Louis Manzi v. Kilolo Kijakazi ( 2022 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        APR 13 2022
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    LOUIS EUGENE MANZI,                             No.    21-55450
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 5:20-cv-01292-JEM
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner
    of Social Security,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    John E. McDermott, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted March 16, 2022
    San Francisco, California
    Before: W. FLETCHER, GOULD, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges.
    Louis Eugene Manzi appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the
    Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of Manzi’s application for disability
    insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. The district court had
    jurisdiction under 
    42 U.S.C. § 405
    (g), and we have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review the district court’s decision de novo, Attmore v. Colvin, 827 F.3d
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    872, 875 (9th Cir. 2016), and we affirm.
    Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s step three finding that Manzi did
    not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or equaled a listed
    impairment. The ALJ did not err by not considering listing 2.09, loss of speech,
    where there is no evidence of “inability to produce by any means speech that can
    be heard, understood, or sustained.” See 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 §
    2.09.
    The ALJ did not err in formulating Manzi’s residual functional capacity
    (“RFC”), and substantial evidence supports the RFC. See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 
    427 F.3d 1211
    , 1217 (9th Cir. 2005) (affirming the ALJ’s RFC determination where the
    ALJ “applied the proper legal standard and [her] decision is supported by
    substantial evidence”). The ALJ reasonably incorporated the limitations assessed
    by consulting psychologist Robert Bilbrey into the RFC. See Stubbs-Danielson v.
    Astrue, 
    539 F.3d 1169
    , 1174 (9th Cir. 2008) (ALJ reasonably translated the
    assessed limitations into concrete work restrictions).
    We reject as unsupported by the record Manzi’s contentions that the ALJ
    ignored and mischaracterized evidence and failed to address evidence of pain. The
    ALJ proffered specific, clear, and convincing reasons to discount Manzi’s
    symptom testimony as inconsistent with and unsupported by the record, and based
    on evidence of exaggerated symptoms. See Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec.
    2                                 21-55450
    Admin., 
    533 F.3d 1155
    , 1161 (9th Cir. 2008) (ALJ may discount a claimant’s
    testimony if inconsistent with the medical evidence); Burch v. Barnhart, 
    400 F.3d 676
    , 681 (9th Cir. 2005) (ALJ may consider a lack of corroborating medical
    evidence as one factor in a credibility determination); Tonapetyan v. Halter, 
    242 F.3d 1144
    , 1148 (9th Cir. 2001) (evidence of exaggerated symptoms undermined
    credibility).
    The ALJ did not err in determining, at step five, that jobs existed in
    significant numbers in the national economy that Manzi could perform. Manzi’s
    arguments concerning the ALJ’s step five finding repeat his allegations that the
    ALJ erred in evaluating the medical evidence and his testimony. Because Manzi
    did not show error in the earlier analysis, these arguments lack support. See
    Stubbs-Danielson, 
    539 F.3d at
    1175–76.
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                    21-55450