Elma Reyes-Guzman v. Merrick Garland ( 2022 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
APR 20 2022
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ELMA ERODITA REYES-GUZMAN, No. 17-70900
Petitioner, Agency No. A206-641-945
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted April 11, 2022
San Francisco, California
Before: BYBEE and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges, and MORRIS,** District Judge.
Elma Erodita Reyes-Guzman, a native and citizen of Honduras, petitions for
review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision dismissing her appeal of
an immigration judge’s (IJ) order denying her application for asylum, withholding
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Brian M. Morris, United States District Judge for the
District of Montana, sitting by designation.
of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We review
“denials of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief for substantial
evidence and will uphold a denial supported by reasonable, substantial, and
probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Huang v. Holder, 744
F.3d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026,
1031 (9th Cir. 2014)). Under the substantial evidence standard, we “must uphold
the agency determination unless the evidence compels a contrary conclusion.”
Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019); see also
Villavicencio v. Sessions, 904 F.3d 658, 663–64 (9th Cir. 2018) (as amended)
(“The BIA’s factual findings are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator
would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” (quoting Young v. Holder, 697
F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 2018) (en banc))). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(1), and we deny the petition.
1. Reyes-Guzman bears the burden of establishing that she is eligible for
asylum. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a). She “must demonstrate that [s]he has suffered past
persecution or has a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”
Duran-Rodriguez, 918 F.3d at 1028. The threat from Vargas and harassment from
Liberal Party members, while serious, were not accompanied by any other
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confrontations or mistreatment. See Duran-Rodriguez, 918 F.3d at 1028
(explaining that the Ninth Circuit has been “most likely to find persecution where
threats are repeated, specific and ‘combined with confrontation or other
mistreatment.’” (quoting Lim v. INS, 224 F.3d 929, 936 (9th Cir. 2000))). Nor is
there evidence that Vargas or members of the Liberal Party would seek to harm
Reyes-Guzman if she returns to Honduras. Considered cumulatively, the record
does not compel the conclusion that Reyes-Guzman demonstrated past persecution
or a well-founded fear of future persecution. The BIA’s denial of her asylum claim
is supported by substantial evidence.1
2. To qualify for withholding of removal, Reyes-Guzman must
demonstrate “that it is more likely than not that he or she would be persecuted on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion upon removal to [Honduras].” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2).
Withholding requires the applicant to show “a ‘clear probability’ that [her] life or
freedom would be threatened in the proposed country of removal”—a more
demanding standard than asylum. Davila v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir.
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The IJ considered the domestic violence Reyes-Guzman faced in her
decision. The IJ and BIA were not required to conduct a separate analysis on
whether the domestic abuse Reyes-Guzman faced was based on a protected ground
because Reyes-Guzman did not raise this argument before the IJ or BIA.
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2020). When an applicant fails to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution,
“it necessarily follows that they do not qualify for withholding of removal.” See
Gonzalez-Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 995, 1001 n.5 (9th Cir. 2003); see also
Sowe v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 1281, 1288 (9th Cir. 2008). Because the record does
not compel the conclusion that Reyes-Guzman suffered past persecution or has an
objectively reasonable fear of future persecution, substantial evidence also
supports the BIA’s denial of her withholding of removal claim.
3. Under CAT, it is Reyes-Guzman’s burden to establish that it is more
likely than not that she will be tortured if she returns to Honduras, either by
government officials or with government officials’ acquiescence. 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.16(c)(2); Garcia-Milian, 755 F.3d at 1033. Nothing in the record indicates
that the BIA failed to consider all the documentary evidence Reyes-Guzman
submitted. See Cole v. Holder, 659 F.3d 762, 771–72 (9th Cir. 2011). The IJ
stated that she gave full evidentiary weight to the documentary evidence in the
record and there is no “highly probative or potentially dispositive evidence” in the
country condition reports that was overlooked. Cole, 659 F.3d at 771–72. The
BIA’s denial of Reyes-Guzman’s CAT claim was supported by substantial
evidence.
PETITION DENIED
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