Arthur Ezor v. Jim McDonnell ( 2022 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 21 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
A. EDWARD EZOR, No. 21-55117
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:19-cv-08851-JVS-AGR
v.
MEMORANDUM*
JIM McDONNELL; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
JAMES V. SELNA; ALICIA G.
ROSENBERG,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
James V. Selna, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 11, 2022**
Before: McKEOWN, CHRISTEN, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.
A. Edward Ezor appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging various federal and state law claims. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Engebretson v.
Mahoney, 724 F.3d 1034, 1037 (9th Cir. 2013) (dismissal on the basis of
immunity); Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004) (dismissal on
the basis of Rooker-Feldman). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Ezor’s claims contesting the validity of
the probate case judgment and writ of execution because they are a “forbidden de
facto appeal” of state court proceedings and raise issues that are “inextricably
intertwined” with those proceedings. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1158, 1163 (9th
Cir. 2003) (discussing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine); see also Cooper v. Ramos,
704 F.3d 772, 779 (9th Cir. 2012) (claims are “inextricably intertwined” for
purposes of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine where “the relief requested in the federal
action would effectively reverse the state court decision or void its ruling” (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)). Contrary to Ezor’s contention, the
extrinsic fraud exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is inapplicable.
Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2004).
The district court properly dismissed on the basis of absolute immunity
Ezor’s claims contesting the implementation of the writ of execution and alleging
that the property sale was conducted in an unlawful manner. See Engebretson, 724
F.3d at 1039 (“[O]fficials charged with executing facially valid court orders enjoy
2 21-55117
absolute immunity from § 1983 liability for conduct prescribed by those orders.”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ezor’s motion to
recuse District Judge Selna and Magistrate Judge Rosenberg because Ezor failed to
demonstrate that a reasonable person would believe that the judges’ impartiality
could be questioned. See United States v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d 1450, 1453 (9th
Cir. 1997) (setting forth standard of review and discussing standard for recusal).
We reject as meritless Ezor’s contention that the district court erred in
denying as moot his motion to disqualify defendant Page’s counsel.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
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