Rakesh Dhingra v. United States ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 26 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RAKESH DHINGRA, No. 19-16957
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:19-cv-00360-JCS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Joseph C. Spero, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**
Submitted July 19, 2021***
Before: SCHROEDER, SILVERMAN, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Rakesh Dhingra appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
his action alleging constitutional violations arising from the application of the
International Megan’s Law (“IML”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(c).
***
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
§ 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,
656 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Dhingra’s action because Dhingra
failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to
state a plausible claim for relief); see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.
v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993) (“[A] law that is neutral and of
general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest
even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious
practice.”); United States v. Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d 999, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 2012)
(setting forth the requirements for substantive and procedural due process claims
and concluding that individuals convicted of serious sex offenses do not have a
fundamental right to be free from sex offender registration requirements).
The district court correctly found that to the extent Dhingra’s claims rest on
the implied invalidity of his criminal conviction, they are Heck-barred. See Heck
v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff
would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence . . . the
complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the
conviction or sentence has already been invalidated”).
2 19-16957
We reject as without merit Dhingra’s contentions regarding Doe v. Kerry,
No. 16-cv-0654-PJH, 2016 WL 5339804 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2016).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
Dhingra’s request to stay this appeal, set forth in the opening brief, is denied.
AFFIRMED.
3 19-16957