The Travelers Indemnity Co. v. New Orleans Louisiana Saints ( 2016 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    MAY 19 2016
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    THE TRAVELERS INDEMNITY                          No. 14-55838
    COMPANY, a Connecticut corporation,
    D.C. No. 8:13-cv-01998-JLS-JPR
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.                                              MEMORANDUM*
    NEW ORLEANS LOUISIANA SAINTS,
    L.L.C., a Texas limited liability company,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Josephine L. Staton, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted May 3, 2016
    Pasadena, California
    Before: FISHER, M. SMITH, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
    The Travelers Indemnity Company (Travelers) filed an action against the
    New Orleans Louisiana Saints (Saints) for reimbursement, subrogation, and
    indemnity related to a workers’ compensation claim that Travelers settled on
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    behalf of an insured, the Kansas City Chiefs. In its complaint, Travelers alleged
    that an injured football player, Jim Rourke, played for both the Saints and the
    Chiefs during the last year of his exposure to a cumulative injury. Travelers prayed
    for “that portion of the settlement . . . which represents the percentage of time that
    Mr. Rourke was employed by the Saints during his last year of injurious exposure,”
    damages under a subrogation theory, and equitable indemnity. The district court
    dismissed the claims on the grounds that the California Workers’ Compensation
    Appeals Board (WCAB) had exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute. It also
    declined to hear Travelers’ declaratory judgment action and denied leave to amend.
    We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
    1.    California’s workers’ compensation statute confines recovery of benefits for
    a cumulative injury to the employer that employed the employee during the last
    year of the cumulative injury. See Cal. Lab. Code § 5500.5. If there is more than
    one employer in that final year, the claimant “may elect to proceed against any one
    or more of the employers.” 
    Id. § 5500.5(c).
    Any employers held liable are jointly
    and severally liable for the award, 
    id., and “may
    institute proceedings before the
    appeals board for the purpose of determining an apportionment of liability or right
    of contribution.” 
    Id. § 5500.5(e).
    2
    “In the event that none of the employers during the . . . periods of . . .
    cumulative injury are insured for workers’ compensation coverage,” liability is
    pushed back to the last employer who was insured during the period of cumulative
    injury. 
    Id. § 5500.5(a).
    As a general matter, the WCAB has “exclusive authority to hear claims
    ‘[f]or the recovery of [workers’] compensation, or concerning any right or liability
    arising out of or incidental thereto.” U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Lee Invs. LLC, 
    641 F.3d 1126
    , 1134 (9th Cir. 2011) (alterations in original) (quoting Cal. Lab. Code
    § 5300(a)). A limited exception exists where a plaintiff is pursuing a “claim for
    damages against an uninsured employer” under the push-back scenario described
    in the third paragraph of subsection 5500.5(a). Graphic Arts Mut. Ins. Co. v. Time
    Travel Int’l, Inc., 
    23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864
    , 870 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
    Here, although Travelers characterizes its claim as one for “reimbursement
    and subrogation” under subsection 5500.5(a) and alleges that the Saints were
    unlawfully uninsured during the relevant time period, it cannot state a claim for
    3
    reimbursement and subrogation under that subsection.1 According to Travelers’
    own pleading, the Chiefs employed Rourke during his last year of exposure to the
    cumulative injury. Thus, even under Travelers’ version of the facts, it was not
    liable “as a result of” the Saints’ alleged failure to secure workers’ compensation
    insurance pursuant to the third paragraph of subsection 5500.5(a). Travelers may
    well have claims for apportionment and contribution pursuant to subsections
    5500.5(c) and (e), but exclusive jurisdiction lies with the WCAB, and the district
    court properly dismissed the case. See U.S. Fid. & Guar. 
    Co., 641 F.3d at 1133
    .
    2.    “[D]istrict courts’ decisions about the propriety of hearing declaratory
    judgment actions . . . should be reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Wilton v. Seven
    Falls Co., 
    515 U.S. 277
    , 289–90 (1995). “A district court should avoid needless
    determination of state law issues; it should discourage litigants from filing
    declaratory actions as a means of forum shopping; and it should avoid duplicative
    litigation.” Huth v. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest, 
    298 F.3d 800
    , 803 (9th Cir.
    2002).
    1
    We do not view In re George, 
    361 F.3d 1157
    (9th Cir. 2004), and In re
    Lorber Industries of California, 
    564 F.3d 1098
    (9th Cir. 2009), as controlling this
    issue. In those cases, liability had been pushed back to the state’s Uninsured
    Employers Fund due to the bankruptcy debtors’ undisputed failure to carry
    workers’ compensation insurance. The only question before the court was how to
    treat the reimbursement claim as a debt of the bankruptcy estate. They say nothing
    about the nature of Travelers’ claim.
    4
    Travelers sought a declaratory judgment that the Saints’ insurance policy did
    not constitute workers’ compensation coverage. In a similar case filed in the state
    system, however, a workers’ compensation judge made a ruling adverse to
    Travelers, determining that the Saints’ policy was appropriate insurance. In this
    context, the district court concluded that Travelers was forum shopping, as it
    sought a declaratory judgment in an “attempt to have that interpretation enforced in
    ongoing workers’ compensation proceedings” before the WCAB. That conclusion
    was reasonable.
    3.    The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend the
    complaint. See Airs Aromatics, LLC v. Opinion Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand
    Mgmt., Inc., 
    744 F.3d 595
    , 600 (9th Cir. 2014). “A district court may dismiss a
    complaint without leave to amend if ‘amendment would be futile.’” 
    Id. (quoting Carrico
    v. City & County of San Francisco, 
    656 F.3d 1002
    , 1008 (9th Cir. 2011)).
    “A party cannot amend pleadings to ‘directly contradic[t] an earlier assertion made
    in the same proceeding.’” 
    Id. (alteration in
    original) (quoting Russell v. Rolfs, 
    893 F.2d 1033
    , 1037 (9th Cir. 1990)).
    Given leave to amend, Travelers would be unable to allege a set of facts
    showing it was liable “as a result of” the Saints’ alleged failure to carry lawful
    insurance, or that it would otherwise be entitled to “reimbursement and
    5
    subrogation” from the Saints. Cal. Lab. Code § 5500.5(a). Even considering the
    additional facts related to Rourke’s NFL career after 1986, Travelers does not
    dispute that the Chiefs (and only the Chiefs) employed Rourke again in 1987, more
    than a year after he played his final game for the Saints. Travelers also concedes
    that the WCAB had jurisdiction over the Chiefs.
    The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
    The Appellee’s Motion to Take Judicial Notice (Dkt. 18) is DENIED.
    6