Hipolito Chacoan v. Alvaro Traquina , 580 F. App'x 574 ( 2014 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUN 25 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
HIPOLITO M. CHACOAN, ) No. 12-15871
)
Plaintiff - Appellant, ) D.C. No. 2:05-cv-02276-MCE-KJN
)
v. ) MEMORANDUM*
)
ALVARO TRAQUINA, M.D., )
)
Defendant - Appellee. )
)
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Morrison C. England, Jr., Chief District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 9, 2014**
San Francisco, California
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, FERNANDEZ, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
Hipolito Chacoan appeals from the judgment issued by the district court
after a jury’s determination that Dr. Alvaro Traquina, the Chief Medical Officer at
California State Prison, Solano, was not deliberately indifferent to Chacoan’s
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral
argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
serious medical needs. We affirm.
(1) Chacoan asserts that the district court erred when it instructed the jury
on the elements he had to prove to establish supervisory deliberate indifference by
Dr. Traquina. We disagree. The instruction given was sufficient to inform the jury
that Dr. Traquina could be found responsible for his own deliberate indifference if
he failed to act to prevent harm caused by the deliberately indifferent conduct of
his subordinates that was known to him. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 663 n.7, 691, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2022 n.7, 2036, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978);
Lemire v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2013);
Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); see also OSU Student Alliance
v. Ray, 699 F.3d 1053, 1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 2012) (pleading standards), cert.
denied, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 70, 187 L. Ed. 2d 29 (2013); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d
1202, 1205–07 (9th Cir. 2011) (same); cf. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 844,
114 S. Ct. 1970, 1982–83, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1994). Moreover, even if on this
record the instruction was not a model of perfection, it is more probable than not
that any ambiguity in the instruction was harmless. See Clem v. Lomeli, 566 F.3d
1177, 1182 (9th Cir. 2009); Dang v. Cross, 422 F.3d 800, 811 (9th Cir. 2005);
Phillips v. U.S. IRS, 73 F.3d 939, 941 (9th Cir. 1996).
2
(2) Chacoan also asserts that the district court abused its discretion1 when
it did not define the phrase “serious medical need” for the jury. Again, we
disagree. Nothing in this record indicates that the jury was confused by that
phrase, even if “more elaboration might not have been improper.” United States v.
Keyser, 704 F.3d 631, 643 (9th Cir. 2012). Moreover, both parties told the jury
that Chacoan had a serious medical condition. Here, too, our review of the record
indicates that if there was any lack of clarity, it was harmless.
AFFIRMED.
1
See Dang, 422 F.3d at 804.
3