Giles Manley v. Warden ( 2023 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 27 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GILES MANLEY, No. 21-16401
Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No.
3:11-cv-00354-HDM-WGC
v.
WARDEN, DIRECTOR OF NEVADA MEMORANDUM*
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Respondents-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Howard D. McKibben, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted April 19, 2023
San Francisco, California
Before: VANDYKE and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges, and LASNIK,** District
Judge.
Petitioner Giles Manley appeals the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas
corpus petition. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253, and we
affirm. This Court reviews the denial of a habeas petition de novo. Runningeagle v.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Robert S. Lasnik, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.
Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 766 (9th Cir. 2012). To do so, we look “to the last reasoned
[state court] decision that finally resolve[d] the claim at issue.” Amado v. Gonzalez,
758 F.3d 1119, 1130 (9th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Because the parties are familiar with the factual and procedural history of the case,
we need not recount it here.
Where, as here, § 2254(d) applies to a petitioner’s claims, federal habeas
relief may not be granted unless it is shown that the earlier state court’s decision
was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or “based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Harrington v. Richter,
562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). In other words, the state court’s ruling must be “so
lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended
in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington,
562 U.S. at 103.
First, Manley argues that his trial counsel’s advice in connection with his
decision to enter a guilty plea constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. An
ineffective assistance claim requires proving that (1) “counsel’s representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and (2) there is a reasonable
probability that “but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
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proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
688, 694 (1984). Manley argues that the Nevada state court’s conclusion that his
trial counsel was not ineffective meets all three potential pathways to habeas relief
under § 2254(d). We disagree. The state court’s determination that Manley’s trial
counsel made no guarantees to Manley that he could withdraw his guilty plea if the
law regarding the execution of juvenile offenders ever changed was not an
unreasonable determination of fact in light of the testimony given during the state
habeas evidentiary hearing. See Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010).
Nor was the state court’s decision contrary to clearly established law. While
the Nevada Supreme Court decision did not apply the Strickland test, this was not
erroneous because the only issue presented was the trial court’s credibility
determination. See Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (per curiam) (“Avoiding
[a ‘contrary to’ error] does not require citation . . . [or] awareness of [Supreme
Court] cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court
decision contradicts them.”) (emphasis in original). Furthermore, the Nevada trial
court’s decision – which addressed Manley’s ineffective assistance of counsel
claims – cited Strickland and laid out the relevant two-part test. See Wilson v.
Sellers, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1193–96 (2018) (explaining that “federal
habeas law employs a ‘look through’ presumption”).
Finally, the state court’s decision was not an unreasonable application of
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clearly established federal law. The Supreme Court has cautioned that “[f]ederal
habeas courts must guard against the danger of equating unreasonableness under
Strickland with unreasonableness under § 2254(d). When § 2254(d) applies, the
question is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable. The question is whether
there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential
standard.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105. Here, while perhaps counsel could have
better communicated to Manley that the chances of withdrawing his plea were
extremely remote, the Court finds that given the uncertain state of the law
surrounding juvenile death sentences at the time Manley entered into his plea there
is a reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.
See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770 (1970) (“That a guilty plea must be
intelligently made is not a requirement that all advice offered by the defendant’s
lawyer withstand retrospective examination in a post-conviction hearing.”).
Second, Manley also argues that the Nevada Supreme Court unreasonably
applied clearly established federal law when it upheld his guilty plea. A guilty plea
must be “intelligent and voluntary.” Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
Voluntariness of a plea is determined “only by considering all of the relevant
circumstances surrounding it.” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749 (1970).
As part of this totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, courts frequently consider
defendant’s written plea agreements and statements made during the plea hearing.
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See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73–74 (1977) (“[T]he representations of the
defendant, his lawyer, and the prosecutor at [a plea] hearing, as well as any
findings made by the judge accepting the plea, constitute a formidable barrier in
any subsequent collateral proceedings.”); United States v. Mims, 928 F.2d 310, 313
(9th Cir. 1991) (“We attach substantial weight to contemporaneous on-the-record
statements in assessing the voluntariness of pleas.”) (citation omitted); see, e.g.,
United States v. Kaczynski, 239 F.3d 1108, 1114–15 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, the
Nevada Supreme Court focused its analysis on the written plea agreement and the
plea canvass, including the trial court’s questioning of both Manley’s defense
counsel and Manley himself. Given the broadness of the rule governing the validity
of plea agreements, the Nevada Supreme Court’s opinion was not an unreasonable
application of clearly established federal law. See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541
U.S. 652, 664 (2004) (“The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in
reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations.”) (citation omitted).
AFFIRMED.
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