Marco Garcia v. United States , 550 F. App'x 506 ( 2013 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION DEC 24 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARCO ANTONIO GARCIA, an No. 11-56982
individual,
D.C. No. 8:09-cv-01169-DOC-
Plaintiff - Appellee, RNB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant,
And
RAYMOND A. ESCOBAR, AKA Ray
Escobar,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 3, 2013
Pasadena, California
Before: D.W. NELSON, WARDLAW, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
In this Bivens action, Marco Antonio Garcia asserts Fourth Amendment
claims against Immigration and Customs Enforcement Special Agent Ray Escobar,
arising from Garcia’s apparently wrongful arrest and indictment as a courier in a
global money-laundering conspiracy. Escobar appeals the district court’s denial of
qualified immunity on his motion for summary judgment. We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
1. The district court did not err in holding that there was a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether probable cause supported Garcia’s arrest.
Among the disputed factual issues correctly identified by the district court are:
whether anyone actually identified Garcia before his arrest; whether Escobar made
a reckless or deliberate misrepresentation by listing Detective Moreno as having
identified Garcia; and whether Escobar recklessly or deliberately withheld
exculpatory information by excluding relevant photographs from his report. A
genuine dispute exists as to whether a prudent person would have concluded that
there was a fair probability that the courier was Garcia. Peng v. Mei Chin Penghu,
335 F.3d 970, 976 (9th Cir. 2003).
2. The district court did not err in holding that Escobar failed to show
that the evidentiary presumption that a criminal prosecution results from the
prosecutor’s independent determination of probable cause renders Escobar
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immune. Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2004). A
genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether Escobar engaged in reckless or
deliberate misrepresentations or omissions. Galbraith v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 307
F.3d 1119, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002). There is also a genuine dispute as to whether any
misrepresentations or omissions were material to the prosecutor’s probable cause
determination. Id. Although the prosecutor also relied on a report submitted by
the Drug Enforcement Administration, that report in turn relied heavily on
Escobar’s report to identify Garcia as the courier.
3. The district court did not err in holding that the law was clearly
established. An objectively reasonable officer would have known that making
reckless or deliberate misrepresentations or omissions in a report to a prosecutor,
which resulted in an arrest without probable cause, violates the arrestee’s Fourth
Amendment rights. Id.; Barlow v. Ground, 943 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1991).
4. The district court did not err by rejecting Escobar’s argument that
executing a valid arrest warrant entitles him to qualified immunity for preparing
the prosecution report. See Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1198 (9th Cir.
1997) (“Officers who in good faith relied upon . . . reports may well be able to
assert a successful qualified immunity defense . . . . The fabricators of a false story
that misled them cannot.”).
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AFFIRMED.
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