Joel Holmes v. Maggie Miller-Stout ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 30 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOEL CHRISTOPHER HOLMES, No. 18-35197
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:17-cv-05145-RJB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MAGGIE MILLER-STOUT; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Robert J. Bryan, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 27, 2018**
Before: CANBY, TASHIMA, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Joel Christopher Holmes, a former Washington state prisoner, appeals pro se
from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
First Amendment retaliation and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act (“RLUIPA”) claims related to his filing of a kiosk message to prison staff. We
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Ford v. City of
Yakima, 706 F.3d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 2013). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Holmes’s First
Amendment retaliation claims against defendants Douglas and Miller-Stout
because those claims are barred by the statute of limitations. See Wash. Rev. Code
4.16.080(2) (providing three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions);
Canatella v. Van De Kamp, 486 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2007) (forum state’s
personal injury statute of limitations and tolling laws apply to § 1983 actions).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on the basis of
qualified immunity on Holmes’s First Amendment retaliation claim against
defendant Lawrence because Holmes failed to establish that Lawrence’s conduct
violated Holmes’s clearly established constitutional rights. See Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects
government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011) (courts should
not define clearly established law “at a high level of generality”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Holmes’s
RLUIPA claim for damages because RLUIPA does not authorize a claim for
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damages against state officials sued in their official or individual capacities. See
Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1031 (9th Cir. 2015) (recognizing that RLUIPA
does not authorize suits for money damages against state officials in their official
or individual capacities).
The district court properly dismissed Holmes’s § 1983 and RLUIPA claims
for injunctive relief as moot because Holmes was released from Washington State
Department of Corrections custody in 2014 and there is no reasonable expectation
that defendants will violate his rights in the future. See id. (holding that former
inmate’s RLUIPA claims for injunctive relief were moot given inmate’s release
from prison).
We do not consider issues not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in
the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
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