Christopher Hamilton v. Elite of Los Angeles, Inc. ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 21 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: CHRISTOPHER JOHN No. 18-60026
HAMILTON; ELIZABETH LEIGH
TESOLIN, BAP No. 17-1223
Debtors,
MEMORANDUM*
------------------------------
CHRISTOPHER JOHN HAMILTON;
ELIZABETH LEIGH TESOLIN,
Appellants,
v.
ELITE OF LOS ANGELES, INC.; SAN
DIEGO TESTING SERVICES, INC.,
Appellees.
In re: CHRISTOPHER JOHN No. 18-60027
HAMILTON; ELIZABETH LEIGH
TESOLIN, BAP No. 17-1126
Debtors,
------------------------------
CHRISTOPHER JOHN HAMILTON,
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Appellant,
v.
ELITE OF LOS ANGELES, INC.; et al.,
Appellees.
Appeal from the Ninth Circuit
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
Faris, Lafferty III, and Brand, Bankruptcy Judges, Presiding
Submitted November 6, 2019**
Pasadena, California
Before: MURGUIA and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and GUIROLA,*** District
Judge.
Christopher Hamilton and Elizabeth Tesolin filed a Chapter 11 petition after
Elite of Los Angeles, Inc. and San Diego Testing Services, Inc. (collectively,
“Elite”) obtained a state court judgment against them. The bankruptcy court held
that Elite’s judgment against Hamilton was nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(6) because of his willful and malicious conduct; the Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel (“BAP”) affirmed. See Elite of Los Angeles, Inc. v. Hamilton (In re
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Louis Guirola, Jr., United States District Judge for the
Southern District of Mississippi, sitting by designation.
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Hamilton), 584 B.R. 310, 322 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2018). Hamilton appeals that
ruling, and both he and Tesolin appeal the BAP’s determination regarding
assessment of post-judgment interest. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 158(d)(1) and affirm.
1. The bankruptcy court and the BAP did not err in finding that Hamilton’s
conduct was “willful” under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) because he “had a subjective
motive to inflict injury or . . . believed that injury was substantially certain to occur
as a result of his conduct.” See Petralia v. Jercich (In re Jercich), 238 F.3d 1202,
1207–08 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Ormsby v. First Am. Title Co. of Nev. (In re
Ormsby), 591 F.3d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir. 2010); Carrillo v. Su (In re Su), 290 F.3d
1140, 1142, 1144–45 (9th Cir. 2002).
2. The BAP correctly awarded post-judgment interested at the ten percent
rate imposed by California Code of Civil Procedure § 685.010 for the full post-
judgment period because the bankruptcy court only had authority to determine
whether Hamilton’s debt was dischargeable, and “interest at the state’s judgment
interest rate continues to accrue postpetition on nondischargeable debts.” See
Schoen v. Schoen (In re Schoen), 176 F.3d 1150, 1166 (9th Cir. 1999) (per
curiam).
AFFIRMED.
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