Nelson Pleitez-Bermudez v. Merrick Garland ( 2022 )


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  •                               NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        APR 4 2022
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    NELSON ANTONIO PLEITEZ-                         No.    20-72815
    BERMUDEZ,
    Agency No. A209-792-380
    Petitioner,
    v.                                             MEMORANDUM*
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Argued and Submitted March 18, 2022
    San Francisco, California
    Before: W. FLETCHER, GOULD, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges.
    Nelson Antonio Pleitez-Bermudez, a native and citizen of El Salvador,
    petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) order denying his
    appeal from an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision rejecting his applications for
    asylum, withholding of removal, protection under the Convention Against Torture
    (“CAT”), and voluntary departure. We have jurisdiction under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    . We
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    review the agency’s factual findings for substantial evidence. INS v. Elias-Zacarias,
    
    502 U.S. 478
    , 481 & n.1 (1992); Silaya v. Mukasey, 
    524 F.3d 1066
    , 1070 (9th Cir.
    2008). We deny the petition for review in part, grant in part, and remand to the BIA.
    1.    Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Pleitez-Bermudez
    did not establish that the harm he suffered in El Salvador constitutes past persecution
    for purposes of asylum and withholding of removal. See Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr,
    
    918 F.3d 1025
    , 1028 (9th Cir. 2019) (explaining that the record in an analogous case
    did not compel a conclusion that the petitioner suffered past persecution because the
    death threats at issue were not “repeated, specific, and ‘combined with confrontation
    or other mistreatment’” (quoting Lim v. INS, 
    224 F.3d 929
    , 936 (9th Cir. 2000)).
    Pleitez-Bermudez’s efforts to distinguish Duran-Rodriguez are unsuccessful, and
    the record does not support his claims that the BIA ignored arguments or otherwise
    erred in analyzing the past persecution question. See Fernandez v. Gonzales, 
    439 F.3d 592
    , 603 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that the BIA is presumed to have reviewed the
    record). We deny the petition for review as to the issue of past persecution. See
    Duran-Rodriguez, 918 F.3d at 1028.
    2.    In concluding that Pleitez-Bermudez did not establish a well-founded fear of
    future persecution, the BIA dispositively relied on its view that Pleitez-Bermudez’s
    BIA brief forfeited any challenge to the IJ’s finding that the Salvadoran government
    had not been shown to be unwilling or unable to control a specific gang. Although
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    Pleitez-Bermudez’s BIA brief did not have a separate section devoted to that point,
    it recited the applicable legal standard on the issue, pointed to evidence in the record
    showing that the police could not control the gang, and argued that such evidence
    established the “apparent inability of the police or a police officer to protect” Pleitez-
    Bermudez in El Salvador. This issue was not forfeited, and the BIA erred in
    bypassing Pleitez-Bermudez’s arguments regarding whether he has a well-founded
    fear of future persecution. We grant the petition for review as to the issue of a well-
    founded fear of future persecution and remand for the BIA to address the relevant
    arguments in the first instance and consider whether the IJ properly denied asylum
    and withholding of removal.
    3.    Pleitez-Bermudez did not challenge the agency’s denial of CAT relief in his
    Opening Brief, so this issue is forfeited on appeal. See Etemadi v. Garland, 
    12 F.4th 1013
    , 1026 (9th Cir. 2021) (explaining that “forfeiture is the failure to make a timely
    assertion of a right, whereas waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment
    of a right” (internal citation omitted)).
    4.    As to voluntary departure, the BIA did not have the benefit of Posos-Sanchez
    v. Garland, 
    3 F.4th 1176
    , 1185 (9th Cir. 2021), which held that a deficient notice to
    appear cannot trigger the stop-time rule. At oral argument, the government conceded
    that we should remand for the BIA to reevaluate voluntary departure in light of this
    intervening case. For these reasons, we grant the petition for review of Pleitez-
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    Bermudez’s request for voluntary departure and remand to the BIA for reassessment.
    See INS v. Ventura, 
    537 U.S. 12
    , 16 (2002).
    PETITION DENIED in part as to the issue of past persecution and the
    CAT claim. PETITION GRANTED in part as to whether Pleitez-Bermudez
    can gain asylum or withholding of removal because he has a well-founded fear
    of future persecution and voluntary departure; these issues are REMANDED
    to the BIA for reconsideration. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
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