Gaston Cornu-Labat v. Mehdi Merred , 580 F. App'x 557 ( 2014 )

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                                                                           FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION                              JUN 24 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GASTON CORNU-LABAT,                              No. 13-35158
Plaintiff - Appellant,             D.C. No. 2:11-cv-00080-EFS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MEHDI MERRED, an individual;
THOMAS CLARK; ERIC BAKKE,
individually and in his official capacities
as a police officer; CITY OF QUINCY;
GRANT COUNTY SHERIFFS OFFICE;
GRANT COUNTY,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Washington
Edward F. Shea, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted June 6, 2014
Seattle, Washington
Before: McKEOWN and WATFORD, Circuit Judges, and ROTHSTEIN, Senior
District Judge.**
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The Honorable Barbara Jacobs Rothstein, Senior District Judge for the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.
Gaston Cornu-Labat appeals the district court’s summary judgment in favor
of Mehdi Merred, police officers Eric Bakke and Thomas Clark, the City of
Quincy, and Grant County. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
and we affirm.
Cornu-Labat’s claims of outrage, defamation, and false light against Merred
fail because Merred is immune from civil liability under Washington’s anti-SLAPP
statute, Wash. Rev. Code Ann. (“RCW”) § 4.24.510. Merred’s calls to law
enforcement and school employees were “reasonably of concern” to both, for law
enforcement to enforce the protection order and for the school to ensure the safety
of its students. RCW § 4.24.510; see Bailey v. State,

191 P.3d 1285

, 1287 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2008). Washington law does not require good faith on the part of Merred
to receive this statutory protection. See Phoenix Trading, Inc. v. Loops LLC,

732 F.3d 936

, 942 (9th Cir. 2013) (providing that RCW § 4.24.510 does not include a
good faith requirement);

Bailey, 191 P.3d at 1290

–91 (holding that the good faith
reference in the anti-SLAPP statute’s purpose section is trumped by the statute’s
more specific provision setting out requirements for receiving immunity).
Cornu-Labat’s claims against Officers Bakke and Clark and the City of
Quincy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on an alleged Fourth Amendment violation,
and for false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and negligence,
2
also fall short. The officers had probable cause to arrest Cornu-Labat. They relied
on “reasonably trustworthy information”—the 911 dispatcher’s description, the
Spillman computer report of the protection order, and their in-person conversation
with Alexa Merred—“sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing” that
Cornu-Labat had violated the protection order. Rohde v. City of Roseburg,

137 F.3d 1142

, 1144 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). Probable
cause defeats Cornu-Labat’s § 1983, false arrest, false imprisonment, and
malicious prosecution claims.1 See

id. at 1143–44

(requiring a lack of probable
cause to determine that a false arrest occurred under § 1983); Hanson v. City of
Snohomish,

852 P.2d 295

, 298, 301 (Wash. 1993) (recognizing that probable cause
is a complete defense to claims of malicious prosecution, false arrest, and false
imprisonment under Washington law). Cornu-Labat also fails to raise a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether the City of Quincy had a “policy or custom”
that served as the “moving force” behind an alleged Fourth Amendment violation.
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servc. of City of New York,

436 U.S. 658

, 694 (1978).
Cornu-Labat’s § 1983 and negligence claims against Grant County fare no
better. Because the police officers had probable cause to arrest Cornu-Labat, he
1
Because of our probable cause determination, we need not reach the
question of whether the officers had qualified immunity.
3
was not deprived of any constitutional right due to Grant County’s actions or
customs, nor was Grant County an “integral participant” in committing the alleged
violation. See Mabe v. San Bernardino Cnty., Dep’t of Public Soc. Servc.,

237 F.3d 1101

, 1110–11 (9th Cir. 2001); Hopkins v. Bonvicino,

573 F.3d 752

, 769–70
(9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Given that probable cause for
the arrest existed, the record does not support Cornu-Labat’s assertion that Grant
County’s use of the Spillman computer system was the “but for” or legal cause of
his arrest. See Joyce v. State, Dep’t of Corr.,

119 P.3d 825

, 833–34 (Wash. 2005).
Cornu-Labat’s defamation claim fails to identify a provably false statement
or publication made by Grant County, the City of Quincy, or Officers Bakke and
Clark. See Duc Tan v. Le,

300 P.3d 356

, 363 (Wash. 2013). As with defamation,
“false light claims require a showing of falsity and knowledge of, or reckless
disregard for that falsity.” Corey v. Pierce Cnty.,

225 P.3d 367

, 373 (Wash. 2010).
Thus both claims fall together.
Finally, Cornu-Labat argues that a jury must decide whether the defendants’
actions were outrageous. Although the elements of outrage “are generally factual
questions for the jury,” a district court may grant summary judgment if “reasonable
minds could [not] differ on whether the conduct was sufficiently extreme to result
in liability.” Strong v. Terrell,

195 P.3d 977

, 981–82 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008).
4
Grant County’s use of a pre-set field for inputting temporary protection order
information into the National Crime Center Information database and the officers’
use of that database did not exceed “all possible bounds of decency.” Grimsby v.
Samson,

530 P.2d 291