United States v. Mario Bernadel , 490 F. App'x 22 ( 2012 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUL 23 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 10-10119
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 2:08-cr-00256-SMM-1
v.
MEMORANDUM *
MARIO GERARD BERNADEL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Stephen M. McNamee, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted June 13, 2012
San Francisco, California
Before: HUG, RAWLINSON, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
Mario G. Bernadel appeals his conviction by jury of one count of conspiracy
to commit mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1349, 1341, 1343, and 1344 (Count 1), six counts of mail fraud in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Counts 2–7), seven counts of wire fraud in violation of 18
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
U.S.C. § 1343 (Counts 8–14), one count of bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1344 (Count 15), and four counts of money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1957(a) (Counts 18, 19, 20, and 43). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, and we affirm.
(1) The government presented sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, to find
Bernadel guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of conspiracy to commit mail fraud,
wire fraud, and bank fraud (Count 1). See United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158,
1163–64 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). The evidence introduced at trial supported the
conclusion that Bernadel worked together with Amanda Adorno, April Lucero, and
other co-defendants to recruit straw buyers with good credit scores and falsify the
information on the buyers’ loan applications for the agreed-upon purpose of
deceiving financial institutions in order to get home loans approved, that they used
the United States mails and wires to carry out this scheme to defraud, and that one
or more overt acts listed in the indictment was taken in furtherance of the illegal
purpose. See United States v. Alonso, 48 F.3d 1536, 1543 (9th Cir. 1995); see also
United States v. Rizk, 660 F.3d 1125, 1134–35 (9th Cir. 2011); Sanford v.
MemberWorks, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 557 (9th Cir. 2010).
2
There was also sufficient evidence to convict Bernadel on a Pinkerton theory
of liability for the substantive counts of mail fraud (Counts 2–7), wire fraud
(Counts 8–14), and bank fraud (Count 15). See Pinkerton v. United States, 328
U.S. 640, 646–48 (1946). Although the government did not present evidence
directly tying Bernadel to the specific transactions that served as the basis for
Counts 2–12 and 14–15,1 there was adequate evidence to support the conclusion
that these transactions were reasonably foreseeable acts committed by co-
defendants Adorno and Lucero in furtherance of the same overall conspiracy, see
United States v. Bingham, 653 F.3d 983, 997 (9th Cir. 2011), and that Bernadel
“knew, or had reason to know, that his benefits were probably dependent upon the
success of the entire operation,” United States v. Fernandez, 388 F.3d 1199, 1226
(9th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Duran, 189 F.3d 1071, 1080 (9th Cir.
1999)). Regardless whether, as Bernadel asserts, he and his co-conspirators were
in some sense competing real estate investors, the evidence established that there
was “an interdependent relationship between [their] fraudulent activities.” United
States v. Olano, 62 F.3d 1180, 1194 (9th Cir. 1995). Bernadel helped facilitate the
transactions alleged in Counts 2–12 and 14–15 by, for example, (1) teaching
1
The jury could rationally conclude from the evidence that Bernadel was
directly involved in the transaction that served as the basis for Count 13, a wire
transfer of loan proceeds used to purchase Bernadel’s own personal property.
3
Adorno and Lucero how to carry out their own “cash-back” deals by recruiting
straw buyers with good credit scores, setting up a limited liability company (LLC),
getting the target property appraised at an amount higher than the seller’s asking
price, and using co-defendant and escrow agent Chris Bartlemus for the closing,
(2) appearing at the closing of Adorno’s first cash-back deal and assuring the straw
buyers Adorno had recruited that the transaction was “completely legal,” (3)
providing Adorno and Lucero with a joint venture agreement to use with straw
buyers, (4) meeting with Adorno and Lucero to discuss potential sellers, and (5)
serving as the seller in one of Adorno’s cash-back deals. Further, Bernadel
benefitted substantially, albeit indirectly, from Adorno’s and Lucero’s deals: he
sold at least four of his own properties to straw buyers that Adorno and Lucero
recruited, and he borrowed $90,000 from Adorno that he had reason to know she
had received from the illegal scheme.
The government also presented sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that Bernadel was responsible, as either a principal or
an aider and abettor, for the transactions that served as the basis for money
laundering Counts 18, 19, 20, and 43. The jury could rationally conclude that
Bernadel was directly responsible for the cash-back transfers alleged in Counts 19
and 20 from Security Title to, respectively, JC Development (co-defendant John
4
Webber’s company) and Compass Development (Bernadel’s company), as these
transfers involved proceeds from a fraudulently obtained loan used by straw buyer
Christine Shiplett to purchase Bernadel’s own personal property. There was also
sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that Bernadel aided and abetted the
cash-back transfer from Security Title to Lamp Light Marketing alleged in Count
43. Based on Joyce Johnson’s testimony that Bernadel was present at the closing
for the property involved and reassured the straw buyers that the transaction was
completely legal, the jury could infer that Bernadel participated in the transaction
as something he wished to bring about and sought by his assurance to make it
succeed. See United States v. Hungerford, 465 F.3d 1113, 1117 (9th Cir. 2006); 18
U.S.C. § 2.2 Finally, the jury could rationally conclude that Bernadel aided and
abetted the cash-back transfer alleged in Count 18 from Security Title to AMB
Consulting (co-defendant Marcus Branch’s company) based on evidence that
Bernadel was the instigator of the overall scheme and generally assisted Adorno,
Lucero, and the others in its implementation. This was enough for the jury to infer
2
Bernadel’s assertion that his conviction on Count 43 must be overturned
because the government did not charge the underlying criminal activity from which
the cash-back funds were derived is unfounded. A money laundering conviction
will stand so long as the evidence is sufficient to allow the jury to conclude that the
funds were the receipts of prior criminal activity, whether charged or uncharged.
See United States v. Jenkins, 633 F.3d 788, 805–06 (9th Cir. 2011).
5
that he sought by his actions to make this transaction succeed. See Hungerford,
465 F.3d at 1117; see also United States v. Smith, 832 F.2d 1167, 1170–71 (9th
Cir. 1987).
Because there was sufficient evidence to support Bernadel’s conviction on
all counts, the district court did not err in denying Bernadel’s motion for acquittal,
nor did it abuse its discretion in denying Bernadel’s motion for a new trial. See
Nevils, 598 F.3d at 1170; United States v. Alston, 974 F.2d 1206, 1211–12 (9th Cir.
1992).
(2) The district court did not commit plain error in failing to instruct the jury
that in order to convict Bernadel of the money laundering counts, it was required to
find that the transactions at issue involved profits, and not merely gross receipts, of
criminal activity. See generally United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (2008). It is
not “clear” or “obvious” under current law, see United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.
725, 734 (1993), that the cash-back transfers that served as the basis for the money
laundering counts merged with the substantive counts of mail fraud, wire fraud,
and bank fraud, such that a Santos jury instruction was required, see United States
v. Van Alstyne, 584 F.3d 803, 814–16 (9th Cir. 2009). The criminal conduct
charged in the substantive fraud counts (the mailings of the fraudulent loan
applications to the mortgage lenders, as well as the wire transfers from the
6
mortgage lenders to Security Title) was different from the criminal conduct
charged in the money laundering counts (the cash-back transfers from Security
Title to the defendants after the loans had been fraudulently procured), indicating
that the money laundering transactions were not “a crucial element of the ‘scheme
to defraud.’” Id. at 815; see also United States v. Wilkes, 662 F.3d 524, 549 (9th
Cir. 2011); United States v. Ali, 620 F.3d 1062, 1072 (9th Cir. 2010). Furthermore,
it would not be plain error to conclude that there is no merger problem where, as
here, the money laundering counts are based on transfers of ill-gotten gains from
one co-conspirator to another. See Wilkes, 662 F.3d at 549. Finally, unlike in
Santos, the money laundering counts did not lead to “‘a radical increase in the
statutory maximum sentence’ for the underlying offense,” United States v. Bush,
626 F.3d 527, 538 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Kratt, 579 F.3d 558,
562 (6th Cir. 2009)); in fact, they did not increase Bernadel’s sentence at all
because the district court ordered all prison terms to run concurrently.
Accordingly, the district court did not plainly err in not giving a Santos jury
instruction.
(3) The district court did not abuse its discretion in relying on the purported
Maricopa County property records for its loss calculation under U.S.S.G. §
2B1.1(b) because the information contained therein was corroborated by the
7
escrow files introduced at trial, and the records therefore bore “sufficient indicia of
reliability to support [their] probable accuracy.” U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a); see also
United States v. Petty, 982 F.2d 1365, 1369 (9th Cir. 1993).
(4) The district court did not commit plain error by using a preponderance-
of-the-evidence standard of proof, as opposed to a clear-and-convincing-evidence
standard of proof, in calculating loss under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b) because the loss
calculation was based on evidence presented at trial to support the conspiracy
charge, and Bernadel cannot contend that he was “denied adequate procedural
protection in contesting that evidence.” United States v. Treadwell, 593 F.3d 990,
1001 (9th Cir. 2010).
(5) The district court did not err by increasing Bernadel’s offense level by
eighteen levels under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(J) based on a finding that the loss
attributable to Bernadel was more than $2.5 million but less than $7 million.
Although the district court erred by calculating loss based on the purchase price
less the amount the lender or successor lender recovered through sale of the
property after foreclosure, rather than the loan amount less the amount the lender
or successor lender recovered through sale of the property after foreclosure, see
United States v. Yeung, 672 F.3d 594, 604 (9th Cir. 2012), and by including loss
purportedly related to properties that were never the subject of foreclosure
8
proceedings, these errors were harmless. Even using the proper methodology, the
loss attributable to Bernadel was over $2.5 million. The district court was not
required to credit against loss the mortgage payments made on the loans because
Bernadel did not point to any specific payments that were made, and the evidence
at trial indicated that any payments were negligible and did not decrease the
principal balance due on the loans. See United States v. Davoudi, 172 F.3d 1130,
1136 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Allen, 88 F.3d 765, 771 (9th Cir. 1996). Nor
did the district court err by including the loss incurred by successor lenders,
because such loss was a reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm resulting from
Bernadel’s offense. See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 app. n.3(A)(i). Finally, the district court
was not required to discount the loss to account for external market factors beyond
Bernadel’s control because the Guidelines explicitly provide that in cases
involving pledged collateral, the loss should be reduced by “the amount the victim
has recovered at the time of sentencing from disposition of the collateral,” not by
the value the collateral could have had in better economic conditions. U.S.S.G.
§ 2B1.1 app. n.3(E)(ii) (emphasis added).
(6) The district court did not err in increasing Bernadel’s offense level by
two levels under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(14)(A) (2009) based on a finding that
Bernadel derived more than $1 million in gross receipts from one or more financial
9
institutions. The loan that was fraudulently obtained for straw buyer Shiplett to
purchase Bernadel’s property at 7301 East Third Avenue #309 alone totaled
$932,760.52; this money flowed to Bernadel as the seller and qualifies as “gross
receipts” regardless whether Bernadel used some of it to pay the straw buyer or to
pay off his mortgage. See United States v. Kohli, 110 F.3d 1475, 1477–78 (9th Cir.
1997). The district court also properly included as “gross receipts” the
fraudulently obtained loan proceeds that passed through Security Title to
Bernadel’s company as cash-back. See Kohli, 110 F.3d at 1477–78. Based on
Bartlemus’s notes (introduced into evidence as trial exhibit 334) showing that he
disbursed over $100,000 in loan proceeds for properties involved in the conspiracy
to Bernadel’s company as cash-back, together with the Shiplett loan, the district
court could conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that Bernadel derived
over $1 million in gross receipts from one or more financial institutions “directly
or indirectly as a result of [his] offense[s].” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 app. n.11(B).
(7) The district court did not err in increasing Bernadel’s offense level by
two levels under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A) based on a finding that there were ten
or more victims. Even when considering only the counts of conviction, Bernadel
was responsible for defrauding the ten mortgage lenders identified in Counts 2–15
of the indictment, whose losses were also included in the district court’s loss
10
calculation. See United States v. Armstead, 552 F.3d 769, 780–81 (9th Cir. 2008).
Contrary to Bernadel’s assertion, the Guidelines do not require that victims come
forward to claim restitution in order to be counted under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2), as
the Guidelines enhancements serve different purposes than the restitution statute.
See United States v. Gossi, 608 F.3d 574, 579–80 (9th Cir. 2010).
(8) The district court did not err in applying a two-level sentence
enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 based on obstruction of justice. The district
court reasonably concluded that Bernadel’s multiple pro se pleadings, which
demanded that various individuals associated with the case, including government
witnesses Thomas Giallanza and William Park, comply with his requests or be
subject to default judgments or prosecution for mail and wire fraud, constituted an
attempt to “threaten[], intimidat[e], or otherwise unlawfully influenc[e] . . . [a]
witness.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 app. n.4(A). Although Bernadel’s pro se pleadings
were filed after all the trial testimony had concluded, they could have been
intended to influence potential witnesses at sentencing. Cf. United States v.
Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 1262 (9th Cir. 2009). The district court’s assessment of
Bernadel’s intent in filing these pleadings was a finding of fact, which we review
for clear error. See United States v. Shetty, 130 F.3d 1324, 1333 (9th Cir. 1997).
Given that Bernadel continued to file several pleadings threatening suit even after
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the district court warned him that they had the potential “to harass and disrupt lives
of public employees,” the district court could logically infer that Bernadel’s intent
was to threaten and intimidate potential witnesses, rather than to set forth a
legitimate claim. See United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1262 (9th Cir.
2009) (en banc).
(9) The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant a
downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 app. n.19(C), on the ground that the
Guidelines range substantially overstated the seriousness of Bernadel’s offense.
Post-Booker, we do not review the district court’s application of a particular
departure provision for procedural error; rather, we review the district court’s
deviation from the applicable Guidelines range once for substantive
reasonableness. See United States v. Ellis, 641 F.3d 411, 421–22 (9th Cir. 2011);
United States v. Mohamed, 459 F.3d 979, 987 (9th Cir. 2006).
(10) Because the district court did not err in calculating Bernadel’s offense
level as 35, the district court did not err in imposing a $25,000 fine, which was at
the low end of the Guidelines range of $20,000 to $200,000. See U.S.S.G.
§ 5E1.2(c)(3).
(11) Bernadel’s sentence was not substantively unreasonable. His sentence
of 200 months was at the low end of the Guidelines range of 188 to 235 months for
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an offense level of 35, see U.S.S.G. § 5.A, and well within the statutory maximum
of thirty years for mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, and conspiracy to commit the
same, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1344, 1349. The district court carefully
reviewed all the sentencing materials, considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a), and explained that a sentence of 200 months was appropriate because it
was in line with sentences imposed by other courts in similar mortgage fraud cases,
and because Bernadel engaged in serious deception and manipulation, leaving
many broken lives in his wake. This was not an abuse of discretion. See United
States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 993–95 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
AFFIRMED.
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FILED
United States v. Bernadel, No. 10-10119 JUL 23 2012
IKUTA, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
Although I agree with the majority’s conclusions as to all other claims, I
would reverse Bernadel’s conviction on Count 18. A rational trier of fact, viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could not conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that Bernadel aided and abetted the “cash-back”
transfer from Security Title to AMB Consulting that served as the basis for this
money laundering count. See United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1163–64 (9th
Cir. 2010) (en banc). Unlike Pinkerton liability, which focuses on the defendant’s
role in the overall conspiracy, aiding and abetting liability depends on the
defendant’s connection to the specific criminal act the defendant is alleged to have
aided or abetted. See United States v. Bingham, 653 F.3d 983, 997 (9th Cir.
2011).1 There was, quite simply, no evidence that Bernadel associated himself
with the specific transaction alleged in Count 18, participated in it as something he
wished to bring about, or sought by his actions to make it succeed. See United
States v. Hungerford, 465 F.3d 1113, 1117 (9th Cir. 2006).
1
Contrary to the government’s suggestion at oral argument, the district court
did not give a Pinkerton instruction with respect to the money laundering counts,
so we cannot uphold Bernadel’s money laundering convictions on a Pinkerton
theory. See United States v. Straub, 538 F.3d 1147, 1165 (9th Cir. 2008).