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 2023-07

Carlos Andrews v. Megan Brennan ( 2023 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JUL 20 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CARLOS L. ANDREWS,                              No.    22-35081
Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 4:20-cv-00011-BMM
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MEGAN J. BRENNAN, Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Brian M. Morris, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 19, 2023**
Before: WALLACE, O’SCANNLAIN, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
Carlos Andrews appeals from the district court’s denial of his post-trial
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Because the facts are known to the
parties, we repeat them here only as necessary to explain our decision.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
I
The district court properly denied Andrews’s post-trial motion, whether that
motion is construed as having been brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
50(b) or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e).
A Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law should be granted when
“the evidence permits only one reasonable conclusion, and that conclusion is
contrary to the jury’s verdict.” EEOC v. Go Daddy Software, Inc.,
    581 F.3d 951
    , 961
(9th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up). But when, as here, no Rule 50(a) motion was brought
before submission to the jury, the Rule 50(b) motion should be granted only if the
jury’s verdict was plain error. See
    id.
     Although Andrews offers his own reading of
the record, he does not meaningfully address the copious evidence supporting the
jury’s verdict, let alone show that the jury’s verdict was plain error.
A Rule 59(e) motion to amend the judgment may be granted only if “1) the
motion is necessary to correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which the judgment
is based; 2) the moving party presents newly discovered or previously unavailable
evidence; 3) the motion is necessary to prevent manifest injustice; or 4) there is an
intervening change in controlling law.” Turner v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R. Co.,
    338 F.3d 1058
    , 1063 (9th Cir. 2003) (cleaned up). Even if one of these conditions is
present, the district court has considerable discretion to deny the motion. See
    id.
    Andrews fails meaningfully to argue for the presence of any of the conditions which
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would have allowed the district court to grant his motion, let alone that the district
court’s denial of that motion was an abuse of discretion.
Since the jury verdict was not plain error, and the district court did not abuse
its discretion in not amending the judgment, Andrews’ motion was properly denied.
II
Andrews also claims that the district court’s jury instructions were plain error,
and so reversible despite his failure to object prior to this appeal. See Erickson
Prods., Inc. v. Kast,
    921 F.3d 822
    , 828 (9th Cir. 2019). But none of his arguments
for plain error is convincing.
First, Andrews argues that the jury should have been given a ‘motivating
factor’ disparate treatment instruction. But “[a]fter hearing both parties’ evidence,
the district court must decide what legal conclusions the evidence could reasonably
support and instruct the jury accordingly.” Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc.,
    299 F.3d 838
    , 856 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), aff’d,
    539 U.S. 90
     (2003). Here, the district court
gave a ‘sole reason’ instruction because Andrews presented no evidence of mixed
motives. Cf. id. at 857 (distinguishing pretextual reasons from mixed motives).
Second, Andrews argues that the jury should have been instructed as to
‘regarded as disability’ discrimination. But, given the lack of any evidence that any
relevant persons perceived Andrews to be disabled, it was not error for the district
court instead to instruct the jury as to ‘actual disability’ discrimination.
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Third, Andrews argues that the instructions should have described his alleged
injuries, but he gives no reason to think such an instruction appropriate.
Fourth, Andrews argues that the jury should have been instructed as to USPS’s
‘interactive process’ obligation. But the ‘interactive process’ burden-shifting
framework applies at summary judgment, not at trial. See Snapp v. United Transp.
Union,
    889 F.3d 1088
    , 1100 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that district court did not err in
declining to instruct jury as to the interactive process obligation).
In sum, Andrews fails to show that the district court’s jury instructions were
error, let alone plain error.
III
Finally, Andrews argues that the district court erred in allowing a non-expert
to testify regarding her understanding of a medical disability. But Andrews did not
raise this argument below, and this case presents no “exceptional circumstances” to
“overcome the presumption against hearing new arguments” on appeal. AMA
Multimedia, LLC v. Wanat,
    970 F.3d 1201
    , 1213-14 (9th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up).
Accordingly, we decline to reach this argument.
IV
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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