Dennis Uptain v. Paul Penzone ( 2023 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       AUG 21 2023
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    DENNIS LEE UPTAIN,                              No. 22-16865
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:22-cv-01751-SPL-JZB
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    PAUL PENZONE; MARICOPA COUNTY
    BOARD OF DIRECTORS; UNKNOWN
    PARTY, Listed as Sheriffs Canteen,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    Steven Paul Logan, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted August 15, 2023**
    Before:      TASHIMA, S.R. THOMAS, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.
    Arizona state prisoner Dennis Lee Uptain appeals pro se from the district
    court’s judgment dismissing his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action alleging constitutional
    violations arising from his pretrial detention. We have jurisdiction under 28
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Resnick
    v. Hayes, 
    213 F.3d 443
    , 447 (9th Cir. 2000). We affirm.
    The district court properly dismissed Uptain’s action because Uptain failed
    to allege facts sufficient to show that the jail’s meals or commissary prices put
    Uptain at a substantial risk of suffering serious harm, or that defendants
    intentionally discriminated against him. See Gordon v. County of Orange, 
    888 F.3d 1118
    , 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2018) (setting forth the elements of a claim for
    unconstitutional conditions of confinement); Hebbe v. Pliler, 
    627 F.3d 338
    , 341-42
    (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining that although pro se pleadings are construed liberally,
    plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for
    relief); SeaRiver Mar. Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Mineta, 
    309 F.3d 662
    , 679 (9th Cir.
    2002) (explaining that a “class of one” discrimination claim requires showing a
    plaintiff “has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated
    and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment”); Barren v.
    Harrington, 
    152 F.3d 1193
    , 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order) (explaining that a
    discrimination claim generally requires showing “an intent or purpose to
    discriminate” based on membership in a protected class).
    To the extent Uptain intended to raise a due process claim based on the
    circumstances of his plea bargain, dismissal was proper because Uptain failed to
    allege facts sufficient to show that he was denied any process to which he was due.
    2                                       22-16865
    See Hill v. Lockhart, 
    474 U.S. 52
    , 56 (1985) (“The longstanding test for
    determining the validity of a guilty plea is whether the plea represents a voluntary
    and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the
    defendant.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Mathews v. Eldridge,
    
    424 U.S. 319
    , 333-35 (1976) (setting forth requirements for procedural due process
    claim).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Uptain’s
    complaint without leave to amend because amendment would have been futile.
    See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 
    656 F.3d 1034
    , 1041 (9th Cir.
    2011) (setting forth standard for review and explaining that leave to amend may be
    denied where amendment would be futile).
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                    22-16865