Jessie Roberts v. Danny Samuel ( 2023 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 31 2023
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
JESSIE C. ROBERTS, No. 20-56365
Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:19-cv-04002-JLS-DFM
v.
DANNY SAMUEL, MEMORANDUM*
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Josephine L. Staton, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 9, 2023
Pasadena, California
Before: WATFORD and COLLINS, Circuit Judges, and MURPHY,** District
Judge.
Jessie Roberts appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.
I
Roberts “visited three different car dealerships” in California “over two
consecutive days” and “tried, with varying degrees of success, to steal a car from
each dealership.” People v. Roberts, 2017 WL 4112240, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as
provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Stephen Joseph Murphy III, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.
18, 2017). At two of the dealerships—a Toyota dealership in Glendale and a
Chevy dealership in Lancaster—Roberts drove away while an employee of the
dealership was still in the car with him. Id. at *1–*2. A jury eventually convicted
Roberts on several counts, including two that required a showing of specific
intent—namely, (1) carjacking in violation of California Penal Code § 215(a), for
the incident at the Chevy dealership; and (2) kidnapping for carjacking in violation
of California Penal Code § 209.5(a), for the incident at the Toyota dealership.
After his convictions were affirmed on direct review, Roberts filed for habeas
corpus relief from the California state courts, asserting, inter alia, that his counsel
had been ineffective in failing to investigate and present a mental-state defense to
the specific-intent charges. After the state courts denied relief, Roberts filed a
federal habeas petition that included this ineffective assistance claim. The district
court denied the petition. We granted a certificate of appealability limited to the
question whether Roberts’s “trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate
and present testimony from mental health experts concerning whether appellant
lacked the specific intent to commit carjacking and kidnapping during the
commission of a carjacking.”
II
Roberts argues that, because the various state-law procedural grounds on
which his state habeas corpus petition was denied by the Los Angeles Superior
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Court and the California Court of Appeal were all patently erroneous, the
California Supreme Court’s subsequent summary denial of his petition must be
understood as resting on the merits rather than on those flawed state-law
procedural grounds. See Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1196 (2018) (noting
that the presumption that the state supreme court relied on the same ground as the
lower state courts may not apply “where the lower state court decision is
unreasonable”). On that basis, Roberts concedes that the deferential standards of
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) apply to our review
of the California Supreme Court’s rejection of his ineffective assistance claim on
the merits. The State agrees with that latter proposition, and we proceed on the
same basis.
Where, as here, “a state court’s decision is unaccompanied by an
explanation, the habeas petitioner’s burden” under AEDPA requires him to show
that “there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Harrington
v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011) (emphasis added). We therefore “must
determine what arguments or theories supported or, as here, could have supported,
the state court’s decision; and then [we] must ask whether it is possible fairminded
jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the
holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court.” Id. at 102 (emphasis added).
We must, in other words, affirm the denial of habeas relief unless we conclude that
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the California Supreme Court’s summary rejection of the merits of Roberts’s
ineffective assistance claim was erroneous, under any possible theory, “beyond any
possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 103.
To establish an ineffective assistance claim, a criminal defendant must show
that “counsel’s performance was deficient” and that “the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
Here, Roberts argues that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient because
counsel failed to investigate or present “a mental state defense to the specific intent
requirements of the charged crimes.” To establish prejudice with respect to this
claim, Roberts had to show that it was “‘reasonably likely’ that the result would
have been different” had the mental health evidence Roberts submitted with his
state habeas petition been presented at trial. Richter, 562 U.S. at 111 (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696). Although the “reasonably likely” standard “does not
require a showing that counsel’s actions ‘more likely than not altered the
outcome,’” the “likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just
conceivable.” Id. at 111–12 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693). Assuming
arguendo that Roberts’s trial counsel performed deficiently in failing to investigate
and present such a defense, we hold that the California Supreme Court nonetheless
could reasonably have concluded that Roberts was not prejudiced thereby.
The jury instructions in this case—which no party contends were legally
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erroneous—provided that “[t]he Specific Intent required for the crime of
Carjacking is the intent to deprive the other person of possession of the vehicle
either temporarily or permanently.” See People v. Magallanes, 92 Cal. Rptr. 3d
751, 756 (Ct. App. 2009). The jury instructions further explained that “[t]he
Specific Intent required for the crime of Kidnapping for Carjacking is the intent to
facilitate the commission of Carjacking.” See People v. Medina, 161 P.3d 187,
191–92 (Cal. 2007). The California appellate courts have held that a kidnapping
“facilitate[s]” the commission of a carjacking if, inter alia, it “make[s] it easier to
take the victim’s car” or is intended “to effect [an] escape . . . or to remove the
victim to another place where he might less easily sound an alarm.” People v.
Perez, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376, 378–79 (Ct. App. 2000) (citation omitted). However,
the intended escape need not be successful or well-planned: “An escape attempt
that is poorly thought out is still an escape attempt.” Id. at 379.
Roberts’s petition presented evidence indicating that he suffered from
serious mental illness, including auditory hallucinations and delusional thinking.
According to this evidence, his delusions included “magical” thinking about “the
physical characteristics and attributes of vehicles,” which influenced “the cars that
he chose to take.” Although this evidence strongly supports the view that his
motivation for committing the crime of carjacking was influenced by his mental
illness, the California Supreme Court could reasonably conclude that it would not
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have altered the jury’s assessment of his ability to form the specific intent to
deprive the Chevy dealership “of the vehicle either temporarily or permanently.”
That is, the state high court could reasonably conclude that Roberts’s actions at the
Chevy dealership demonstrated an ability to form and execute a plan to take a
car—indeed, he said during that incident, “All I want is a car.” Roberts, 2017 WL
4112240, at *1.
Likewise, with respect to the kidnapping for carjacking at the Toyota
dealership, the California Supreme Court could reasonably conclude that Roberts’s
mental health evidence would not have altered the jury’s determination that
Roberts intended his kidnapping of the dealership employee to facilitate the
carjacking. The trial evidence showed that Roberts requested a test drive with the
Toyota employee; that once in the driver’s seat, he drove away from the dealership
at a high rate of speed; that he initially ignored the employee’s requests to slow
down, pull over, and let him out; and that it was not until they had traveled 10
blocks that Roberts finally pulled into a parking lot and allowed the employee to
leave. Roberts, 2017 WL 4112240, at *1. The California Supreme Court could
reasonably conclude that, although Roberts’s delusional thinking concerning cars
influenced his desire to take one, his behaviors nonetheless confirmed that he was
able to form the specific intent to continue driving with the employee in the car in
order to facilitate the carjacking. In reaching such a conclusion, the California
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Supreme Court would not have erred “beyond any possibility for fairminded
disagreement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 103.
AFFIRMED.
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