United States v. Geoffrey Mousseau , 599 F. App'x 726 ( 2015 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT APR 10 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 13-50645
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 2:04-cr-01697-GAF-3
v.
MEMORANDUM*
GEOFFREY C. MOUSSEAU,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Gary A. Feess, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 6, 2015**
Pasadena California
Before: D.W. NELSON, TASHIMA, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
Geoffrey Mousseau (“Mousseau”) appeals pro se the district court’s denial
of his motion to determine the enforceability of a restitution order and to lift a
restitution lien. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
The district court did not err in denying Mousseau’s motion to discharge his
restitution obligation and to lift the restitution lien. First, the Mandatory Victims
Restitution Act (“MVRA”) requires full, not partial, restitution. 18 U.S.C. §
3663A, 3771(a)(6); United States v. Grice, 319 F.3d 1174, 1177 (9th Cir. 2003)
(per curiam). The district court does not have the authority to discharge a
restitution obligation that is not fully satisfied. Here, the restitution obligation has
not been fully satisfied.
Moreover, a civil settlement in bankruptcy court does not discharge the
criminal restitution obligation mandated by the MVRA. A bankruptcy settlement
subsequent to the imposition of restitution in criminal court does not waive the
requirement of restitution. See United States v. Edwards, 595 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th
Cir. 2010); see also United States v. Cloud, 872 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding
“that the existence of a prior bankruptcy settlement does not preclude a subsequent
criminal restitution order”). This is so because restitution serves penal objectives,
such as deterrence, rehabilitation and retribution. Edwards, 595 F.3d at 1013
(citing Cloud, 872 F.3d at 854).
The district court did not err in designating the bankruptcy trustee as the
victim. The district court directed Mousseau to remit payments to the trustee so
that, in turn, the trustee could return the money to the estate’s creditors. Moreover,
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even if would have been more precise for the district court to refer to the trustee as
the facilitator for the victims’ recovery rather than the sole victim, this choice in
language did not cause Mousseau harm. The district court properly credited all
payments actually made pursuant to Mousseau’s bankruptcy settlement, as well as
payments by third parties, against Mousseau’s restitution obligation. Even with
these credits, however, Mousseau remains jointly and severally liable for the
balance of money owed under the restitution order, an amount in excess of
$720,000. Pursuant to the MVRA, the district court cannot discharge a prior
restitution order that is not fully satisfied. Any error was harmless.
AFFIRMED.
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