De La Cruz v. Garland ( 2023 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          JUN 15 2023
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    OMAR TALAVERA DE LA CRUZ,                       No. 21-548
    Agency No.
    Petitioner,                        A205-312-995
    v.                                             MEMORANDUM*
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted June 9, 2023**
    Pasadena, California
    Before: GRABER and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and TUNHEIM,*** District
    Judge.
    Petitioner Omar Talavera De La Cruz, a native and citizen of Mexico,
    timely seeks review of a Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
    precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable John R. Tunheim, United States District Judge for
    the District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.
    dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of asylum,
    withholding of removal, protection under the Convention Against Torture
    (“CAT”), and cancellation of removal. We deny the petition in part and dismiss
    it in part.
    When the BIA adopts the decision of the IJ while adding its own
    reasoning, we review both decisions and treat any additional findings by the
    BIA as part of the final agency decision. Arteaga-De Alvarez v. Holder, 
    704 F.3d 730
    , 735 (9th Cir. 2012). “We review purely legal questions de novo, and
    the agency’s factual findings for substantial evidence.” Perez-Portillo v.
    Garland, 
    56 F.4th 788
    , 792 (9th Cir. 2022). Under the substantial evidence
    standard, “administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable
    adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(B).
    1. Petitioner argues that his immigration proceedings must be terminated
    because the immigration court lacked jurisdiction due to a defective Notice to
    Appear (“NTA”). Jurisdiction in immigration proceedings vests “when a
    charging document is filed with the Immigration Court by the Service.” 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.14
    (a). An NTA is a charging document. 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.13
    .
    Petitioner suggests that, under Pereira v. Sessions, an NTA is defective when it
    fails to include the time and place of removal proceedings. 
    138 S. Ct. 2105
    ,
    2113–14 (2018). The NTA in Petitioner’s case did not specify the time and
    place of his hearing. Thus, Petitioner argues that jurisdiction never vested in the
    2
    immigration court.
    Petitioner misconstrues the effect of Pereira on his case. We have
    previously held that a defective NTA does not invalidate the jurisdiction of the
    immigration court. See United States v. Bastide-Hernandez, 
    39 F.4th 1187
    ,
    1193 & n.9 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc), cert. denied, 
    143 S. Ct. 755 (2023)
    .
    Because the agency supplemented Petitioner’s NTA with the missing
    information, the immigration court properly exercised jurisdiction.
    2. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision that Petitioner did not demonstrate
    that he filed his asylum application within the one-year deadline or qualified for
    an exception. Petitioner did not meaningfully challenge the BIA’s finding
    before us, so the issue is waived on appeal. See Lopez-Vasquez v. Holder, 
    706 F.3d 1072
    , 1079–80 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that a petitioner waived issues not
    specifically raised and argued in an opening brief).
    3. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s decision to deny
    withholding of removal. We assume without deciding that “indigenous
    Mexicans” or “members of the Purepecha or Tarasco group” are cognizable
    particular social groups. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that
    Petitioner failed to meet the “clear probability” standard required for
    withholding of removal. See Tamang v. Holder, 
    598 F.3d 1083
    , 1094 (9th Cir.
    2010).
    Petitioner did not claim that he experienced past persecution, so his claim
    was based on fear of future persecution. Here, substantial evidence supports the
    3
    BIA’s finding that Petitioner failed to establish that he would face any
    individualized risk of future persecution on account of his particular social
    group. Critically, none of Petitioner’s other family members who live in
    Mexico have been threatened or harmed. See 
    id.
     (“[A] petitioner’s fear of future
    persecution ‘is weakened, even undercut, when similarly-situated family
    members’ living in the petitioner’s home country are not harmed.” (citations
    omitted)). We therefore deny this portion of the petition.
    4. Petitioner challenges the BIA’s decision denying his CAT claim as
    having relied too heavily on internal relocation. But substantial evidence
    supports the BIA’s denial of Petitioner’s CAT claim because Petitioner did not
    establish that he faces a particularized risk of torture or that the Mexican
    government would acquiesce to any torture. Therefore, we deny his petition as
    to the CAT claim.
    5. Finally, Petitioner challenges the denial of cancellation of removal.
    Cancellation of removal is a discretionary form of relief available to those who
    are ordered removed but otherwise meet the requirements under 8 U.S.C.
    § 1229b(b)(1). Because the BIA and the IJ denied cancellation of removal
    based on discretionary factors, we lack jurisdiction to review that decision
    unless Petitioner raises a constitutional claim or a question of law. See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a)(2)(B) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law . . . no court shall
    have jurisdiction to review . . . any judgment regarding the granting of relief
    under section [1229b.]”); 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a)(2)(D) (creating an exception for
    4
    review of constitutional claims or questions of law). Because Petitioner
    challenges only the discretionary denial of relief, we dismiss for lack of
    jurisdiction. See Arteaga-De Alvarez, 
    704 F.3d at 735
     (“In cancellation of
    removal cases we lack jurisdiction to ‘review [ ] the merits of a hardship
    determination.’” (quoting Mendez–Castro v. Mukasey, 
    552 F.3d 975
    , 978 (9th
    Cir. 2009) (alteration in original))).
    PETITION DENIED in part and DISMISSED in part. The stay of
    removal will remain in place until the mandate issues.
    5