Rodtravion Woods v. W.L. Montgomery ( 2023 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 16 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RODTRAVION WOODS, No. 14-56195
Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No.
2:13-cv-05524-JFW-SS
v.
W. L. MONTGOMERY, Acting Warden, MEMORANDUM*
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
John F. Walter, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted April 12, 2023
San Francisco, California
Before: S.R. THOMAS, PAEZ, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Rodtravion Woods, a California state prisoner, appeals the district court’s
denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition (§ 2254 petition) challenging his
convictions for attempted first degree murder, shooting from a motor vehicle, and
being a felon in possession of a firearm. We granted a certificate of appealability
on two issues and have jurisdiction to consider Woods’s appeal pursuant to 28
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a). We affirm the district court’s denial of the petition.
We review de novo the district court’s denial of a § 2254 petition. Balbuena
v. Sullivan, 980 F.3d 619, 628 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Our review is
constrained by the deferential standard of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) as to “any claim that was adjudicated on the merits
in State court proceedings.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A federal court may only grant
habeas relief if the state court’s ruling was: (1) “contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States,” or (2) “based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2).
1. In his supplemental brief, Woods argues that we should grant his separate
application to file a second or successive petition, stay this appeal, and permit him
to file a motion, in the district court, to reopen and amend his original petition. We
deny Woods’s application to file a second or successive petition in a separate
memorandum disposition filed simultaneously with this order because Woods fails
to show that “the factual predicate for [his claims] could not have been discovered
previously through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i).
2. The district court denied Woods’s § 2254 petition in which he alleged that
his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance under Strickland v. Washington,
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466 U.S. 668 (1984) by failing to impeach Delorian Forman, the victim and only
testifying eyewitness to the shooting, with his prior conviction for making criminal
threats. A petitioner raising an ineffective assistance claim “must show that
counsel’s performance was deficient” and “that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense.” Id. at 687. Prejudice exists when there is “a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694.
Woods did not raise this ineffective assistance claim until he filed a post-
conviction petition with the California Supreme Court. That court summarily
denied the petition. A summary denial from the California Supreme Court is
considered an adjudication on the merits for AEDPA purposes, Cullen v.
Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 187–88 & n.12 (2011), and AEDPA requires that Woods
show “there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief,” Demetrulias
v. Davis, 14 F.4th 898, 906 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562
U.S. 86, 98 (2011)).
The California Supreme Court could have reasonably concluded that Woods
was not prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failure to impeach Forman with his
criminal threats conviction. The jury heard from Forman that he was a gang
member and that he had to be taken into custody to secure his testimony at trial.
Additionally, the California Supreme Court could have relied on Forman’s
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consistent accounts of the shooting and the cell phone records that undermined
Woods’s alibi.1
3. Woods also argues that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to
impeach Forman with his prior statement to Anthony Jones identifying another
person as the shooter. Because Woods raised this claim before the state courts, we
“look through” to the last reasoned state court decision addressing its merits—here,
the California Court of Appeal’s opinion on direct review—and read the California
Supreme Court’s unexplained order rejecting the claim to rest upon the same
ground. Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018).2
The California Court of Appeal determined that trial counsel’s deficient
performance was not prejudicial because: (1) Forman’s account of the shooting
1
Woods argues that Forman later executed a declaration in which he recanted
his identification of the shooter. We are limited to considering the record that was
before the state court when it denied Woods’s application for post-conviction
relief, and Forman’s declaration and subsequent testimony were not before the
state court at that time. See Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181–82. Further, when the
declaration and related evidence was admitted at the state-court exhaustion
proceeding, Forman again identified Woods as the shooter, and the court found
that his testimony was credible.
2
We reject the State’s suggestion that the look-through presumption is
rebutted in this case. See, e.g., Flemming v. Matteson, 26 F.4th 1136, 1143–44
(9th Cir. 2022) (rejecting argument that the presumption is rebutted by “internal
state procedures for a state supreme court indicating that its summary, unreasoned
orders do not adopt the lower court’s rationale”); Wilson, 138 S. Ct. at 1196(providing examples of circumstances that may be sufficient to rebut the
presumption).
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was “stable and resolute”; and (2) Woods’s alibi defense was fatally undermined
by T-Mobile records showing the location of Woods’s cellular phone. On this
record, we cannot say that the state court erred by concluding that Woods failed to
establish a reasonable probability that the proffered impeachment evidence would
have affected the verdict.
AFFIRMED.
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