Rochelle Stanley v. Kilolo Kijakazi ( 2022 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        APR 19 2022
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ROCHELLE STANLEY,                               No.    21-35236
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 3:20-cv-05532-MAT
    v.
    KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner            MEMORANDUM*
    of Social Security,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Washington
    Mary Alice Theiler, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
    Submitted April 14, 2022**
    Seattle, Washington
    Before: HAWKINS and FORREST, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI,*** Judge.
    Rochelle Stanley appeals the district court’s order affirming the
    Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her applications for social security
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge for the United States Court of
    International Trade, sitting by designation.
    income and disability insurance benefits. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review the district court’s decision de novo. Terry v. Saul, 
    998 F.3d 1010
    , 1012 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing Tommasetti v. Astrue, 
    533 F.3d 1035
    , 1038 (9th
    Cir. 2008). We review the administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) decision for
    substantial evidence. Orn v. Astrue, 
    495 F.3d 625
    , 630 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing
    Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 
    454 F.3d 1050
    , 1052 (9th Cir. 2006)). We
    affirm.
    First, the ALJ did not err in her treatment of Stanley’s testimony. At prong
    two of the credibility analysis, the ALJ’s negative credibility determination was
    supported by “specific, clear, and convincing reasons” because Stanley’s
    statements about the severity of her symptoms were inconsistent with the medical
    and functional evidence in the record. See Ahern v. Saul, 
    988 F.3d 1111
    , 1116 (9th
    Cir. 2021).
    Second, the ALJ did not err in weighing the physicians’ medical opinions.
    An ALJ only needs to provide specific and legitimate reasons supported by
    substantial evidence to reject a medical opinion that is inconsistent with other
    record evidence. Ford v. Saul, 
    950 F.3d 1141
    , 1154 (9th Cir. 2020). The ALJ
    found Drs. Neims and Zolnikov’s opinions unpersuasive because they were not
    supported by record evidence and were based on Stanley’s self-reported symptoms.
    See Tommasetti, 
    533 F.3d at 1041
    . The ALJ’s treatment of Dr. Clifford’s opinion
    2
    faithfully represented the overall opinion and was consistent with other record
    evidence.
    Third, Patty Olive’s lay witness testimony was inconsistent with evidence
    elsewhere in the record and thus the ALJ’s treatment of it was not reversible error.
    See Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 
    574 F.3d 685
    , 694 (9th Cir. 2009).
    Fourth, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding at Step Four that
    Stanley’s past relevant work as a “cleaner/housecleaner” constituted substantial
    gainful activity that does not exceed Stanley’s residual functional capacity. We
    need not reach Stanley’s argument that the ALJ erred at Step Five. See 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1520
    (a)(4) (“If we can find that you are disabled or not disabled at a step, we
    make our determination or decision and we do not go on to the next step.”).
    Finally, considering the entire record, we find that Stanley’s post-hearing
    evidence does not undermine the ALJ's determination. See 
    id.
     § 404.970(a)(5);
    Brewes v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 
    682 F.3d 1157
    , 1160 (9th Cir. 2012).
    AFFIRMED.
    3