Michael Sweets v. Kilolo Kijakazi ( 2021 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        AUG 9 2021
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    MICHAEL CHARLES SWEETS,                         No. 20-55997
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 3:19-cv-01816-BLM
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner
    of Social Security,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of California
    Barbara L. Major, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
    Submitted August 5, 2021**
    Pasadena, California
    Before: PAEZ, CALLAHAN, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
    Michael Sweets appeals the district court’s order affirming the decision of an
    administrative law judge (ALJ) denying disability insurance benefits under Title II
    of the Social Security Act. We review the district court’s decision de novo and
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    “reverse only if the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence in
    the record as a whole or if the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard.” Molina v.
    Astrue, 
    674 F.3d 1104
    , 1110 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted), superseded by
    regulation on other grounds. “[W]hen the evidence is susceptible to more than
    one rational interpretation, we must uphold the ALJ’s findings if they are
    supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record.” 
    Id. at 1111
    . We have
    jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     and affirm.
    Sweets argues that the ALJ: (1) misapplied the Medical-Vocational
    Guidelines (the grids); (2) did not provide “a reasonable explanation using
    evidence that Sweets can carry, lift, and move objects in a job that requires
    frequent[ly] lifting 25 pounds and 50 pounds occasionally”; and (3) “provided his
    own limitations” without “adequate explanation of the record, without specific
    support from a medical source, and with no testimony from a medical expert.”
    However, substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s assessment of Sweets’s
    residual functional capacity (RFC), application of the grids, and reliance on the
    testimony of a vocational expert (VE). The limitations of the RFC, which allows
    for medium work, are supported by substantial evidence, including the exertional
    and non-exertional limitations identified by accepted medical sources, here, Drs.
    Kanner, Post, Taylor-Holmes, and Sabourin. See Ford v. Saul, 
    950 F.3d 1141
    ,
    1149 (9th Cir. 2020); 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1545
    (a). Given his capacity for medium
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    work, Sweets fails to establish that the grids would direct a finding of
    disability. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App’x 2, §§ 202.00-203.31. Because
    the grids did not direct a finding of disability and because Sweets exhibited a mix
    of exertional and non-exertional limitations, the ALJ correctly turned to the
    expertise of the VE. Lounsburry v. Barnhart, 
    468 F.3d 1111
    , 1115–16 (9th Cir.
    2006). The ALJ gave the VE all the limitations supported by substantial evidence
    and reasonably relied on the testimony of the VE to conclude that Sweets could
    adjust to other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy.
    Ghanim v. Colvin, 
    763 F.3d 1154
    , 1166 (9th Cir. 2014).
    Sweets also argues that the ALJ failed to address his impaired vision and
    hearing loss. However, the ALJ considered the opinion of Dr. Kanner, who found
    that Sweets’s “vision is well corrected with glasses.” As for Sweets’s hearing, the
    ALJ addressed Dr. Kanner’s and Dr. Alello’s findings, and concluded that “he
    should avoid exposure to loud noise.”
    Sweets contends that “[t]he ALJ’s decision does not address Sweets’[s]
    pain.” But the ALJ considered Dr. Berry’s notes regarding Sweets’s pain and
    concluded that Dr. Berry’s opinion “is without significant objective support from
    objective medical records, is very inconsistent with other evaluations in the file
    done by orthopedist specialists, and is overly restrictive in light of the remainder of
    the file and even the claimant’s own testimony.” The ALJ also acknowledged Dr.
    3
    Kanner’s “lower back pain” diagnosis, but noted the same doctor’s finding that
    Sweets “would be able to lift and carry fifty pounds occasionally and twenty-five
    pounds occasionally with equivalent limitations on pushing and pulling. He could
    sit or stand and/or walk for six hours in an eight-hour workday.”
    Finally, Sweets asserts that the ALJ erred by “independently dismiss[ing] the
    effect of Sweets’[s] [m]edication.” However, Sweets fails to offer any objective
    evidence of side effects. He points only to his own testimony. Therefore, the ALJ
    was not required to discuss the alleged side effects in the first place. See Bayliss v.
    Barnhart, 
    427 F.3d 1211
    , 1217 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding no error where “the ALJ
    took into account those limitations for which there was record support that did not
    depend on Bayliss’s subjective complaints.”).
    AFFIRMED.
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