William Rouser v. Jared Lozano ( 2022 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        APR 20 2022
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    WILLIAM ROUSER,                                 No. 21-15608
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:20-cv-01009-KJM-JDP
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    JARED LOZANO; et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of California
    Kimberly J. Mueller, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted April 11, 2022**
    Before:      McKEOWN, CHRISTEN, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.
    William Rouser appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
    his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action alleging constitutional violations in connection with
    his parole hearing. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de
    novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Resnick v.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Hayes, 
    213 F.3d 443
    , 447 (9th Cir. 2000). We may affirm on any basis supported
    by the record. Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 
    534 F.3d 1116
    , 1121 (9th
    Cir. 2008). We affirm.
    To the extent that Rouser’s claims challenged the denial of parole or would
    otherwise necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of the duration of his confinement,
    the district court properly concluded that the claims are barred by Heck v.
    Humphrey, 
    512 U.S. 477
     (1994). See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 
    544 U.S. 74
    , 78 (2005)
    (“[A] prisoner in state custody cannot use a § 1983 action to challenge the fact or
    duration of his confinement.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
    To the extent that Rouser’s claims challenged parole procedures, dismissal
    was also proper because Rouser failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible
    claim for relief. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 
    627 F.3d 338
    , 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010)
    (although pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally, a plaintiff must present
    factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); see also
    Swarthout v. Cooke, 
    562 U.S. 216
    , 220 (2011) (in parole context, due process
    requires only that a prisoner be provided with an opportunity to be heard and a
    statement of the reasons why parole was denied); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S
    722, 752-53 (1991) (where there is no constitutional right to counsel there can be
    no deprivation of effective assistance).
    We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
    2                                     21-15608
    in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 
    587 F.3d 983
    , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
    Rouser’s motion to appoint counsel (Docket Entry No. 4) is denied.
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                  21-15608