Salma Agha-Khan v. United States , 683 F. App'x 613 ( 2017 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      MAR 20 2017
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    SALMA AGHA-KHAN, M.D., AKA                      No. 15-55976
    Salma H. Agha, an individual,
    D.C. No. 2:14-cv-03490-FMO-CW
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                            MEMORANDUM*
    BRUCE BREITMAN, an individual; et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Fernando M. Olguin, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted March 8, 2017**
    Before:       LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
    Salma Agha-Khan, a.k.a. Salma H. Agha, appeals pro se from the district
    court’s judgment dismissing her action alleging federal and state law claims arising
    out of her Chapter 7 bankruptcy. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    .
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    We review for an abuse of discretion a dismissal for failure to comply with Rule 8.
    McHenry v. Renne, 
    84 F.3d 1172
    , 1177 (9th Cir. 1996). We affirm.
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Agha-Khan’s
    action for failure to comply with Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
    Procedure because the allegations in the second amended complaint are vague,
    confusing and failed to tie individual defendants to specific claims. See Fed. R.
    Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring that a pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the
    claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”); McHenry, 
    84 F.3d at 1179-80
    (affirming dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint because it failed to set forth simple,
    concise and direct averments).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Agha-Khan’s
    second amended complaint without leave to amend because Agha-Khan was
    provided with two opportunities to amend and further amendment would be futile.
    See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 
    656 F.3d 1034
    , 1041 (9th Cir.
    2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave
    to amend is proper when amendment would be futile); see also Chodos v. West
    Publ’g Co., 
    292 F.3d 992
    , 1003 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[W]hen a district court has
    already granted a plaintiff leave to amend, its discretion in deciding subsequent
    motions to amend is particularly broad.” (citation and internal quotation marks
    omitted)).
    2                                    15-55976
    We reject as unsupported by the record Agha-Khan’s contentions regarding
    default.
    We reject as without merit Agha-Khan’s various contentions about judicial
    bias and allegedly fraudulent docket entries in this case and in her bankruptcy
    proceedings.
    We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
    in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
    appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 
    587 F.3d 983
    , 985 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2009).
    Agha-Khan’s motion for leave to file a substitute reply brief (Docket Entry
    No. 53) is granted. The Clerk shall file the reply brief submitted at Docket Entry
    No. 52, and strike the reply briefs filed at Docket Entry Nos. 31 and 47. All other
    pending motions and requests are denied.
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                       15-55976