S. Thomas v. Leroy Baca , 695 F. App'x 325 ( 2017 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       AUG 16 2017
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    S. A. THOMAS, in both his individual and        No.    15-55399
    class representative capacities,
    D.C. No.
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            2:14-cv-07883-R-VBK
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    LEROY D. BACA; et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Manuel L. Real, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted June 7, 2017
    Pasadena, California
    Before: LIPEZ,** BEA, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
    S.A. Thomas appeals the district court’s dismissal of his First Amended
    Complaint (“FAC”). We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     and affirm. Because the parties are familiar with the factual and procedural
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Kermit V. Lipez, United States Circuit Judge for the
    First Circuit, sitting by designation.
    background, we repeat only those facts necessary to resolve the issues raised on
    appeal.
    1. Thomas contends that the district court abused its discretion when it
    denied his motion to recuse Judge Manuel L. Real. We disagree. In denying the
    motion, Judge S. James Otero reasonably determined that any alleged animosity
    held by Judge Real against Stephen Yagman, a former attorney acting as a
    paralegal for Thomas, did not amount to bias against Thomas, and that Thomas had
    failed to provide evidence of any bias by Judge Real against Marion Yagman,
    Thomas’s attorney. See United States v. Jacobs, 
    855 F.2d 652
    , 656 n.2 (9th Cir.
    1988) (per curiam) (citing United States v. Burt, 
    756 F.2d 1364
    , 1368 (9th Cir.
    1985)).
    2. Thomas also contends that the district court erred when it dismissed the
    FAC, which alleged constitutional claims and civil RICO1 claims. But, Thomas’s
    opening brief presented no argument or record citations to support his contention
    that the court erred when it dismissed his constitutional claims. Therefore, Thomas
    waived these claims on appeal. See Nilsson, Robbins, Dalgarn, Berliner, Carson
    & Wurst v. La. Hydrolec, 
    854 F.2d 1538
    , 1548 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam); Ninth
    Circuit Rule 28-1(b); Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 687 (2009) (holding that mere recitation of “bare elements” of a cause of
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    Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act, 
    18 U.S.C. § 1964
    .
    2
    action is insufficient to survive dismissal).
    And, the district court did not err when it dismissed Thomas’s civil RICO
    claims. The district court properly dismissed Thomas’s claims against Defendants
    in their official capacities, as those claims are properly made against the Los
    Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, see Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 
    491 U.S. 58
    , 71 (1989), and governmental entities cannot form the necessary criminal
    intent to commit a RICO violation, see Pedrina v. Chun, 
    97 F.3d 1296
    , 1300 (9th
    Cir. 1996). The district court also properly dismissed Thomas’s civil RICO claims
    against Defendants in their personal capacities. The FAC proffered legal
    conclusions in support of these claims rather than specific factual allegations. N.
    Star Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 
    720 F.2d 578
    , 583 (9th Cir. 1983) (“Because the
    complaint is vague, conclusory, and general and does not set forth any material
    facts in support of the allegations, these claims were properly dismissed.”).
    3. Thomas next contends that the district court abused its discretion when it
    denied his motion for class certification. The district court held that Thomas had
    not demonstrated the commonality required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
    23(a), and Thomas’s opening brief fails to identify which allegations in the FAC
    establish commonality. Therefore, Thomas has not demonstrated that reversal is
    warranted.
    4. Finally, Thomas contends that the district court erred when it refused to
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    refund his filing fee. Because Thomas’s opening brief did not present any
    argument or citations to the record to support this contention, the issue is also
    waived. See Nilsson, 
    854 F.2d at 1548
    .
    AFFIRMED.
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