Christopher Watson v. City of Bonney Lake , 506 F. App'x 555 ( 2013 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JAN 23 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
CHRISTOPHER J WATSON, No. 11-35641
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:10-cv-05692-BHS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CITY OF BONNEY LAKE,
Defendant,
and
MARCUS KOEHN, in his individual
capacity and ROBERT KOCHER, in his
individual capacity,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Benjamin H. Settle, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted July 11, 2012
Seattle, Washington
Before: REINHARDT, KLEINFELD, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Plaintiff Christopher Watson appeals the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of defendants, Officers Koehn and Kocher, on his claim that the
officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they used force to enter his
home without a warrant. We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary
judgment and we must reverse if, when viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to Watson, there remains a genuine dispute of material fact. Martin v.
City of Oceanside, 360 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 2004).
The officers approached Watson outside of his home and placed him under
arrest, believing at the time that he was an individual named “Jeff Ross,” for whom
there was an outstanding warrant for a misdemeanor offense. After receiving an
initial verification of his identity, the officers unhandcuffed Watson and instructed
him to retrieve his driver’s license from his home to prove that he was not, in fact,
Jeff Ross. Watson’s evidence and the defendants’ evidence differ on what
happened next. Because the case was decided on summary judgment, we must
review de novo taking the facts most favorable to Watson. According to Watson’s
version of the facts, he entered his home and grabbed his wallet, which was on a
table near the door. He stood on the threshold of his home, attempting to exit with
his wallet in his hands, but his egress was obstructed by the officers who stood
approximately two feet from the entrance of the house. After a brief discussion
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with the officers as they stood outside his home, Watson was physically pushed
into his home by Koehn and the officers entered and searched the house.
“[T]he most basic constitutional rule in this area is that searches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per
se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically
established and well delineated exceptions. The exceptions are jealously and
carefully drawn, and there must be a showing by those who seek exemption . . .
that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative.” Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted). The officers’ sole justification for their warrantless entry into Watson’s
home is the exception recognized in Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1 (1982).
Under Chrisman, an officer who arrests an individual outside of his home may
accompany the arrestee if he enters his home to obtain identification, and the
officer has a “right to remain literally at [the arrestee’s] elbow at all times.” Id. at
6. Because the Supreme Court recognized that “[e]very arrest must be presumed to
present a risk of danger to the arresting officer,” this exception was crafted to
satisfy “[t]he officer’s need to ensure his own safety[,] as well as the integrity of
the arrest,” id. at 7, when the arrestee is permitted to reenter his home.
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Under the facts as presented by Watson, construed in the light most
favorable to him, the officers did not accompany him into his home, but rather,
waited until he had effectively exited before attempting to gain entry. See, e.g.,
United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976) (holding that the doorway of
the home is a public place for purposes of the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment). Under Chrisman, the officers would have been permitted to enter
the house with Watson, or even to enter after him while he remained in the home.
There is, however, no exception to the Fourth Amendment that would permit the
officers to enter the house of an arrestee after he has already exited, nor is there an
exception that would permit the officers to force an arrestee into his home in order
to justify their warrantless entry. Cf. United States v. Whitten, 706 F.2d 1000,
1015 (1983) (“[The] arresting officers [may not] lead the accused from place to
place and use his presence in each location to justify a search incident to the
arrest.”) (quoting United States v. Mason, 523 F.2d 1122, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
Under Watson’s version of the event, the officers’ warrantless entry constituted an
illegal search under the Fourth Amendment.
When determining whether the use of force by the police is unreasonable,
we balance the factors justifying the use of force against the degree of
governmental intrusion. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). Here,
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under Watson’s version of the facts, the officers entered Watson’s home without a
warrant and in the absence of any valid exception to the warrant requirement.
They did so by using force against an individual that the officers have not
contended posed any threat to their safety, who was suspected of, at most, a
misdemeanor, and who did not resist arrest or attempt to flee. The amount of force
used was sufficient to knock Watson off balance and backwards and down into his
kitchen stove. We cannot say that, as a matter of law, the force used by the officers
was reasonable under these circumstances.
The clearly established prong of the qualified immunity analysis is intended
to recognize that “government officials . . . generally are shielded from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). “To show that the right in question here
was ‘clearly established,’ [Watson] need not establish that [the officers’] behavior
had been previously declared unconstitutional, only that the unlawfulness was
apparent in light of preexisting law.” Jensen v. City of Oxnard, 145 F.3d 1078,
1085 (1998) (quoting Blueford v. Prunty, 108 F.3d 251, 254 (9th Cir.1997))
(internal quotation marks omitted). With regard to the warrantless entry, “the
burden is on the government to demonstrate exigent circumstances that overcome
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the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless home entries.”
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750 (1984). Under the facts as presented by
Watson, it would have been clear to reasonable officers that the Chrisman
exception did not apply because Watson was no longer in his home and the
underlying law enforcement needs that justified the Chrisman exception had
dissipated. Similarly, given the lack of governmental interest justifying the use of
force, it would have been clear to reasonable officers that even the limited amount
of force they employed was unreasonable. See Guite v. Wright, 147 F.3d 747, 750
(8th Cir. 1998) (officers used excessive force when they pushed an individual up
against an open door when he refused to consent to their entry); see also Liberal v.
Estrada, 632 F.3d 1064, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 2011) (officers used excessive force
when they pushed an individual against a police car).
There exists a genuine dispute of material facts that, if resolved in Watson’s
favor, would allow him to prevail on both his warrantless entry and excessive force
claims. The officers are not entitled to qualified immunity on either claim if
Watson’s factual account is accepted, thus summary judgment was improperly
granted. We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
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