Jaime Centeno v. Merrick Garland ( 2022 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
APR 21 2022
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JAIME CENTENO, No. 21-71031
Petitioner, Agency No. A036-907-798
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted April 15, 2022
San Francisco, California
Before: BYBEE and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges, and BOLTON,** District Judge.
Jamie Centeno, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions this court for review
of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision summarily affirming the
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Susan R. Bolton, United States District Judge for the
District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of deferral of removal under the Convention
Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and
deny the petition.
1. In order to be eligible for relief under the CAT, the petitioner bears
the burden of establishing: (1) it is “more likely than not that the alien will be
tortured upon return to his homeland”; and (2) there is “sufficient state action
involved in that torture.” Benedicto v. Garland, 12 F.4th 1049, 1063 (9th Cir.
2021) (quoting Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1033 (9th Cir. 2014)).
“Torture is defined as ‘an extreme form of cruel and inhuman treatment’ that is
‘specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering.’”
Lopez v. Sessions, 901 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.18(a)). Denial of relief under the CAT is reviewed for substantial evidence.
See Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1692 (2020) (citations omitted).
The IJ found that Centeno failed to show that he would more likely than not
be tortured by a cartel or in a Mexican mental health facility with the acquiescence
of the Mexican government. These findings were supported by substantial
evidence. First, the IJ’s analysis of Centeno’s risk of torture at the hands of a cartel
was informed by his ability to relocate to an area outside of the geographic scope
of Los Juniors and the Arellano Felix Organization (AFO) and the fact that
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Centeno is capable of living independently. The record does not compel a contrary
conclusion. See Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019).
Country conditions evidence indicates that the AFO is a “regional tollgate
organization . . . based in . . . Tijuana.” Centeno also testified to having lived
independently in Mexico and that while he would sometimes forget to take his
medication, he would take it when he started to feel bad. Second, the record does
not compel the conclusion that Centeno will be institutionalized if removed.
Centeno’s mental health expert noted that he is “amenable to treatment and
compliant with medication in detention,” and Centeno previously lived in Mexico
with symptoms of Schizophrenia and Major Depression and was not
institutionalized. Even if Centeno were institutionalized, he failed to show that
anyone in a Mexican mental health facility would act with specific intent to torture.
See Villegas v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 984, 988–89 (9th Cir. 2008). Centeno points to
country conditions evidence describing the poor conditions in such facilities, but
this evidence does not compel the conclusion that staff or the Mexican government
would specifically intend to torture patients. Rather, this evidence suggests that
such conditions are the result of underfunding and a lack of understanding of
psychiatric illnesses, and that the Mexican government continues to work toward
improving such conditions.
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2. Centeno also argues that the panel should remand because the IJ failed
to consider all relevant evidence and failed to provide an adequate statement of
reasons. Centeno fails to point to any indication that the IJ did not consider all of
the evidence, see Cole v. Holder, 659 F.3d 762, 771–72 (9th Cir. 2011), and
instead argues that there exists a “significant and material disconnect” between the
evidence and the IJ’s findings. Since we conclude that the IJ’s findings are
supported by substantial evidence, Centeno’s contention is unavailing. Finally, the
IJ provided clear reasons for its conclusion that the government would not
acquiesce in Centeno’s alleged torture. See Castillo v. I.N.S., 951 F.2d 1117, 1121
(9th Cir. 1991).
PETITION DENIED. Petitioner’s motion for stay of removal is also
DENIED.
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