Raymond Potlongo, Jr. v. Herff Jones, LLC ( 2018 )


Menu:
  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    OCT 23 2018
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    RAYMOND J. POTLONGO, JR.;                        No.   17-56815
    GRADS R US, INC.,
    D.C. No.
    Plaintiffs-Appellees,              8:17-cv-01624-JLS-DFM
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    HERFF JONES, LLC,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Josephine L. Staton, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted August 8, 2018
    Pasadena, California
    Before: GRABER, WARDLAW, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
    Herff Jones, LLC, appeals a district court order entering a preliminary
    injunction in favor of Raymond J. Potlongo, Jr. and Grads R Us, Inc. We have
    jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1292
    (a)(1), and we review for abuse of discretion.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    Pimentel v. Dreyfus, 
    670 F.3d 1096
    , 1105 (9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). We vacate
    the injunction and remand.
    Plaintiffs seeking preliminary injunctions must establish, among other
    things, that they are “likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary
    relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
    555 U.S. 7
    , 20 (2008). We look to
    federal law to determine whether a plaintiff has made such a showing. See Rent-A-
    Center, Inc. v. Canyon Television & Appliance Rental, Inc., 
    944 F.2d 597
    , 600–03
    (9th Cir. 1991) (applying federal standards to determine whether a preliminary
    injunction should issue, but applying state law to the merits of the underlying
    contract claim).
    On this record, Potlongo and Grads did not establish a likelihood of
    irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction for two reasons. First,
    there is no evidence that the status quo would have changed if an injunction had
    not issued. Potlongo avers that he is currently working for Herff Jones’s
    competitor, and the record does not show that he will lose that position unless and
    until Herff Jones secures and enforces a judgment against him. Second, Potlongo
    and Grads present evidence of only economic injury, which does not qualify as
    irreparable harm because it can be compensated by an award of money damages.
    Rent-A-Center, 
    944 F.2d at 603
    . Although the loss of one’s business can constitute
    2
    irreparable harm, see Am. Passage Media Corp. v. Cass Commc’ns, Inc., 
    750 F.2d 1470
    , 1474 (9th Cir. 1985), the record here does not demonstrate that the loss of
    Potlongo’s business is likely. Moreover, this case does not present circumstances
    similar to Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer, 
    757 F.3d 1053
     (9th Cir. 2014),
    Enyart v. National Conference of Bar Examiners, 
    630 F.3d 1153
     (9th Cir. 2011),
    or Chalk v. United States District Court, 
    840 F.2d 701
     (9th Cir. 1988). Unlike
    those cases, the record here demonstrates only a potential temporary job loss for
    Potlongo, which he has not shown is likely to occur. The district court’s
    conclusion as to irreparable harm thus lacked support from inferences that may be
    drawn from facts in the record. Pimentel, 670 F.3d at 1105.
    Because Potlongo and Grads did not establish a likelihood of irreparable
    harm in the absence of preliminary relief, an injunction should not have issued.
    Winter, 
    555 U.S. at 20
    .
    VACATED and REMANDED. Costs on appeal are awarded to Herff
    Jones, LLC.
    3
    FILED
    Potlongo v. Herff Jones, No. 17-56815
    OCT 23 2018
    WARDLAW, Circuit Judge, dissenting:                                     MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to vacate the injunction.
    The majority concludes there is no irreparable harm because, first, the record does
    not show that Potlongo would lose his job with Herff Jones’s competitor absent the
    injunction, and second, Potlongo and Grads R Us, Inc. present evidence of
    economic injury only. It reasons that although the loss of one’s business can
    constitute irreparable harm, the “record does not demonstrate the loss of
    Potlongo’s business is likely.”
    But in reaching this conclusion, the majority fails to apply the correct
    standards of review to the district court’s factual findings and conclusions of law.
    We review the district court’s factual findings under the clearly erroneous
    standard. United States v. Hinkson, 
    585 F.3d 1247
    , 1259–60 (9th Cir. 2009). We
    review its legal conclusions de novo. 
    Id.
     And we review the district court’s grant
    of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. 
    Id.
    Turning first to the factual findings, the district court found “[a]fter
    reviewing the Agreement and Herff Jones’ own plea for injunction in the Indiana
    arbitration proceeding,” that the “restrictions would infringe on Potlongo’s
    livelihood sufficiently to create a likelihood of irreparable injury.” Based on the
    evidence before it, the district court found that an injunction would likely issue
    1
    from the Indiana arbitration, which would result in Potlongo’s loss of livelihood
    for four years. This finding is a mixed question of fact and law, and it is entitled to
    deference on appeal unless the district court’s conclusion was based on clearly
    erroneous factual findings. Hinkson, 
    585 F.3d at 1259
    ; Darensburg v. Metro.
    Transp. Comm’n, 
    636 F.3d 511
    , 518–19 (9th Cir. 2011).
    But the majority does not even begin to explain why the district court’s
    factual findings in this respect were clearly erroneous. Rather, the majority
    engages in de novo review of the entire record, summarily concluding for itself
    that “[o]n this record, Potlongo and [Grads R Us, Inc.] did not establish a
    likelihood of irreparable harm.” The majority does not even attempt to explain
    why it thinks an injunction is not likely to issue in the Indiana arbitration, nor does
    it explain how the district court erred in concluding that the loss of Potlongo’s
    livelihood and business are likely. Because the majority’s conclusions run
    contrary to the district court’s factual findings, and those findings have not been
    shown to be clearly erroneous, reversal is improper.
    The district court concluded as a matter of law that such loss of livelihood
    constitutes irreparable injury, as Potlongo “does not have an adequate remedy at
    law.” In reaching this legal conclusion, the district court did not err. Our circuit’s
    precedent is clear that loss of livelihood and the attendant effects of lost
    employment may constitute irreparable harm. Am. Passage Media Corp. v. Cass
    2
    Commc’ns, Inc., 
    750 F.2d 1470
    , 1474 (9th Cir. 1985); Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v.
    Jewell, 
    747 F.3d 1073
    , 1092 (9th Cir. 2014); Nelson v. Nat’l Aeronautics and
    Space Admin., 
    530 F.3d 865
    , 882 (9th Cir. 2008), petition for rehearing en banc
    denied, 
    568 F.3d 1028
     (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d on other grounds, 
    562 U.S. 134
    (2011).
    Finally, nowhere does the majority identify just how the district court abused
    its discretion in issuing the injunction. I would affirm the district court’s grant of a
    preliminary injunction against Herff Jones.
    3