Audra Hopkins v. Kilolo Kijakazi ( 2022 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 7 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
AUDRA E. HOPKINS No. 19-15939
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:18-cv-08129-DGC
v.
MEMORANDUM*
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
David G. Campbell, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 7, 2022**
Before: D.W. NELSON, BERZON and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Audra E. Hopkins appeals the district court’s judgment vacating the
Commissioner of Social Security's denial of her application for disability insurance
benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the Social
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Security Act and remanding to the agency for further proceedings. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for abuse of discretion the district
court’s decision to remand for further proceedings. Leon v. Berryhill, 880 F.3d
1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2017). We affirm.
The parties agree with the district court’s conclusion that the ALJ did not
provide legally sufficient reasons for discounting the opinion of Hopkins’s treating
physician, Dr. Mary Janikowski.
The district court properly concluded that the ALJ did not provide “clear and
convincing” reasons for discounting Hopkins’s testimony about her pain and other
symptoms. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014–15 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[I]f there
is no evidence of malingering, ‘the ALJ may reject the claimant’s symptom
testimony only by giving specific, clear, and convincing reasons.’”) (citation
omitted). The district court properly rejected the ALJ’s conclusion that Hopkins’s
limited daily activities demonstrated that she “is able to spend a substantial part of
[her] day engaged in pursuits involving the performance of physical functions that
are transferable to a work setting.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 (9th Cir.
2007). The district court also properly concluded that the ALJ’s selective and
vague analysis of the medical record did not provide a clear and convincing basis
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to discount Hopkins’s symptom testimony.
Having determined that the ALJ discounted evidence for legally insufficient
reasons, the district court applied this circuit’s credit-as-true analysis to determine
whether to remand for further proceedings or the payment of benefits. See Leon,
880 F.3d at 1045 (outlining steps of the analysis). The district court did not
consider whether the improperly discredited evidence established disability
because it first found that there were “outstanding issues that must be resolved
before a disability determination can be made.” Id.; see also Treichler v. Comm’r,
775 F.3d 1090, 1105 (9th Cir. 2014) (concluding that the court is required “to
assess whether there are outstanding issues requiring resolution before considering
whether to hold that the claimant's testimony is credible as a matter of law”)
(emphasis in original).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in remanding for further
proceedings. It identified “mixed” clinical findings in the record. It described in
detail how the “normal” findings the ALJ emphasized co-existed with evidence
suggesting Hopkins’s impairments were more serious and limiting than the ALJ
allowed. “Where there is conflicting evidence, and not all essential factual issues
have been resolved, a remand for an award of benefits is inappropriate.” Treichler,
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775 F.3d at 1101.
Similarly, the district court properly cited the conflict between Dr.
Janikowski’s opinion and the report of consultative examiner Dr. Efren Cano as a
reason to remand for further findings about Hopkins’s impairments. The two
doctors reached different conclusions about Hopkins’s limitations based on their
respective clinical findings. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir.
2002) (“The opinions of non-treating or non-examining physicians may . . . serve
as substantial evidence when the opinions are consistent with independent clinical
findings or other evidence in the record.”). The district court determined that
although the ALJ recognized that Dr. Cano’s opinion was based in part on outdated
treatment records, it did give that opinion partial weight without specifying “why
Dr. Cano’s report was credible as to its other findings,” or “which specific portions
of [Dr. Janikowski’s] testimony Dr. Cano’s report discredits.” This lack of
explanation confirms that the district court’s determination that there are
outstanding issues requiring resolution was not an abuse of discretion.
The remand decision in a Social Security case “is a fact-bound determination
that arises in an infinite variety of contexts,” and properly consigned to the district
court’s discretion. Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 2000). The
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district court did not abuse its discretion here.
AFFIRMED.
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