Paul Moseley v. Citimortgage Inc , 564 F. App'x 300 ( 2014 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 18 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PAUL A. MOSELEY, No. 12-35090
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:11-cv-05349-RJB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CITIMORTGAGE INC,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Robert J. Bryan, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 10, 2014**
Before: PREGERSON, LEAVY, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Paul A. Moseley appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment
in his action challenging his mortgage obligations. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d
1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), and we affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Moseley’s various
federal and state law claims because Moseley failed to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether the loan transaction at issue was fraudulent, void, or
subject to rescission, and whether defendant violated any of its legal obligations
regarding loan disclosures or loan servicing. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986) (party opposing summary judgment must come
forward with significant probative evidence as to each element of the claim on
which it bears the burden of proof); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 n.11 (1986) (averments in a pleading are not sufficient to
create a triable dispute of fact to defeat summary judgment).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by partially granting
defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees because the Deed of Trust entitled it to
attorney’s fees as the prevailing party in any action regarding its terms. See
Childress v. Darby Lumber, Inc., 357 F.3d 1000, 1011 (9th Cir. 2004) (setting
forth standard of review); see also King v. W. United Assur. Co., 997 P.2d 1007,
1010 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (prevailing party in an action brought to declare
invalid the provisions of a promissory note is entitled to contractual attorney’s
fees). Moreover, the district court declined to impose attorney’s fees that would
require a finding that Moseley’s claims were frivolous or pursued in bad faith.
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Moseley’s contentions regarding opposing counsel’s alleged submission of
fabricated evidence and other improper conduct; the district court’s denial of oral
argument before granting summary judgment; the application of the Supremacy
Clause and the Equal Protection Clause; and the level of lenience owed to him as a
pro se litigant, are unpersuasive.
Moseley’s “Motion to Vacate Summary Judgment and Renew Plaintiff’s
Motion to Compel for Admission of Documents,” filed on March 22, 2013, and his
request for attorney’s fees and costs incurred in this appeal, set forth in his reply
brief, are denied.
Defendant’s request for attorney’s fees and costs incurred on appeal, set
forth in its answering brief, is denied without prejudice. See Fed. R. App. P. 38.
AFFIRMED.
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