
    separate proceeding. Such ambiguities are ordinarily read in the defendantùs favor.
    United States v. Transfiguracion, 
    442 F.3d 1222
    , 1228 (9th Cir. 2006). I would,
    therefore, remand for an evidentiary hearing on the meaning of the 2005 agreement
    and the scope of the underlying investigation. I concur with the remainder of the
    majorityùs decision.