Marilyn Price v. Kilolo Kijakazi ( 2022 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        APR 19 2022
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    MARILYN L. PRICE,                               No.    21-35377
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 3:19-cv-05703-MLP
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner
    of Social Security,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Washington
    Michelle L. Peterson, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
    Submitted April 15, 2022**
    Seattle, Washington
    Before: HAWKINS and FORREST, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI,*** Judge.
    Claimant Marilyn Price appeals from the district court’s order affirming the
    Commissioner’s partial denial of her applications for disability insurance benefits
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge for the United States Court of
    International Trade, sitting by designation.
    under Title II and supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social
    Security Act. We have jurisdiction under 
    42 U.S.C. § 405
    (g) and 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    ,
    and we affirm.
    We review the district court’s order de novo and reverse only if the
    Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) decision was not supported by substantial
    evidence or relied on legal error. Ford v. Saul, 
    950 F.3d 1141
    , 1154 (9th Cir. 2020).
    1. Chronic Fatigue Syndrome. To qualify as a medically determinable
    impairment (MDI) “a physical or mental impairment must be established by
    objective medical evidence from an acceptable medical source.” 
    20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521
    , 416.921. Social Security Ruling 14-1p provides that the SSA “will find
    that a person has an MDI of [chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS)] if a licensed physician
    diagnosed CFS, and this diagnosis is not inconsistent with the other evidence in the
    person's case record.” SSR 14-1P (S.S.A. Apr. 3, 2014). The record supports the
    ALJ’s finding that there was no official diagnosis of CFS. Although Dr. Uy said
    Price “appears to have chronic fatigue,” Dr. Keene subsequently noted that “final
    [diagnosis] of Chronic Fatigue will be deferred until after the planned neurology
    followup.” We find no error in the ALJ’s finding regarding CFS. 1
    1
    Price argues that the ALJ erred by not explaining why he disagreed with the
    prior ALJ’s finding regarding CFS. However, the district court reversed the prior
    ALJ decision, and Price has offered no authority requiring a second ALJ to explain
    the specific reasons for making different findings than a prior, vacated ALJ decision.
    2
    2. Depression and Anxiety. Price makes several general arguments
    challenging the ALJ’s evaluation of mental health medical evidence. The ALJ
    properly evaluated the medical evidence regarding Price’s depression and anxiety
    and gave “clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence in the
    record” for the weight he gave to each medical opinion. Ford, 950 F.3d at 1154
    (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). For instance, the ALJ accurately
    analyzed opinions from Dr. Mayer and Ms. Geist and provided detailed explanations
    for why he gave them significant weight when assessing severity and residual
    functional capacity (RFC).2 We find no error in the ALJ’s analysis of the medical
    evidence regarding Price’s depression and anxiety.
    3. Price’s Testimony. The ALJ provided “specific, clear, and convincing
    reasons” supported by substantial evidence for discounting Price’s testimony
    regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms. Ahearn v.
    Saul, 
    988 F.3d 1111
    , 1116 (9th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks and citation
    omitted). The ALJ noted that prior to 2013 the medical evidence showed very limited
    treatment for any mental impairments and that the treatment notes from January
    2013 to June 2015 showed mild symptoms and limited treatment. As explained
    2
    To the extent Price argues that the ALJ failed to consider Dr. Davenport’s
    opinion that her depression affected her ability to perform skilled work, her
    argument fails because the ALJ specifically found that Price has been unable to
    perform her past skilled work and included limitations in the RFC to account for her
    impairment.
    3
    above, the ALJ did not err by not considering Price’s testimony about limitations
    cause by CFS. Nor did the ALJ err in discounting Price’s testimony about the extent
    of limitations associated with her depression where the medical evidence supports
    the ALJ’s reasoning concerning the sparse and limited nature of Price’s treatment.
    We find no error in the ALJ’s assessment of Price’s testimony.
    4. Lay Evidence. The ALJ discounted lay evidence from Price’s sister and
    friend for germane reasons. Diedrich v. Berryhill, 
    874 F.3d 634
    , 640 (9th Cir. 2017).
    The ALJ considered this evidence but gave more weight to the opinions of doctors
    who assessed Price’s limitations. Because the statements of these witnesses
    recounted the same complaints as Price, the ALJ provided sufficient reasoning to
    discount them. See Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 
    574 F.3d 685
    , 694 (9th
    Cir. 2009) (holding that where an ALJ cited inconsistency with medical evidence as
    a clear and convincing reason to discount a claimant’s testimony, he also provides
    germane reasons to discount a lay witness’s similar testimony).
    Price also argues that the ALJ erred by failing to consider a Social Security
    interviewer’s observation that Price looked tired during her interview but does not
    explain how it affected the ALJ’s decision. Thus, we find that any error was
    harmless.
    5. RFC Assessment and Step Five Finding. The ALJ conducted a careful
    RFC assessment that weighed all medical opinions and accounted for Price’s
    4
    depressed condition with non-exertional limitations. For instance, the ALJ gave
    Dr. Mayers significant weight because she personally examined Price and her
    opinions were consistent with other mental health examinations in the record. The
    ALJ did not err in declining to consider properly discounted evidence when
    determining Price’s RFC. Chaudhry v. Astrue, 
    688 F.3d 661
    , 671 (9th Cir. 2012).
    AFFIRMED.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 21-35377

Filed Date: 4/19/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/19/2022