Damian Raffele v. Vca, Inc. ( 2023 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        AUG 25 2023
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    DAMIAN RAFFELE,                                 No.    22-55502
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 8:18-cv-01727-MAA
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    VCA, INC.,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    The Honorable Maria A. Audero, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
    Submitted August 18, 2023**
    Pasadena, California
    Before: TASHIMA, CHRISTEN, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.
    Plaintiff-Appellant Damian Raffele (“Raffele”) appeals from a jury verdict
    finding that his former employer, Veterinary Centers of America, Inc. (“VCA”),
    (1) did not fail to accommodate his disability and (2) did not discriminate against
    him. Raffele also appeals from the district court’s order striking his Rule 59
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Motion for a New Trial because of his failure to comply with Central District of
    California Local Rule 7-3, which requires a conference with opposing counsel at
    least seven days before the filing of such a motion. We review the jury verdict for
    substantial evidence, Dunlap v. Liberty Nat. Prods., Inc., 
    878 F.3d 794
    , 797 (9th
    Cir. 2017), and we review the district court’s application of its local rules for abuse
    of discretion.1 Miranda v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 
    710 F.2d 516
    , 521 (9th Cir. 1983).
    For the reasons described below, we affirm both the jury verdict and the district
    court’s order.
    1. Substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict that VCA did not fail to
    accommodate Raffele when it refused to allow Raffele to work from home full
    time. Substantial evidence review is deferential: We must affirm a verdict if there
    is “evidence that is adequate to support the jury’s findings, even if contrary
    findings are also possible.” Dunlap, 
    878 F.3d at 797
    .
    Raffele argues that the jury’s verdict that VCA did not fail to accommodate
    his disability is inconsistent with the jury’s finding that Raffele could perform his
    essential job functions with a reasonable accommodation. We disagree for two
    reasons. First, under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, Raffele is
    not entitled to any specific accommodation; VCA’s only obligation is to offer a
    1
    We review de novo whether a district court’s local rule conflicts with a federal
    rule. Heinemann v. Satterberg, 
    731 F.3d 914
    , 916 (9th Cir. 2013).
    2
    reasonable accommodation. See Raine v. City of Burbank, 
    135 Cal. App. 4th 1215
    ,
    1222 (2006). An accommodation is reasonable if it allows an employee to
    “perform the essential functions of the job the employee holds.” 
    Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, § 11065
    (p)(1)(B). The jury heard evidence that Raffele would not be able to
    perform his essential job functions while working from home full time. Therefore,
    the jury could have concluded that Raffele’s requested accommodation—working
    from home—was not reasonable, but that other accommodations, such as those
    offered by VCA, would enable Raffele to perform his essential job functions.
    Second, an employer is not required to grant an accommodation if an
    employee provides insufficient documentation to show the need for it.
    Documentation can be insufficient if “the health care provider does not have the
    expertise to confirm the applicant’s or employee’s disability or need for reasonable
    accommodation, or other objective factors indicate that the information provided is
    not credible or is fraudulent.” 
    Id.
     § 11069(d)(5)(C). In such cases, “the employer
    may require an employee to go to an appropriate health care provider of the
    employer’s or other covered entity’s choice.” Id. The jury heard evidence that
    VCA did not find Raffele’s medical certification credible, that VCA requested
    Raffele undergo a medical evaluation by a VCA-selected physician, and that
    Raffele never underwent that evaluation. Accordingly, the jury could have found
    that VCA did not fail to accommodate Raffele because there was no valid medical
    3
    certification establishing that Raffele required accommodation.
    2. Substantial evidence supports the jury verdict that VCA did not
    discriminate against Raffele when the employment relationship ended because
    VCA did not discharge him. Although Raffele argues that the fact of his discharge
    is “undisputed,” the jury instructions did not define “discharge” and left to the jury
    the question of whether Raffele’s separation was a discharge. The jury heard
    evidence that VCA terminated Raffele’s position because it concluded he had
    abandoned his job. The jury was empowered to conclude that a separation due to
    abandonment does not constitute a discharge.
    3. The district court did not abuse its discretion in striking Raffele’s Rule 59
    motion. The district court applied the local rules as written and explained its
    reasons for doing so. See United States v. Warren, 
    601 F.2d 471
    , 474 (9th Cir.
    1979) (“Only in rare cases will we question the exercise of discretion in connection
    with the application of local rules.”). Further, Local Rule 7-3 does not conflict with
    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 because it conditions, but does not eliminate, a
    party’s right to file a motion for a new trial. See Marshall v. Gates, 
    44 F.3d 722
    ,
    725 (9th Cir. 1995). Finally, the district court’s decision did not violate Federal
    Rule of Civil Procedure 83(a)(2). The district court did not strike Raffele’s motion
    because of a requirement of form; instead, the court referenced Raffele’s failure to
    include a statement of compliance under Local Rule 7-4 to conclude that Raffele
    4
    did not comply with the substantive conference requirement of Local Rule 7-3.
    AFFIRMED.
    5