Amr Mohsen v. Carol Wu , 520 F. App'x 557 ( 2013 )


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  •                                                                               FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           MAY 22 2013
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                    U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    In re: AMR MOHSEN,                                   No. 11-60013
    Debtor,                          BAP No. 09-1159
    AMR MOHSEN,                                          MEMORANDUM *
    Appellant,
    v.
    CAROL WU, Chapter 7 Trustee,
    Appellee.
    Appeal from the Ninth Circuit
    Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
    Hollowell, Kirscher, and Saltzman, Bankruptcy Judges, Presiding
    Submitted May 14, 2013 **
    Before:            LEAVY, THOMAS, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument.
    Amr Mohsen appeals pro se from the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s (“BAP”)
    judgment affirming the bankruptcy court’s orders denying Mohsen’s motion to set
    aside the default judgment against corporate entity defendants and his motion for
    reconsideration. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 158
    (d). We review de
    novo BAP decisions, and apply the same standard of review that the BAP applied
    to the bankruptcy court’s ruling. Boyajian v. New Falls Corp. (In re Boyajian),
    
    564 F.3d 1088
    , 1090 (9th Cir. 2009). We review for an abuse of discretion a
    denial of a motion for reconsideration, First Ave. W. Bldg. LLC v. James (In re
    Onecast Media, Inc.), 
    439 F.3d 558
    , 561 (9th Cir. 2006), and a denial of a motion
    to set aside default judgment, Jeff D. v. Kempthorne, 
    365 F.3d 844
    , 850 (9th Cir.
    2004). We affirm.
    The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mohsen’s
    motions because Mohsen is not an attorney and therefore cannot represent the
    named corporate entities. See D-Beam Ltd. P’ship v. Roller Derby Skates, Inc.,
    
    366 F.3d 972
    , 973-74 (9th Cir. 2004) (“It is a longstanding rule that corporations
    and other unincorporated associations must appear in court through an attorney.”
    (alteration, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted)).
    Moreover, Mohsen lacks standing to defend against the complaint as a
    shareholder or as an alter ego of the named corporate entities. See Moneymaker v.
    2                                  11-60013
    Coben (In re Eisen), 
    31 F.3d 1447
    , 1451 n.2 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he debtor’s assets
    and claims pass to the trustee, making the trustee the proper party in interest and
    the only party with standing to appeal the bankruptcy court’s order.” (citation and
    internal quotation marks omitted)); Communist Party v. 522 Valencia, Inc., 
    41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 618
    , 626 (Ct. App. 1995) (alter ego liability “is not a doctrine that allows
    the persons who actually control the corporation to disregard the corporate form”);
    see also Goodrich v. Briones (In re Schwarzkopf), 
    626 F.3d 1032
    , 1037 (9th Cir.
    2010) (state law determines whether alter ego liability applies).
    Mohsen’s contention that Wu lacks standing is unpersuasive.
    Mohsen’s motion to strike Wu’s answering brief is denied.
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                    11-60013