Archdiocese of Washington v. WMATA , 877 F.3d 1066 ( 2017 )


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  •                  United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    ____________
    No. 17-7171                                                 September Term, 2017
    1:17-cv-02554-ABJ
    Filed On: December 20, 2017
    Archdiocese of Washington, Donald Cardinal
    Wuerl, a Roman Catholic Archbishop of
    Washington, a corporation sole,
    Appellant
    v.
    Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
    Authority and Paul J. Wiedefeld, in his official
    capacity as General Manager of the
    Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
    Authority,
    Appellees
    BEFORE:       Rogers, Tatel, and Millett, Circuit Judges
    ORDER
    Upon consideration of the emergency motion for an injunction pending appeal
    and for expedited consideration of this appeal, the response thereto, and the reply, it is
    ORDERED that the motion for a mandatory injunction pending appeal be denied.
    Appellant has not satisfied the stringent requirements for an injunction pending appeal.
    See John Doe Co. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 
    849 F.3d 1129
    , 1131 (D.C. Cir.
    2017); D.C. Circuit Handbook of Practice and Internal Procedures 33 (2017).
    Appellant’s motion for an injunction pending appeal centers on an as-applied
    claim of unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. Specifically, Appellant contends that
    the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority’s (“WMATA”) policy governing the
    placement of advertisements on its buses permits advertisements discussing and
    promoting secular holiday activities, but disallows advertisements promoting religious
    activities during the holiday season or a religious perspective on celebration of the
    holiday season.
    United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    ____________
    No. 17-7171                                                September Term, 2017
    Appellant has failed to establish a substantial likelihood of success because, at
    least at this early pre-discovery procedural stage, Appellant’s argument of
    discriminatory treatment is grounded in pure hypothesis. Appellant has not come
    forward with a single example of a retail, commercial, or other non-religious
    advertisement on a WMATA bus that expresses the view that the holiday season
    should be celebrated in a secular or non-religious manner. Appellant references a
    CorePower Yoga advertisement, but that advertisement contains no discernible holiday,
    seasonal, religious, or irreligious content. Appellant also points to a WMATA-permitted
    Salvation Army advertisement encouraging donations to its seasonal Red Kettle
    campaign so that funds can be used to help the less fortunate. That advertisement
    underscores, however, that WMATA does not exclude religious speakers from
    advertising when their proposed messages comport with the allowed categories of
    speech. Neither does anything in that advertisement suggest that WMATA is
    discriminating against a religious perspective on worthwhile eleemosynary activities; in
    fact, it indicates the opposite.
    Appellant repeatedly cites a statement in WMATA’s district court papers
    proposing a “secular half” and “religious half” to Christmas celebrations. See WMATA
    Opp’n to TRO or Prelim. Inj., Dist. Ct. Docket # 10, at 14-15 n.3. The citation, however,
    refers to a footnoted legal argument made by counsel addressing an argument in the
    alternative. Appellant identifies no basis for concluding that the defendant WMATA
    applied any such test in denying Appellant’s proposed advertisement, or that WMATA
    has actually made Christmas or the holiday season a permissible subject of advertising.
    Cf. Grossbaum v. Indianapolis-Marion County Building Auth., 
    63 F.3d 581
    , 588 (7th Cir.
    1995) (where City had “recogniz[ed] the ‘holiday season’ as a topic of discussion” in a
    forum, religious perspectives on that allowed topic could not be excluded).
    Positing next that WMATA’s advertising ban is arbitrarily enforced, Appellant
    argues that WMATA allowed a Christian radio station to advertise on the side of its
    buses. But the advertisements identified by Appellant were on unidentified non-
    WMATA buses. Mem. Op. at 33 n.20. And while WMATA admits that it did allow that
    same radio station to advertise on its buses in April 2017, the record is silent as to the
    content of those advertisements.
    With respect to Appellant’s facial challenge to WMATA’s decision to exclude
    religion as an advertising subject, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the
    government may impose reasonable limitations on the subjects for discussion in a
    limited public forum, so no substantial likelihood of success in demonstrating WMATA’s
    Page 2
    United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    ____________
    No. 17-7171                                                September Term, 2017
    unreasonableness has yet been shown at this procedural stage. See Rosenberger v.
    Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 
    515 U.S. 819
    , 831 (1995) (noting that the
    University policy “does not exclude religion as a subject matter,” but instead
    unconstitutionally foreclosed religious perspectives on permitted subjects).
    Finally, Appellant has failed to demonstrate any substantial burden on its ability
    to freely exercise its religious beliefs. Although WMATA has declined one proposed
    advertisement, Appellant has not demonstrated how, in the absence of viewpoint
    discrimination, that decision substantially burdens Appellant’s ability to exercise its
    religion. See Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 
    211 F.3d 137
    , 142-43 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
    Because Appellant has not shown a likelihood of success on its free speech or free
    exercise claims, it follows that its hybrid-rights claim must fail as well. See Henderson
    v. Kennedy, 
    253 F.3d 12
    , 19 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
    In denying the injunction pending appeal, we emphasize the preliminary nature
    of this order, which does not speak to the ultimate merits of any of Appellant’s claims on
    a more mature record. It is
    FURTHER ORDERED that the following expedited briefing schedule will apply in
    this case:
    Appellant’s Brief and Appendix             January 12, 2018
    Appellees’ Brief                           February 6, 2018
    Reply Brief                                February 16, 2018
    The Clerk is directed to schedule this case for oral argument on the first available
    date following the completion of briefing.
    To enhance the clarity of their briefs, the parties are urged to limit the use of
    abbreviations, including acronyms. While acronyms may be used for entities and
    statutes with widely recognized initials, briefs should not contain acronyms that are not
    widely known. See D.C. Circuit Handbook of Practice and Internal Procedures 41
    (2017); Notice Regarding Use of Acronyms (D.C. Cir. Jan. 26, 2010).
    Parties are strongly encouraged to hand deliver the paper copies of their briefs to
    the Clerk's office on the date due. Filing by mail may delay the processing of the brief.
    Page 3
    United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    ____________
    No. 17-7171                                                September Term, 2017
    Additionally, counsel are reminded that if filing by mail, they must use a class of mail
    that is at least as expeditious as first-class mail. See Fed. R. App. P. 25(a). All briefs
    and appendices must contain the date that the case is scheduled for oral argument at
    the top of the cover. See D.C. Cir. Rule 28(a)(8).
    Per Curiam
    FOR THE COURT:
    Mark J. Langer, Clerk
    BY:     /s/
    Robert J. Cavello
    Deputy Clerk
    Page 4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 17-7171

Citation Numbers: 877 F.3d 1066

Filed Date: 12/20/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023