United States v. Daniela Ledesma-Saldivar ( 2023 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 15 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 20-50351
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
3:20-mj-20174-WVG-CAB-1
v.
DANIELA LEDESMA-SALDIVAR, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Cathy Ann Bencivengo, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 11, 2023**
Pasadena, California
Before: HURWITZ and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges, and KANE,*** District Judge.
Daniela Ledesma-Saldivar appeals her conviction of misdemeanor improper
attempted entry by an alien in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1). We have
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Yvette Kane, United States District Judge for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
1. Ledesma-Saldivar first argues that the Government failed to satisfy its
obligations under the corpus delicti rule. Under this rule, a “confession standing
alone is not necessarily sufficient to support [a] conviction” because “to serve as a
basis for conviction, the government must also adduce some independent
corroborating evidence.” United States v. Valdez-Novoa, 780 F.3d 906, 922 (9th
Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Corona-Garcia, 210 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir.
2000)). The government “need not introduce independent evidence of every element
of the crime.” United States v. Lopez-Alvarez, 970 F.2d 583, 591 (9th Cir. 1992). It
must “support independently only the gravamen of the offense—the existence of the
injury that forms the core of the offense and a link to a criminal actor—with tangible
evidence.” Id.Ledesma-Saldivar argues that the core of § 1325(a)(1) includes the specific
method of entry, so the Government must provide some independent corroborating
evidence that she entered the U.S. outside a port of entry. Assuming arguendo that
the corpus delicti rule applies and the core of § 1325(a)(1) includes the method of
entry, the Government provided sufficient corroborating evidence. The Government
showed that Ledesma-Saldivar was apprehended in a remote and rugged area near
the border, without any outdoor gear, traveling toward the nearest port of entry. This
evidence corroborates Ledesma-Saldivar’s confession that “she walked through the
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mountains around Tijuana, Mexico, to the United States” and verifies the
trustworthiness of her admission. See Valdez-Novoa, 780 F.3d at 923–24.
2. Ledesma-Saldivar next contends that the district court erred by denying
her motion to suppress her confession, arguing that the Government did not meet its
burden to show that Ledesma-Saldivar was advised of her rights under Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). “The adequacy of a Miranda warning is a legal
question reviewable de novo, although ‘the factual findings underlying the adequacy
challenge, such as what a defendant was told, are subject to clearly erroneous
review.’” United States v. Lares-Valdez, 939 F.2d 688, 689 (9th Cir. 1991) (per
curiam) (quoting United States v. Bland, 908 F.2d 471, 472 (9th Cir. 1990)).
The district court’s finding that Ledesma-Saldivar was advised of her
Miranda rights was not clearly erroneous. The agent testified that he “read her the
Miranda rights,” going “line by line” on the I-214 Form, the form indicated that she
understood her rights, she signed the form, and she specifically initialed the section
stating that she understood her rights and would speak without an attorney present.
See United States v. Loucious, 847 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (“The police can
always be certain that Miranda has been satisfied if they simply read the defendant
his rights from a prepared card.” (cleaned up)).
3. Lastly, Ledesma-Saldivar argues that the Government failed to show
that she was the person apprehended by border officials because the arresting agent
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testified during trial that the person he apprehended was “Danieli,” not “Daniela”
(Ledesma-Saldivar’s first name). She also challenges both in-court identifications
because she was wearing a mask in the courtroom and the agents could not see her
entire face. This is a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, so we must determine
whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a
rational trier of fact could have identified Ledesma-Saldivar as the arrested
individual beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Lindsey, 634 F.3d 541, 551
(9th Cir. 2011).
The Government presented evidence that (1) the interrogating agent testified
that he confirmed during the post-arrest interview that the suspect’s name was
Daniela; (2) another agent’s database search used the name Daniela; and (3) the
arresting agent and the interrogating agent both identified Ledesma-Saldivar in the
courtroom as the suspect they encountered. See United States v. Ginn, 87 F.3d 367,
369 (9th Cir. 1996) (“The testimony of one witness, if solidly believed, is sufficient
to prove the identity of a perpetrator of crime.” (cleaned up)); United States v. Smith,
563 F.2d 1361, 1362–63 (9th Cir. 1977) (upholding a witness’s in-court
identification of a suspect who was wearing “a scarf covering the bottom half of his
face” during the robbery). Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the
Government, we hold that a rational factfinder could identify Ledesma-Saldivar
beyond a reasonable doubt as the person arrested. See Lindsey, 634 F.3d at 551.
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AFFIRMED.
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