Peter Szanto v. United States Trustee, Reno , 703 F. App'x 581 ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 21 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: PETER SZANTO, No. 15-17410
Debtor. D.C. No. 3:14-cv-00355-RCJ
______________________________
PETER SZANTO, MEMORANDUM*
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES TRUSTEE, RENO; et
al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Robert Clive Jones, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 15, 2017**
Before: CANBY, TROTT, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
Peter Szanto appeals pro se from the district court’s order affirming the
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
bankruptcy court’s order dismissing Szanto’s chapter 11 bankruptcy case. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review de novo the district court’s
decision on appeal from the bankruptcy court and apply the same standards of
review applied by the district court. In re Thorpe Insulation Co., 677 F.3d 869,
879 (9th Cir. 2012). We affirm.
The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Szanto’s
bankruptcy case “for cause.” See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(J) (explaining that
“failure to file a disclosure statement, or to file or confirm a plan, within the time
fixed by this title or by order of the Court” provides cause to dismiss a chapter 11
bankruptcy petition); Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 165 (1991) (bankruptcy court
has “substantial discretion” to dismiss a chapter 11 case).
The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by granting JPMorgan
Chase Bank N.A.’s motion to vacate the order granting Szanto’s motion to approve
a settlement agreement because, after reconsideration, the bankruptcy court found
that Szanto’s motion was not properly served and that the attached documents did
not constitute a settlement agreement as Szanto alleged. See Fed. R. Bankr. P.
9024 (making Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 applicable to bankruptcy cases); Casey v.
Albertson’s Inc., 362 F.3d 1254, 1257 (9th Cir. 2004) (setting forth standard of
review).
Contrary to Szanto’s contentions, the bankruptcy court did not err by
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dismissing the case while Szanto’s motion to disqualify under 28 U.S.C. § 144 was
pending. See Smith v. Edwards & Hale, Ltd. (In re Smith), 317 F.3d 918, 932 (9th
Cir. 2002) (“[S]ection 144 applies only to district court judges and not to
bankruptcy court judges. Rather, bankruptcy court judges are subject to recusal
only under 28 U.S.C. § 455.” (internal citations omitted)), abrogated on other
grounds by Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526 (2004).
We reject as unsupported by the record Szanto’s contentions concerning bias
of the bankruptcy judge or that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be
questioned. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).
We do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal or matters
not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett
v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
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