United States v. Vahe Dadyan ( 2023 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 7 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 21-50237
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
2:20-cr-00579-SVW-8
v.
VAHE DADYAN, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted June 8, 2023
Pasadena, California
Before: M. SMITH and DESAI, Circuit Judges, and AMON,** District Judge.
A jury convicted Vahe Dadyan of various offenses stemming from an eight-
person conspiracy to fraudulently obtain and launder millions of dollars in federal
Covid-relief funds that were intended to assist businesses impacted by the pandemic.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Carol Bagley Amon, United States District Judge for
the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
Vahe argues that his convictions are not supported by sufficient evidence.1 We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review “de novo the sufficiency
of the evidence, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution
and asking whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Tuan Ngoc Luong, 965
F.3d 973, 980–81 (9th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). We affirm Vahe’s jury convictions.2
1. A rational jury could have convicted Vahe for conspiracy to commit
wire and bank fraud (Count 1). See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343–1344, 1349. “[P]roof of the
defendant’s connection to the conspiracy must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt,
but the connection can be slight.” United States v. Montgomery, 384 F.3d 1050,
1062 (9th Cir. 2004). “[T]he government need not prove the defendant knew all the
conspirators and details or participated in all the conspiracy’s dealings.” United
States v. Jaimez, 45 F.4th 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 2022). Here, evidence shows that
Vahe worked in tandem with co-conspirator Tamara Dadyan to submit a $157,500
loan application with false payroll information for his business, Voyage Limo.
Voyage Limo had, in fact, no payroll activity, and the false information reported on
1
Because Vahe shares the same last name as one of his co-conspirators,
we refer to all defendants by their first names.
2
In a separately filed opinion, we affirm Vahe’s restitution obligation,
except that we remand for Vahe’s judgment and commitment order to be amended
to reflect that his restitution obligation runs jointly and severally with those of his
trial co-defendants.
2
Vahe’s application exactly matched that on other applications submitted by co-
conspirators.
2. A rational jury could have convicted Vahe for conspiracy to commit
money laundering (Count 26). See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). Evidence shows that the
$157,500 from the Voyage Limo loan was deposited in a bank account that Vahe
controlled. Tamara texted Richard Ayvazyan, another co-conspirator, to “send the
account number again so I have [Artur Ayvazyan, another co-conspirator] go deposit
the 157k Vahe.” All but $2,500 of that sum was then transferred with the false
description, “payroll,” to a Runyan Tax Service account controlled by Richard. That
money was then transferred to an escrow company for the purchase of a house. Text
messages between Richard and Tamara then contemplate paying at least $50,000 to
Vahe. And bank records show two $25,000 payments to one of Vahe’s business
accounts.
3. A rational jury could have convicted Vahe, pursuant to Pinkerton, for
bank and wire fraud based on acts taken by his co-conspirators (Counts 8–12, 19–
20). See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343–1344; Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647–
48 (1946) (a defendant is liable for offenses committed by co-conspirators that are
“in furtherance of the conspiracy,” “within the scope” of the conspiracy, and
“reasonably forsee[able]”). On appeal, Vahe does not contend that Pinkerton’s
requirements are not met—he makes only the threshold argument that because “he
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is not guilty of conspiracy, then he cannot be guilty of any of these [Pinkerton-based]
counts.” Because we affirm his conspiracy convictions (supra sections 1 and 2), we
also affirm his Pinkerton-based convictions.
AFFIRMED in part; VACATED AND REMANDED in part (as explained
in the separately filed opinion).
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