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 2023-08

Calvert Williamson v. State of Hawaii ( 2023 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       AUG 21 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CALVERT A. WILLIAMSON,                          No.    22-16618
Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 1:21-cv-00098-JMS-RT
v.
MEMORANDUM*
STATE OF HAWAII; DAVID Y. IGE,
Governor; PUBLIC SAFETY
DEPARTMENT; MICHAEL HOFFMAN;
FRANCIS SEQUEIRA; LANCE
RABACAL; CESAR ALTARES; DANIEL
BRYANT,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii
J. Michael Seabright, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 15, 2023**
Before:      TASHIMA, S.R. THOMAS, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.
Calvert A. Williamson appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
judgment in his action alleging racial discrimination. We have jurisdiction under
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo. Hamby v. Hammond,
    821 F.3d 1085
    , 1090
(9th Cir. 2016). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Williamson’s
hostile work environment claim because Williamson failed to raise a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether the work environment was sufficiently severe
or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of Williamson’s employment. See
Christian v. Umpqua Bank,
    984 F.3d 801
    , 809 (9th Cir. 2020) (in analyzing a
hostile work environment claim, courts consider “all the circumstances, including
the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it
unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Ray v. Henderson,
    217 F.3d 1234
    , 1245 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Not
every insult or harassing comment will constitute a hostile work environment.”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Williamson’s due
process and equal protection claims because Williamson failed to raise a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether he was deprived of a constitutionally
protected liberty or property interest, or whether defendants acted with an intent or
purpose to discriminate based upon race. See Furnace v. Sullivan,
    705 F.3d 1021
    ,
1030 (9th Cir. 2013) (“To state a claim under
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     for a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a plaintiff must show
2                                    22-16618
that the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the
plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class.” (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)); Johnson v. California,
    207 F.3d 650
    , 656 (9th Cir.
2000) (explaining that where the Equal Protection Clause covers the actions
challenged in the complaint, a plaintiff may not proceed on a substantive due
process theory); Portman v. County of Santa Clara,
    995 F.2d 898
    , 904 (9th Cir.
1993) (reciting elements of procedural due process claim).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Williamson’s state law claims. See Ove v. Gwinn,
    264 F.3d 817
    , 821, 826 (9th Cir. 2001) (setting forth standard of review; “[a] court
may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims
once it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction” (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Williamson leave to
amend his complaint where he requested such relief after summary judgment had
been entered. See Nguyen v. United States,
    792 F.2d 1500
    , 1503 (9th Cir. 1986)
(stating that a court “ordinarily will be reluctant to allow leave to amend to a party
against whom summary judgment has been entered” (citation omitted)).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
3                                       22-16618
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright,
    587 F.3d 983
    , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
Appellees’ motion to supplement record on appeal (Docket Entry No. 11) is
granted.
AFFIRMED.
4                                22-16618