United States v. Carlos Linares , 691 F. App'x 196 ( 2017 )


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  •      Case: 16-30650      Document: 00514045252         Page: 1    Date Filed: 06/22/2017
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    No. 16-30650                                FILED
    Summary Calendar                          June 22, 2017
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee
    v.
    CARLOS L. LINARES,
    Defendant-Appellant
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 3:15-CR-71-1
    Before KING, DENNIS, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    A jury convicted Carlos L. Linares of aiding and abetting the theft of
    government funds, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 641 and 2 (Count One); failure
    to maintain an effective anti-money laundering program, in violation of
    31 U.S.C. §§ 5318(h) and 5322 (Count Two); and obstruction of a proceeding
    before a federal agency, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (Counts Three and
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 16-30650     Document: 00514045252    Page: 2   Date Filed: 06/22/2017
    No. 16-30650
    Four). On appeal, Linares argues that the evidence was insufficient to support
    his convictions.
    Linares did not renew his motion for a judgment of acquittal at the close
    of all the evidence. Accordingly, Linares has waived any objection to the denial
    of his motion, and our review is “limited to determining whether there was a
    manifest miscarriage of justice.” See United States v. Delgado, 
    256 F.3d 264
    ,
    274 (5th Cir. 2001).
    With respect to Count One, the only argument that Linares raises is that
    the Government failed to sufficiently prove that he acted knowingly or with
    fraudulent intent. To establish a violation of § 641, the Government was
    required to prove in relevant part that Linares stole or knowingly converted
    money or property to his use or the use of another and that he did so knowing
    that the money or property was not his and with the intent to deprive the
    owner of the use or benefit of the money or property. See FIFTH CIRCUIT
    PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION (CRIMINAL), No. 2.27.
    There was no dispute that from March 2012 through May 2013, Linares
    cashed more than 270 fraudulent and/or stolen United States Treasury checks,
    causing more than $1.6 million in loss. At trial, the Government introduced
    evidence that Linares accepted, cashed, and deposited hundreds of thousands
    of dollars’ worth of Treasury checks that no reasonable person would have
    accepted. As an example, Linares cashed a check where the payee’s name
    appeared as “%NA” with an address in Tampa, Florida. For more than 100 of
    the checks Linares cashed, he failed to verify and/or retain a copy of the
    customer’s identification. Of the checks he verified, he often accepted IDs that
    were obviously fraudulent.
    2
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    No. 16-30650
    The Government presented sufficient evidence for the jury to find that
    Linares knew he was cashing fraudulent checks. 1 Linares has failed to show
    that his conviction on Count One was a manifest miscarriage of justice.
    
    Delgado, 256 F.3d at 274
    .
    As for Count Two, to establish a violation of §§ 5318 and 5322, the
    Government was required to prove, in part, that Linares did not have a written
    anti-money laundering program in place at his business; that the anti-money
    laundering program, if any, failed to meet certain minimum requirements
    outlined in the regulations; and that he acted willfully.                Because Linares
    operated a money service business, he was required to comply with the Bank
    Secrecy Act (BSA) and have an effective anti-money laundering program in
    place at his business. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 5318(h); 5312(a)(2)(K).
    The evidence at trial established that, from the date of the first Internal
    Revenue Service (IRS) compliance exam in 2010 through at least early 2014,
    Linares was never in compliance with the BSA. The IRS examiner told Linares
    that he was subject to the BSA in 2010; Linares received written guidance from
    the IRS regarding his obligations under the BSA; and Linares certified in 2009
    and in 2012 that he was aware that he was subject to the BSA. The evidence
    provided a sufficient basis for the jury to conclude that Linares was fully aware
    of his obligations under the BSA and that he deliberately chose not to comply.
    Linares’s claim to the contrary is without merit. See 
    Delgado, 256 F.3d at 274
    .
    Count Three charged Linares with obstructing the 2010 IRS compliance
    examination. Count Four was based on the 2013 exam. To establish each
    offense, the Government was required to prove, in part, that Linares knew that
    1  The district court also provided the jury with this Circuit’s pattern instruction on
    deliberate ignorance, and advised the jury, “you may find that the defendant had knowledge
    of a fact if you find that the defendant deliberately closed his eyes to what otherwise would
    have been obvious to him.” See FIFTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION (CRIMINAL),
    No. 1.37A.
    3
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    No. 16-30650
    a proceeding was pending before a federal agency and that he corruptly
    endeavored      to   influence,   obstruct,   or   impede     the   due   and   proper
    administration of the law under which the proceeding was being conducted.
    As relevant to Count Three, Linares failed to provide the IRS examiner
    with copies of any checks, but a later federal search led agents to recover
    numerous checks that would have been responsive to the examiner’s request.
    Additionally, Linares told the examiner (1) that he did not cash checks worth
    more than $5,000, and (2) that he did not allow customers to cash more than
    $5,000 in checks at a time. The evidence proved that both statements were
    false.
    Finally, as to Count Four, Linares refused to provide a second IRS
    examiner with copies of any checks or identification cards. But the federal
    search revealed that Linares had in his possession over 90 different checks and
    more than 150 different identification cards that he had not provided to the
    IRS. Linares told the IRS examiner (1) that he did not allow customers to cash
    more than $10,000 worth of checks in a single day; (2) that he “very rarely”
    allowed customers to cash more than one check at a time; and (3) that the vast
    majority of his customers were “regulars” who “lived or worked in the
    community.” The evidence proved that all three representations were false.
    Linares attempts to attack these convictions based on an alleged
    “language and comprehension barrier.” Both IRS examiners testified that they
    had no trouble communicating with Linares and that he never gave them any
    indication that he did not fully understand them. Indeed, Linares admitted
    during questioning from his attorney that he frequently communicates with
    others in English and “understand[s] generally what’s being said.” Linares’s
    attempt to attack the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to Counts Three
    and Four based on an alleged language barrier is without merit.
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    Based on the evidence presented, a reasonable jury was entitled to find
    that Linares intentionally lied to the IRS examiners and refused to provide
    them with relevant documents that they had requested in the course of their
    compliance examinations. Linares had failed to show that his convictions
    amount to “a manifest miscarriage of justice.” See 
    Delgado, 256 F.3d at 274
    .
    The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16-30650

Citation Numbers: 691 F. App'x 196

Filed Date: 6/22/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/13/2023