Maria Reimers v. Uscis ( 2023 )


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  •                             NOT FOR PUBLICATION                          FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JUN 2 2023
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    MARIA ELENA REIMERS, USCIS A# 097 No. 22-35248
    107 629,
    D.C. No. 2:20-cv-00459-RMP
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                       MEMORANDUM*
    UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND
    IMMIGRATION SERVICES; et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Washington
    Rosanna Malouf Peterson, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted April 12, 2023
    Seattle, Washington
    Before: McKEOWN, BYBEE, and DESAI, Circuit Judges.
    Maria Reimers, a lawful permanent resident, appeals the district court’s grant
    of summary judgment in favor of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
    (“USCIS”), several of its employees, and the U.S. Attorney General (collectively,
    “Defendants”) in Ms. Reimers’s action under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1421
    (c) challenging
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    USCIS’s denial of her application for naturalization. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     and review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
    See Park v. Barr, 
    946 F.3d 1096
    , 1097 (9th Cir. 2020). We affirm.
    1.     Ms. Reimers first challenges the district court’s holding that she is
    ineligible for naturalization. To qualify for naturalization, an applicant must
    establish that “during the five years immediately preceding the date of filing [the]
    application,” she “has been and still is a person of good moral character.” 
    8 U.S.C. § 1427
    (a). But an applicant is precluded from establishing good moral character if
    she violated the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”). 
    8 U.S.C. §§ 1101
    (f)(3),
    1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II); 
    8 C.F.R. § 316.10
    (b)(2)(iv). A violation of the CSA is “a per
    se bar to naturalization.” Hussein v. Barrett, 
    820 F.3d 1083
    , 1088 (9th Cir. 2016).
    Ms. Reimers admitted to operating a marijuana business. Even though Ms.
    Reimers’s business is licensed under Washington law, it nevertheless constitutes a
    violation of the CSA. See 
    21 U.S.C. § 812
    , Schedule I(c)(10) (designating marijuana
    as a controlled substance). And, even though Ms. Reimers may otherwise be eligible
    to naturalize, her operation of a licensed marijuana business categorically precludes
    her from qualifying for naturalization.
    We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment.1
    1
    Ms. Reimers also argues that the district court erred by granting summary
    judgment because she was entitled to a full evidentiary hearing under 
    8 U.S.C. § 2
                                       22-35248
    2.     Ms. Reimers also challenges the constitutionality of the “good moral
    character” statutory bar. Her Commerce Clause, Supremacy Clause, and Tenth
    Amendment arguments are foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent. In Gonzales v.
    Raich, 
    545 U.S. 1
     (2005), the Supreme Court held that the CSA’s criminalization of
    purely intrastate manufacture, distribution, or possession of marijuana was a proper
    exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority. 
    Id.
     at 25–26. And Gonzales held
    that the CSA preempts state marijuana laws. 
    Id. at 29
    . The Court has also held that
    when Congress acts under one of its enumerated powers, there is no Tenth
    Amendment violation. New York v. United States, 
    505 U.S. 144
    , 156–57 (1992);
    United States v. Mikhel, 
    889 F.3d 1003
    , 1024 (9th Cir. 2018) (“‘[I]f Congress acts
    under one of its enumerated powers’ . . . then ‘there can be no violation of the Tenth
    Amendment.’”) (quoting United States v. Jones, 
    231 F.3d 508
    , 515 (9th Cir. 2000)).
    Ms. Reimers’s equal protection claim also fails. She contends that she is
    treated differently than citizen marijuana business owners, but Ms. Reimers is not a
    citizen and, moreover, the naturalization statutes do not apply to citizens. Ms.
    Reimers has not shown that Defendants treated similarly situated individuals—other
    1421(c). Even if we assume—without deciding—that § 1421(c) entitled Ms.
    Reimers to a full hearing, she cross-moved for summary judgment, and thus
    relinquished any right to a full hearing. Cf. In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 
    627 F.3d 376
    , 386 (9th Cir. 2010); Johnson v. I.N.S., 
    971 F.2d 340
    , 343–44 (9th Cir. 1992)
    (holding that the invited error doctrine precluded a litigant from challenging the
    admissibility of a document on appeal when her own lawyer introduced the
    document below).
    3                                   22-35248
    non-citizen marijuana business owners—differently under the naturalization
    statutes. See United States v. Quintero, 
    995 F.3d 1044
    , 1057 (9th Cir. 2021)
    (rejecting equal protection claim because two groups were “not comparable for equal
    protection purposes” and the government had “different interests” related to each
    group).
    We thus affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in Defendants’
    favor on Ms. Reimers’s constitutional challenges.
    AFFIRMED.
    4                                   22-35248