Jose Mendoza, Jr. v. Amalgamated Transit Union ( 2022 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 7 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOSE MENDOZA, Jr., No. 20-16079
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. Nos.
2:18-cv-00959-JCM-DJA
and 2:17-cv-02485-JCM-CWH
ROBBIE HARRIS; et al.,
MEMORANDUM*
Plaintiffs,
v.
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION
INTERNATIONAL; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
JOSE MENDOZA, Jr.; et al., No. 20-16080
Plaintiffs-Appellants, D.C. Nos.
2:18-cv-00959-JCM-DJA
v. 2:17-cv-02485-JCM-CWH
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION
INTERNATIONAL; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Page 2 of 4
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
James C. Mahan, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted June 11, 2021
Seattle, Washington
Before: W. FLETCHER, WATFORD, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges.
Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge COLLINS.
Jose Mendoza is the former President of Local 1637, an affiliate of
Amalgamated Transit Union International (ATU) that represents bus drivers and
mechanics in Las Vegas. After Mendoza was accused of financial malfeasance,
ATU imposed a trusteeship on Local 1637 and removed Mendoza, as well as his
fellow executive board members, from office. Mendoza filed suit against ATU
and associated individuals (collectively, the ATU defendants) in Nevada state
court, asserting various state law tort and breach-of-contract claims (Mendoza I).
The ATU defendants removed the case to federal court on the ground that all of the
claims were premised on ATU’s alleged breach of the union constitution and thus
were preempted by Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act
(LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). The district court dismissed the tort claims without
prejudice and allowed the two breach-of-contract claims to proceed as Section
301(a) claims.
Shortly after discovery closed in Mendoza I, Mendoza and seven other
former members of the executive board filed a second lawsuit in federal district
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court (Mendoza II). ATU and associated individuals were once again named as
defendants, but so too were Miller Kaplan & Arase (MKA), an accounting firm
that conducted an audit of Local 1637’s finances, and two of its employees
(collectively, the MKA defendants), as well as Mendoza’s employer, Keolis
Transit America (KTA), and a KTA employee (collectively, the KTA defendants).
After consolidating the two actions, the district court granted summary judgment to
the ATU defendants on the two remaining breach-of-contract claims in Mendoza I
and dismissed the claims against the ATU defendants in Mendoza II on the basis of
claim splitting. The court also dismissed all of the claims against the MKA
defendants for failure to state a claim and all of the claims against the KTA
defendants for failure to state a claim or on motion for summary judgment.
Although we address the claim-splitting issue in a concurrently filed opinion, we
affirm the district court’s decisions in their entirety.
1. The district court correctly concluded that Mendoza’s claims in Mendoza
I are preempted by Section 301(a) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Mendoza
argues that claims based on breach of a union’s constitution cannot be preempted
by Section 301(a). This court has squarely rejected that argument, holding that
Section 301(a) “completely preempts state law claims based on contracts between
labor unions, which may include union constitutions.” Garcia v. Serv. Emp. Int’l
Union, 993 F.3d 757, 762 (9th Cir. 2021).
Page 4 of 4
The district court also properly granted summary judgment in favor of the
ATU defendants on Mendoza’s two breach-of-contract claims in Mendoza I. Even
construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mendoza, no reasonable jury
could conclude that ATU improperly amended Local 1637’s bylaws or failed to
follow the proper procedures in implementing a trusteeship.
2. As to the claims against the MKA and KTA defendants in Mendoza II,
the district court properly granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss for failure to
state a claim and for summary judgment. We affirm the dismissal of all claims
against the MKA and KTA defendants for the reasons articulated by the district
court in its well-reasoned orders. We also affirm the district court’s judgment
dismissing the claims against the ATU defendants in Mendoza II in a concurrently
filed opinion.
AFFIRMED.
FILED
Mendoza, et al. v. ATU, et al., 20-16079+
APR 7 2022
COLLINS, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part: MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
I concur in the memorandum disposition except to the extent that it affirms
the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the KTA Defendants on
Plaintiffs’ tenth cause of action—viz., the civil RICO claim. As to that claim, I
would vacate the grant of summary judgment to the KTA Defendants and remand.
To prevail on a civil RICO claim, a plaintiff must establish five elements:
“(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity
(known as ‘predicate acts’) (5) causing injury to plaintiff’s ‘business or property.’”
Grimmett v. Brown, 75 F.3d 506, 510 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). Here, the
KTA Defendants’ motion for summary judgment argued that Plaintiffs had failed
to establish the necessary predicate acts and the element of injury. Plaintiffs were
therefore apprised of the need, in opposing summary judgment, to come forward
with evidence to support those elements of their RICO claim. But the district court
instead granted Keolis’s motion on the alternative ground that the underlying illicit
quid pro quo between the KTA Defendants and the ATU Defendants, on which
this claim was based, was a “singular ‘transaction’” that did not constitute “an
enterprise or an ongoing pattern of racketeering” for RICO purposes. As Plaintiffs
correctly contend on appeal, the grounds invoked by the district court were
different from the ones urged by Defendants in their motion. The disparity is
underscored by the fact that the only aspect of the district court’s reasoning that
the KTA Defendants defend on appeal is that Plaintiffs failed to establish the
“existence of an Enterprise.”
A litigant must be given “reasonable notice” that “the sufficiency of his or
her claim will be in issue”—which requires “adequate time to develop the facts on
which the litigant will depend to oppose summary judgment.” Buckingham v.
United States, 998 F.2d 735, 742 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Portsmouth Square v.
Shareholders Protective Comm’n, 770 F.2d 866, 869 (9th Cir. 1985)); see also
Fountain v. Filson, 336 U.S. 681, 683 (1949). Summary judgment may be granted
“on grounds not raised by a party” only “[a]fter giving notice and a reasonable time
to respond.” See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f)(2). Because the district court departed from
this procedure, I would vacate its summary judgment to the KTA Defendants on
the RICO claim and would remand that one aspect of the case for further
consideration. 1
1
Although the KTA Defendants argue that we should affirm the district court’s
summary judgment on a variety of other grounds, I would leave those points for
the district court to consider in the first instance.
2