Pamela Chyba v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC , 586 F. App'x 397 ( 2014 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION DEC 4 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PAMELA CHYBA, No. 13-55406
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:12-cv-02530-H-WMC
v.
MEMORANDUM*
GREEN TREE SERVICING, LLC, AKA
Green Tree, AKA Green Tree, LLC,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Marilyn L. Huff, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 18, 2014**
Before: LEAVY, FISHER, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Pamela Chyba appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing her
action alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), the
Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), and the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Practices Act (“RFDCPA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review de novo. Doe v. Abbott Labs., 571 F.3d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 2009). We may
affirm on any ground supported by the record. Campbell v. Wash. Dep’t of Soc. &
Health Servs., 671 F.3d 837, 842 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.
Dismissal of Chyba’s first and second causes of action under the FDCPA, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1692e(10), 1692g, and fourth cause of action under the RFDCPA,
California Civil Code section 1788.11, was proper because Chyba failed to allege
facts sufficient to show that Green Tree contacted Chyba, which would require
statutory notice, or that Green Tree used any false representation in connection
with the collection of a debt. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.”); Riggs v. Prober & Raphael, 681 F.3d
1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The [RFDCPA] mimics or incorporates by reference
the FDCPA’s requirements . . . and makes available the FDCPA’s remedies for
violations.”).
Dismissal of Chyba’s third cause of action under the FCRA was proper
because, in Chyba’s December 29, 2011 letter, which Chyba referenced in her
complaint, Chyba admitted that Green Tree was attempting to collect a debt, a
permissible purpose for accessing a consumer’s credit report. See 15 U.S.C.
2 13-55406
§ 1681b(a)(3)(A); Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 674-76 (9th Cir.
2010) (discussing the two requirements for establishing permissible purpose under
§ 1681b(a)(3)(A)); see also Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988
(9th Cir. 2001) (“The court need not . . . accept as true allegations that contradict
matters properly subject to judicial notice or by exhibit.”).
AFFIRMED.
3 13-55406