United States v. June Gibson ( 2023 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 9 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 22-10164
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
1:16-cr-00746-JMS-6
v.
JUNE GIBSON, MEMORANDUM *
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii
J. Michael Seabright, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 7, 2023**
Honolulu, Hawaii
Before: BADE, BUMATAY, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.
June Gibson appeals the district court’s denial of her second motion for
compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). We review for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Aruda, 993 F.3d 797, 799 (9th Cir. 2021).
We affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
The district court recognized and applied the correct legal standard for
determining whether it could exercise its discretion to reduce Gibson’s sentence
under § 3582(c)(1)(A). 1 Consistent with our subsequent holding in United States
v. Chen, 48 F.4th 1092 (9th Cir. 2022), the district court determined “that non-
retroactive changes in sentencing law . . . can constitute extraordinary and
compelling reasons to reduce sentences under § 3582(c)(1)(A) when considered on
an individualized basis.”2 See id. at 1098. The court recognized that, if Gibson
were sentenced today under the new, non-retroactive sentencing changes brought
about by the First Step Act, see id. at 1094, she would be eligible for a sentence of
imprisonment below the previously applicable statutory mandatory minimum.
Upon considered review of Gibson’s individualized circumstances, the
district court concluded that the disparity between the sentence Gibson was serving
and the “most optimistic potential post-FSA sentence” that she might receive did
not constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason justifying a reduction in her
sentence. See Chen, 48 F.4th at 1100 (holding that “the petitioning defendant still
1
Gibson’s argument that we should reconsider the analytical approach for
compassionate release motions is unavailing because we are bound by the
framework that this court has applied for analyzing motions under § 3582(c)(1)(A).
See United States v. Wright, 46 F.4th 938, 945, 947 (9th Cir. 2022); Miller v.
Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 892–93 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
2
Although Chen was issued after Gibson filed her opening brief, the parties
are aware of Chen and appropriately discussed this decision in their subsequent
briefs.
2
must demonstrate that [the relevant] non-retroactive changes rise to the level of
‘extraordinary and compelling’ in his individualized circumstances”). In reaching
this conclusion, the district court applied the correct legal standard, reached a
logical and reasonable conclusion based on the “review of the entire record” and
Gibson’s individual circumstances, and adequately explained its decision. See id.
at 1095 (recognizing that “the determination of what constitutes extraordinary and
compelling reasons for sentence reduction lies squarely within the district court’s
discretion”); see also Wright, 46 F.4th at 949 (discussing factors relevant to the
sufficiency of a court’s explanation).
Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief under
§ 3582(c)(1)(A). See id. at 945 (explaining that a district court may “deny
compassionate release if a defendant fails to satisfy any of the[] grounds” set forth
in 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)).
AFFIRMED.
3