Victor Tisol-Matul v. Merrick Garland ( 2022 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       APR 20 2022
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    VICTOR MANUEL TISOL-MATUL, AKA No. 16-70467
    Victor Tisol Vargas,
    Agency No. A087-991-717
    Petitioner,
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted April 14, 2022**
    San Francisco, California
    Before: BYBEE and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges, and BOLTON,*** District
    Judge.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Susan R. Bolton, United States District Judge for the
    District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
    Victor Manuel Tisol-Matul (“Tisol-Matul”), a native and citizen of
    Guatemala, petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)
    decision dismissing an appeal from an order of an immigration judge denying his
    applications for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention
    Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    , and
    we deny the petition.
    We review the agency’s factual findings, including the agency’s
    determination that a petitioner does not qualify for withholding of removal, under
    the highly deferential “substantial evidence” standard. See Zetino v. Holder, 
    622 F.3d 1007
    , 1015–16 (9th Cir. 2010) (reviewing nexus determination under
    substantial evidence standard); INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 
    502 U.S. 478
    , 481 (1992),
    superseded by statute on other grounds, 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(B). A factual
    finding “is not supported by substantial evidence when ‘any reasonable adjudicator
    would be compelled to conclude to the contrary’ based on the evidence in the
    record.” Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 
    850 F.3d 1051
    , 1059 (9th Cir. 2017) (en
    banc) (quoting Zhi v. Holder, 
    751 F.3d 1088
    , 1091 (9th Cir. 2014)); see also 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(B).
    1.    Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that gang
    members targeted Tisol-Matul because he resisted their demands that he leave his
    job, meaning they targeted him for “economic and personal reasons” rather than on
    2
    account of his political opinion.1 See Barrios v. Holder, 
    581 F.3d 849
    , 855–56 (9th
    Cir. 2009) (quoting Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 
    542 F.3d 738
    , 747 (9th Cir. 2008)),
    abrogated on other grounds by Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 
    707 F.3d 1081
     (9th Cir.
    2013) (en banc); Elias-Zacarias, 
    502 U.S. at 482
     (affirming that persecution must
    be “on account of” a protected ground in order to warrant relief); Zetino, 
    622 F.3d at 1016
     (a petitioner’s “desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated
    by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected
    ground”).
    2.     Because Tisol-Matul did not contest the agency’s findings regarding
    his social group or his CAT claim in his briefing before this Court, he has forfeited
    these claims. See Tijani v. Holder, 
    628 F.3d 1071
    , 1080 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming
    general rule that the court does not review claims absent from opening brief)
    (citation omitted).
    PETITION DENIED.
    1
    We do not have jurisdiction to evaluate Tisol-Matul’s imputed political opinion
    claim because he did not exhaust it before the agency. See Arsdi v. Holder, 
    659 F.3d 925
    , 928–29 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Zara v. Ashcroft, 
    383 F.3d 927
    , 930 (9th
    Cir. 2004) (“[F]ailure to raise an issue in an appeal to the BIA constitutes a failure
    to exhaust . . . and deprives this court of jurisdiction . . . .”).
    3