GTE Svc Corp v. FCC ( 2000 )


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  •                   United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    Argued February 2, 2000    Decided March 17, 2000
    No. 99-1176
    GTE Service Corporation, et al.,
    Petitioners
    v.
    Federal Communications Commission and
    United States of America,
    Respondents
    NorthPoint Communications, Inc., et al.,
    Intervenors
    Consolidated with
    99-1201
    On Petitions for Review of an Order of the
    Federal Communications Commission
    Mark L. Evans argued the cause for petitioners.  With him
    on the briefs were William P. Barr, M. Edward Whelan III.,
    John F. Raposa, Dan L. Poole, Robert B. McKenna, Michael
    K. Kellogg, Lawrence E. Sarjeant, Linda Kent, John W.
    Hunter, and Julie E. Rones.
    Laurence N. Bourne, Counsel, Federal Communications
    Commission, argued the cause for respondents.  With him on
    the brief were Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General,
    United States Department of Justice, Catherine G. O'Sulli-
    van and Nancy C. Garrison, Attorneys, Christopher J.
    Wright, General Counsel, Federal Communications Commis-
    sion, and John E. Ingle, Deputy Associate General Counsel.
    Mark C. Rosenblum, Peter D. Keisler, James P. Young,
    William Single, IV., Mark D. Schneider, Ruth M. Milkman,
    Robert J. Aamoth, Jonathan Jacob Nadler, Leon M. Kestenb-
    aum, Jay C. Keithley, H. Richard Juhnke, Glenn B. Manish-
    in, Christy C. Kunin, Renee R. Crittendon, Randall B. Lowe,
    Eric J. Branfman, Andrew D. Lipman, and Rodney L. Joyce.
    Harold R. Juhnke were on the brief for intervenors AT & T
    Corporation, et al.  Michael B. Fingerhut, David W. Carpen-
    ter, Jodie L. Kelley, Mark B. Ehrlich, and Emily M.
    Williams entered appearances.
    Before:  Edwards, Chief Judge, Ginsburg and Sentelle,
    Circuit Judges.
    Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge Edwards.
    Edwards, Chief Judge:  Section 251(c)(6) of the Telecommu-
    nications Act of 1996 (the "Act"), 47 U.S.C. s 251(c)(6), impos-
    es a statutory duty on incumbent local exchange carriers
    ("LECs") to provide physical or virtual collocation for com-
    peting providers ("competitors").  The Act also requires the
    Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commis-
    sion") to issue implementing regulations to fulfill the colloca-
    tion mandate.  See 47 U.S.C. s 251(d)(1).  In March 1999, in
    Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecom-
    munications Capability ("Collocation Order"), 14 FCC Rcd
    4761 (1999), the FCC issued rules purporting to implement
    s 251(c)(6).  According to the Commission, a principal pur-
    pose of the Collocation Order is to "adopt ... additional
    measures to further facilitate the development of competition
    in the advanced services market ... [by] strengthen[ing] ...
    collocation rules to reduce the costs and delays faced by
    competitors that seek to collocate equipment in an incumbent
    LEC's central office."  
    Id. at 4764
    p 6.
    The petitioners before the court are LECs who challenge
    the Collocation Order on the ground that it impermissibly
    imposes intrusive "physical collocation" requirements on
    them. Section 251(c)(6) says that LECs must provide for
    physical collocation of equipment "necessary for interconnec-
    tion or access to unbundled network elements at the premises
    of the local exchange carrier."  47 U.S.C. s 251(c)(6).  The
    FCC has taken the position that "necessary" means that "an
    incumbent LEC may not refuse to permit collocation of any
    equipment that is 'used or useful' for either interconnection or
    access to unbundled network elements, regardless of other
    functionalities inherent in such equipment."  Collocation Or-
    der, 14 FCC Rcd at 4776-77 p 28.  Petitioners argue that,
    with the adoption of this rule, the FCC seeks to require
    collocation well beyond what has been authorized by Con-
    gress.  Petitioners also claim that the Collocation Order is
    unauthorized and unreasonable in forcing LECs to offer
    competitors "cageless collocation," defining "premises" in
    s 251(c)(6) to include a LEC's central office and adjacent
    property, allowing competitors to have too much say over the
    placement of their equipment in a LEC's central office, and
    depriving LECs of an opportunity to gain full recovery of the
    initial costs of preparing collocation space for competitors.
    Petitioners' position that "physical collocation" under the
    Act is limited to caged collocation is meritless, as is the claim
    that the FCC's definition of "premises" is unduly broad. We
    also reject petitioners' challenge to the cost recovery mecha-
    nism under the Collocation Order.  We agree with petition-
    ers, however, that the FCC's interpretations of "necessary"
    and "physical collocation" appear to be impermissibly broad.
    We therefore vacate the challenged Collocation Order insofar
    as it embraces unduly broad definitions of "necessary" and
    "physical collocation" and remand for further consideration
    by the FCC.
    I. Background
    In recent years, the FCC has sought to increase competi-
    tion in the market for interstate access services, which con-
    nect long-distance companies with local telephone networks
    and subscribers.  In 1992 and 1993, the Commission issued
    orders requiring LECs to set aside portions of their premises
    for occupation and use by competitive access providers, thus
    generating legal battles that have continued to the present.
    See Bell Atlantic Telephone Cos. v. FCC, 
    24 F.3d 1441
    (D.C.
    Cir. 1994).  In their initial attempts to require LECs to
    permit physical collocation of competitors' equipment on de-
    mand, the FCC relied on s 201(a) of the Communications Act
    of 1934, 47 U.S.C. s 201(a), which empowers the agency to
    order "physical connections" as necessary for the public inter-
    est.  The FCC reasoned that its efforts to create a level
    playing field of competition in the market for interstate
    access services served the public interest. On review, howev-
    er, this court upheld a challenge to the Commission's physical
    collocation rule, finding that nothing in the Communications
    Act of 1934 explicitly authorized the FCC to order takings of
    LECs' property through physical collocation.  See 
    id. at 1446
    ("The Commission's power to order 'physical connections,'
    undoubtedly of broad scope, does not supply a clear warrant
    to grant third parties a license to exclusive physical occupa-
    tion of a section of the LEC's central offices.").  The court
    was concerned that
    Chevron deference to agency action that creates a broad
    class of takings claims, compensable in the Court of
    Claims, would allow agencies to use statutory silence or
    ambiguity to expose the Treasury to liability both mas-
    sive and unforeseen.
    
    Id. at 1445
    (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
    Defense Council, Inc., 
    467 U.S. 837
    (1984)).  Thus, absent a
    more definite congressional authorization, the court was un-
    willing to defer to the FCC's unduly broad reading of
    s 201(a).
    The FCC responded to the court's ruling in Bell Atlantic
    Telephone by adopting new rules that gave LECs the option
    to rely more on "virtual collocation" in lieu of physical colloca-
    tion.  See Expanded Interconnection with Local Telephone
    Company Facilities, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 FCC
    Rcd 5154 (1994).  Virtual collocation allows a LEC to retain
    physical control of the equipment, along with the responsibili-
    ty for installing, maintaining, and repairing it.  Virtual collo-
    cation therefore minimizes the takings problem, because com-
    petitors do not have physical access to a LEC's property.
    The LECs petitioned for review of this order, but the issue on
    appeal was rendered moot with the passage of the Telecom-
    munications Act of 1996.  The court therefore remanded the
    case for reconsideration in light of 47 U.S.C. ss 251(c)(6) &
    (g), as applied after the enactment of the Telecommunications
    Act of 1996.  See Pacific Bell v. FCC, 
    81 F.3d 1147
    (D.C. Cir.
    1996).
    The 1996 Act completely revamped the statutory landscape
    by providing explicit congressional authorization for physical
    collocation.  Under s 251(c)(6), LECs are now required
    to provide, on rates, terms, and conditions that are just,
    reasonable, and nondiscriminatory, for physical colloca-
    tion of equipment necessary for interconnection or access
    to unbundled network elements at the premises of the
    local exchange carrier, except that the carrier may pro-
    vide for virtual collocation if the local exchange carrier
    demonstrates to the State commission that physical collo-
    cation is not practical for technical reasons or because of
    space limitations.
    47 U.S.C. s 251(c)(6) (emphasis added).
    Armed with this explicit congressional authorization, the
    FCC first adopted rules resembling earlier orders mandating
    collocation.  See Implementation of the Local Competition
    Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (CC Dock-
    et No. 96-98), 11 FCC Rcd 15499 ("Local Competition Or-
    der"), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC,
    
    120 F.3d 753
    (8th Cir. 1997), rev'd in part and aff'd in part,
    AT & T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 
    525 U.S. 366
    (1999).
    However, under the heat of critical commentary, the Com-
    mission decided that more was necessary "to remove[ ] barri-
    ers to competition so that competing providers are able to
    compete effectively with incumbent LECs and their affiliates
    in the provision of advanced services."  Collocation Order, 14
    FCC Rcd at 4763 p 3.  After studying the issue and review-
    ing comments, the FCC "adopted several measures" in the
    Collocation Order that are designed to "promote competition
    in the advanced services market."  
    Id. p 4.
    The Collocation Order obviously strengthens the Commis-
    sion's stance on physical collocation.  First, the Order re-
    quires LECs to allow competitors to collocate "all equipment
    that is necessary for interconnection or access to unbundled
    network elements, regardless of whether such equipment
    includes a switching functionality, provides enhanced service
    capabilities, or offers other functionalities."  
    Id. at 4776
    p 28.
    In particular, the Order says that "an incumbent LEC may
    not refuse to permit collocation of any equipment that is 'used
    or useful' for either interconnection or access to unbundled
    network elements, regardless of other functionalities inherent
    in such equipment."  
    Id. at 4776
    -77 p 28.  Second, the Order
    requires LECs to offer competitors both caged and cageless
    collocation.  Third, the Order requires LECs to offer colloca-
    tion space in both their central offices and in adjacent con-
    trolled environmental vaults or similar structures;  and it
    prohibits LECs from imposing unreasonable minimum space
    requirements on collocators.  Finally, the Order requires
    LECs to bear the initial costs of preparing collocation space
    for their competitors, as opposed to requiring the first collo-
    cator to bear the entire cost of preparing new collocation
    space--and thus bear the risk of unoccupied space--as an up-
    front charge.  Petitioners claim that these new rules are
    neither authorized by the Act nor justified by reasoned
    decisionmaking.
    II. Discussion
    A.   Standard of Review
    The principal issue in this case is whether the Commis-
    sion's interpretation of s 251(c)(6) of the Telecommunications
    Act of 1996 can withstand scrutiny.  In particular, petitioners
    challenge the FCC's Collocation Order on the ground that the
    agency's constructions of "necessary," "physical collocation,"
    and "premises" will allow unauthorized takings of LEC prop-
    erty by their competitors.
    As this court noted in Bell Atlantic Telephone Companies
    v. FCC, 
    131 F.3d 1044
    (D.C. Cir. 1997),
    Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
    Council, 
    467 U.S. 837
    (1984), governs review of agency
    interpretation of a statute which the agency administers.
    Under the first step of Chevron, the reviewing court
    "must first exhaust the 'traditional tools of statutory
    construction' to determine whether Congress has spoken
    to the precise question at issue."  Natural Resources
    Defense Council, Inc. v. Browner, 
    57 F.3d 1122
    , 1125
    (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting 
    Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843
    n.9,
    104 S. Ct. at 2782 
    n.9).  The traditional tools include
    examination of the statute's text, legislative history, and
    structure, see Southern California Edison Co. v. FERC,
    
    116 F.3d 507
    , 515 (D.C. Cir. 1997);  as well as its purpose,
    see First Nat'l Bank & Trust v. National Credit Union,
    
    90 F.3d 525
    , 529-30 (D.C. Cir. 1996).  This inquiry using
    the traditional tools of construction may be characterized
    as a search for the plain meaning of the statute.  If this
    search yields a clear result, then Congress has expressed
    its intention as to the question, and deference is not
    appropriate.  See Hammontree v. NLRB, 
    894 F.2d 438
    ,
    441 (D.C. Cir. 1990).  If, however, "the statute is silent
    or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue," Chev-
    
    ron, 467 U.S. at 843
    , 104 S. Ct. at 2782, Congress has not
    spoken clearly, and a permissible agency interpretation
    of the statute merits judicial deference.  
    Id. Id. at
    1046-47.
    There is no doubt here that Congress has delegated to the
    FCC the authority to issue regulations implementing
    s 251(c)(6).  See 47 U.S.C. s 251(d)(1).  It is equally clear
    that, given the complexity of the task at hand, any search for
    "plain meaning" in the statute is fruitless.  The disputed
    terms at issue--"necessary," "physical collocation," and
    "premises"--all bear relatively clear definitions if taken out of
    the context of the statutory provision in which they are found.
    The problem here is that these terms are found in a circum-
    scribed statutory provision that seeks to ensure competition
    in areas of advanced technology in telecommunications;  i.e.,
    the statute gives competitors access to the private property of
    LECs by requiring LECs to offer physical collocation on
    reasonable terms, but this access is neither open-ended nor is
    it even required if not practical for technical reasons or
    because of space limitations.  This is hardly the stuff of "plain
    meaning."
    Because the disputed terms in s 251(c)(6) are ambiguous in
    their meanings, we are required to consider the Commission's
    interpretations.  Under the second step of Chevron, we will
    defer to the Commission's interpretations if they are reason-
    able and consistent with the statutory purpose.  See Troy
    Corp. v. Browner, 
    120 F.3d 277
    , 285 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting
    that an agency's interpretation must be "reasonable and
    consistent with the statutory purpose");  City of Cleveland v.
    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 
    68 F.3d 1361
    , 1367 (D.C.
    Cir. 1995) (providing that an agency's interpretation must be
    "reasonable and consistent with the statutory scheme and
    legislative history").  However, a court will not uphold an
    interpretation "that diverges from any realistic meaning of
    the statute."  Massachusetts v. Department of Transp., 
    93 F.3d 890
    , 893 (D.C. Cir. 1996).  In this case, as will be shown
    below, the FCC's interpretations of "necessary" and "physical
    collocation" appear to diverge from any realistic meaning of
    the statute, because the Commission has favored the LECs'
    competitors in ways that exceed what is "necessary" to
    achieve reasonable "physical collocation" and in ways that
    may result in unnecessary takings of LEC property.
    Petitioners' claim that the Collocation Order unfairly pre-
    cludes LECs from gaining full recovery of the initial costs of
    preparing collocation space for competitors raises a matter
    that is subject to review under the traditional "arbitrary and
    capricious" standard.  As the Supreme Court explained in
    Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual
    Automobile Insurance Co., 
    463 U.S. 29
    , 43 (1983),
    [t]he scope of review under the "arbitrary and capri-
    cious" standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute
    its judgment for that of the agency.  Nevertheless, the
    agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a
    satisfactory explanation for its action including a "ration-
    al connection between the facts found and the choice
    made."  Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States,
    
    371 U.S. 156
    , 168 (1962).  In reviewing that explanation,
    we must "consider whether the decision was based on a
    consideration of the relevant factors and whether there
    has been a clear error of judgment."  Bowman Trans-
    portation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc.,
    [
    419 U.S. 281
    , 285 (1974)];  Citizens to Preserve Overton
    Park v. Volpe, [
    401 U.S. 402
    , 416 (1971)].  Normally, an
    agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the
    agency has relied on factors which Congress has not
    intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an
    important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation
    for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before
    the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be
    ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
    expertise.  The reviewing court should not attempt itself
    to make up for such deficiencies;  we may not supply a
    reasoned basis for the agency's action that the agency
    itself has not given.  SEC v. Chenery Corp., 
    332 U.S. 194
    ,
    196 (1947).  We will, however, "uphold a decision of less
    than ideal clarity if the agency's path may reasonably be
    discerned."  Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-
    Best Freight System, Inc., [419 U.S. at 286].  See also
    Camp v. Pitts, 
    411 U.S. 138
    , 142-143 (1973) (per curiam).
    Id.;  see also Communications Satellite Corp. v. FCC, 
    836 F.2d 623
    (1988) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. 
    Ass'ns, 463 U.S. at 43
    ).  As we indicate below, the cost allocation rules under
    the Collocation Order easily survive arbitrary and capricious
    review.  There is a discernible, reasoned basis for the agen-
    cy's action, and the decision reached by the agency does not
    reflect a clear error of judgment.
    We now turn to a consideration of the statutory interpreta-
    tion questions, focused on the meaning of s 251(c)(6).
    B.   "Necessary"
    The first question in this case centers on the meaning of
    "necessary" under 47 U.S.C. s 251(c)(6).  As noted above, the
    statute requires LECs to provide physical collocation of
    equipment as "necessary for interconnection or access to
    unbundled network elements at the premises of the local
    exchange carrier."  This statutory provision is, at first blush,
    fairly straightforward.  Something is necessary if it is re-
    quired or indispensable to achieve a certain result.  Thus,
    competitors who are protected by the Act have a right to
    collocate any equipment that is required or indispensable to
    achieve interconnection or access to unbundled network ele-
    ments at the premises of the local exchange carrier.  In the
    Collocation Order, however, the FCC appears to ignore the
    statutory reference to "necessary" in requiring LECs to
    collocate any competitors' equipment that is " 'used or useful'
    for either interconnection or access to unbundled network
    elements, regardless of other functionalities inherent in such
    equipment."  14 FCC Rcd at 4776-77 p 28.  Petitioners argue
    that by interpreting "necessary" as "used or useful" and by
    permitting competitors to collocate equipment that may do
    more than what is required to achieve interconnection or
    access, the FCC's Collocation Order impermissibly invites
    unwarranted intrusion upon LECs' property rights.  The
    petitioners' argument has merit, for the Collocation Order as
    presently written seems overly broad and disconnected from
    the statutory purpose enunciated in s 251(c)(6).
    The Collocation Order makes two critical points in inter-
    preting "necessary" under s 251(c)(6):  First, the Order says
    that "an incumbent LEC may not refuse to permit collocation
    of any equipment that is 'used or useful' for either intercon-
    nection or access to unbundled network elements, regardless
    of other functionalities inherent in such equipment."  
    Id. at 4776
    -77 p 28 (emphasis added).  Second, the Order makes it
    clear that LECs must allow competitors to collocate "all
    equipment that is necessary for interconnection or access to
    unbundled network elements, regardless of whether such
    equipment includes a switching functionality, provides en-
    hanced services capabilities, or offers other functionalities."
    
    Id. at 4776
    p 28 (emphasis added).  In other words, the
    Collocation Order appears to permit competitors to collocate
    equipment that may do more than what is required to achieve
    interconnection or access.
    Petitioners' concerns with the breadth of the Collocation
    Order are not idle.  The Supreme Court recently had occa-
    sion to address a similar problem in reviewing a challenge to
    the FCC's interpretation of 47 U.S.C. s 251(d)(2), which
    provides, in relevant part, that
    [i]n determining what network elements should be made
    available for purposes of subsection (c)(3) of this section,
    the Commission shall consider ... whether ... access to
    such network elements as are proprietary in nature is
    necessary.
    47 U.S.C. s 251(d)(2).  In AT & T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities
    Board, 
    525 U.S. 366
    (1999), the Court faced a controversy
    over what "necessary" meant in the context of s 251(d)(2).
    See 
    id. at 388.
     The Court rejected the FCC's formulation,
    concluding that "the Act requires the FCC to apply some
    limiting standard, rationally related to the goals of the Act,
    which it has simply failed to do."  
    Id. The Court
    noted that
    the Commission announced that it would regard the
    'necessary' standard as having been met, regardless of
    whether 'requesting carriers can obtain the requested
    proprietary element from a source other than the incum-
    bent,' since '[r]equiring new entrants to duplicate unnec-
    essarily even a part of the incumbent's network could
    generate delay and higher costs for new entrants, and
    thereby impede entry by competing local providers and
    delay competition, contrary to the goals of the 1996 Act.'
    ...  The Commission cannot, consistent with the statute,
    blind itself to the availability of elements outside the
    incumbent's network.  That failing alone would require
    the Commission's rule to be set aside.  In addition,
    however, the Commission's assumption that any increase
    in cost (or decrease in quality) imposed by denial of a
    network element renders access to that element 'neces-
    sary' ... is simply not in accord with the ordinary and
    fair meaning of [the statute's] terms.
    
    Id. at 389-90.
    As is clear from the Court's judgment in Iowa Utilities
    Board, a statutory reference to "necessary" must be con-
    strued in a fashion that is consistent with the ordinary and
    fair meaning of the word, i.e., so as to limit "necessary" to
    that which is required to achieve a desired goal.  The Court's
    admonition seems particularly relevant here where a broader
    construction of "necessary" under s 251(c)(6) might result in
    an unnecessary taking of private property.
    One clear example of a problem that is raised by the
    breadth of the Collocation Order's interpretation of "neces-
    sary" is seen in the Commission's rule requiring LECs to
    allow collocating competitors to interconnect their equipment
    with other collocating carriers.  See Collocation Order, 14
    FCC Rcd at 4780 p 33 ("We see no reason for the incumbent
    LEC to refuse to permit the collocating carriers to cross-
    connect their equipment, subject only to the same reasonable
    safety requirements that the incumbent LEC imposes on its
    own equipment.").  The obvious problem with this rule is that
    the cross-connects requirement imposes an obligation on
    LECs that has no apparent basis in the statute.  Section
    251(c)(6) is focused solely on connecting new competitors to
    LECs' networks.  In fact, the Commission does not even
    attempt to show that cross-connects are in any sense "neces-
    sary for interconnection or access to unbundled network
    elements."  Rather, the Commission is almost cavalier in
    suggesting that cross-connects are efficient and therefore
    justified under s 251(c)(6).  This will not do.  The statute
    requires LECs to provide physical collocation of equipment as
    "necessary for interconnection or access to unbundled net-
    work elements at the premises of the local exchange carrier,"
    and nothing more.  As the Supreme Court made clear in
    Iowa Utilities Board, the FCC cannot reasonably blind itself
    to statutory terms in the name of efficiency.  Chevron defer-
    ence does not bow to such unbridled agency action.
    There are other examples, as well, to demonstrate that the
    FCC's interpretation of "necessary" under s 251(c)(6) is im-
    permissibly broad.  At oral argument, counsel was asked
    whether, under the Collocation Order, a LEC would be
    required to afford collocation of a competitor's equipment that
    included unnecessary multi-purpose features, such as en-
    hancements that might facilitate payroll or data collection
    features.  In other words, must a LEC allow collocation of
    equipment that is not truly "necessary" for a competitor's
    "interconnection or access to unbundled network elements"?
    Counsel could offer no satisfactory answer to the question.
    Counsel seemed to recognize that to require collocation on
    such broad terms would not really square with the terms of
    s 251(c)(6);  yet, the literal terms of the Collocation Order
    seem to embrace any and all equipment that is otherwise
    necessary without regard to whether such equipment unnec-
    essarily "includes a switching functionality, provides en-
    hanced service capabilities, or offers other functionalities."
    Collocation Order, 14 FCC Rcd at 4776 p 28 (emphasis add-
    ed).  The FCC's Collocation Order seeks to justify this broad
    rule by contending that "competitive telecommunications pro-
    viders must be permitted to collocate integrated equipment
    that lowers costs and increases the services they can offer
    their customers."  
    Id. at 4777-78
    p 29.  It was precisely this
    kind of rationale, based on presumed cost savings, that the
    Supreme Court flatly rejected in Iowa Utilities Board.  
    See 525 U.S. at 389-90
    .  In short, the FCC's interpretation of
    "necessary" under s 251(c)(6) goes too far and thus "diverges
    from any realistic meaning of the statute."  Massachusetts v.
    Department of 
    Transp., 93 F.3d at 893
    .
    Because, in some significant respects, the FCC's current
    definition of "necessary" finds no support in the Act, we
    vacate the offending portions of the Collocation Order and
    remand the case to the agency for further consideration.  We
    do not mean to vacate the Collocation Order to the extent
    that it merely requires LECs to provide collocation of com-
    petitors' equipment that is directly related to and thus neces-
    sary, required, or indispensable to "interconnection or access
    to unbundled network elements."  Anything beyond this,
    however, demands a better explanation from the FCC, for the
    current rules under the Collocation Order make no sense in
    light of what the statute itself says.  And the Commission
    must operate within the limits of "the ordinary and fair
    meaning of [the statute's] terms."  Iowa Utilities 
    Bd., 525 U.S. at 390
    .
    C.   "Physical Collocation" and "Premises"
    Petitioners also challenge the FCC's interpretations of
    "physical collocation" and "premises" under s 251(c)(6).  The
    Collocation Order requires LECs to make "cageless" colloca-
    tion available to requesting competitors.  Absent problems
    related to technical feasibility or specific security concerns,
    new competitors are entitled "to collocate in any unused space
    in the incumbent LEC's premises."  Collocation Order, 14
    FCC Rcd at 4785 p 42.  And to protect against bogus claims
    by LECs that they have run out of space, the Collocation
    Order provides that, when space is legitimately exhausted,
    LECs must "permit collocation in adjacent controlled envi-
    ronmental vaults or similar structures to the extent technical-
    ly feasible."  
    Id. at 4786
    p 44.
    Petitioners claim that the FCC lacks the authority to
    promulgate such sweeping rules in support of cageless collo-
    cation, because "[a]s the language, structure, and history of
    s 251(c)(6) reflect, Congress understood 'physical collocation'
    to mean the installation of a competitor's equipment in an
    area that is physically separate from the incumbent's own
    facilities."  Br. of Petitioners at 24.  Petitioners also contend
    that Congress intended collocation to be limited to available
    space within a LEC's central office, and not to extend to
    anywhere on a LEC's property beyond the confines of the
    central office.
    Although petitioners raise some telling points, their argu-
    ments go too far.  Section 251(c)(6) merely provides that
    incumbents have a duty to provide "for physical collocation of
    equipment necessary for interconnection or access to unbun-
    dled network elements at the premises of the local exchange
    carrier."  47 U.S.C. s 251(c)(6).  Congress chose not to de-
    fine either "premises" or "physical collocation," and, at least
    in this context, the meaning of these terms is far from self-
    evident.  Moreover, nothing in the statute can be read to
    require caged collocation, so the FCC surely was free to
    promulgate reasonable rules implementing physical colloca-
    tion under a cageless regime.
    The FCC has satisfied its burden under step two of Chev-
    ron in interpreting s 251(c)(6) as requiring cageless colloca-
    tion.  The Collocation Order points out that caged collocation
    results in the "inefficient use of the limited space in a LEC
    premises," Collocation Order, 14 FCC Rcd at 4784 p 42.  A
    cageless regime, the Order notes, ensures that LECs do not
    place unreasonable minimum space requirements on collocat-
    ing competitors;  the rule thus has the effect of reducing the
    cost of collocation and reducing the likelihood of premature
    space exhaustion.  See 
    id. at 4785-86
    p 43.  We find that the
    agency's interpretation in support of cageless collocation is
    reasonable and consistent with the statutory purpose of pro-
    moting competition, without raising the threat of unnecessary
    takings of LEC property.  Indeed, on the record at hand, it is
    hardly surprising that the FCC opted to prohibit LECs from
    forcing competitors to build cages, particularly given the
    alternative means available to LECs to ensure the security of
    their premises.
    We also reject petitioners' claim that the FCC lacks author-
    ity to require LECs to make available space beyond their
    central offices for the collocation of competitors' equipment.
    The Collocation Order simply requires "incumbent LECs,
    when space is legitimately exhausted in a particular LEC
    premises, to permit collocation in adjacent controlled environ-
    mental vaults or similar structures to the extent technically
    feasible."  
    Id. at 4786
    p 44.  The rule seeks to address the
    "issue of space exhaustion by ensuring that competitive carri-
    ers can compete with the incumbent, even when there is no
    space inside the LEC's premises."  
    Id. The rule
    clearly
    furthers the purpose underlying s 251(c)(6).  The rule is also
    eminently reasonable:  adjacent collocation is required only
    when space in the central offices is exhausted;  adjacent
    collocation may occur only to the extent that it is technically
    feasible;  adjacent collocation is subject to state regulations
    over zoning, design, and construction parameters;  and adja-
    cent collocation is subject to reasonable safety and mainte-
    nance requirements.  And petitioners can find no argument
    to show that this rule is impermissible under s 251(c)(6), for
    the simple reason that the disputed "adjacent" properties all
    are on the LECs' "premises," which is all that is required by
    the statute.
    In sum, the FCC's regulations forbidding LECs from re-
    quiring competitors to "cage" their equipment and requiring
    LECs, under limited circumstances, to use adjacent property
    for the collocation of competitors' equipment are permissible
    and reasonable under step two of Chevron.  This is not the
    end of the inquiry, however, regarding petitioners' challenge
    to the FCC's interpretation of "physical collocation" under
    s 251(c)(6).
    Petitioners argue that, even conceding the validity of cage-
    less collocation and an interpretation of "premises" that in-
    cludes both the central office and adjacent property, the
    Collocation Order still goes too far in giving competitors
    rights well beyond what is reasonably required by s 251(c)(6).
    In particular, petitioners point to paragraph 42 of the Colloca-
    tion Order, which states, in part, that LECs
    must give competitors the option of collocating equip-
    ment in any unused space within the incumbent's prem-
    ises, to the extent technically feasible, and may not
    require competitors to collocate in a room or isolated
    space separate from the incumbent's own equipment.
    
    Id. at 4785
    p 42 (emphases added);  see also Reply Br. at 16
    (complaining about paragraph 42).  The Order acknowledges
    that a LEC "may take reasonable steps to protect its own
    equipment, such as enclosing the equipment in its own cage,"
    
    id., but this
    gloss does not save the rest of the paragraph.
    The FCC offers no good reason to explain why a competi-
    tor, as opposed to the LEC, should choose where to establish
    collocation on the LEC's property;  nor is there any good
    explanation of why LECs are forbidden from requiring com-
    petitors to use separate entrances to access their own equip-
    ment;  nor is there any reasonable justification for the rule
    prohibiting LECs from requiring competitors to use separate
    or isolated rooms or floors.  It is one thing to say that LECs
    are forbidden from imposing unreasonable minimum space
    requirements on competitors;  it is quite another thing, how-
    ever, to say that competitors, over the objection of LEC
    property owners, are free to pick and choose preferred space
    on the LECs' premises, subject only to technical feasibility.
    There is nothing in s 251(c)(6) that endorses this approach.
    The statute requires only that LECs reasonably provide
    space for "physical collocation of equipment necessary for
    interconnection or access to unbundled network elements at
    the premises of the local exchange carrier," nothing more.
    The sweeping language in paragraph 42 of the Collocation
    Order appears to favor the LECs' competitors in ways that
    exceed what is "necessary" to achieve reasonable "physical
    collocation" and in ways that may result in unnecessary
    takings of LEC property.  Once again we find that the FCC's
    interpretation of s 251(c)(6) goes too far and thus "diverges
    from any realistic meaning of the statute."  Massachusetts v.
    Department of 
    Transp., 93 F.3d at 893
    .
    The Collocation Order again suggests that there may be
    cost savings that will flow from the enunciated approach.  See
    Collocation Order, 14 FCC Rcd at 4785 p 42.  This is a weak
    claim.  First, there is no explanation from the FCC as to why
    this would be so.  It is not intuitive that all of what is
    required by paragraph 42 of the Collocation Order will sup-
    port a decrease in the cost of collocation and an increase in
    the amount of available collocation space, as suggested by the
    FCC.  See 
    id. And merely
    saying it does not make it so.
    Second, and more importantly, as noted by the Court in Iowa
    Utilities Board, "delay and higher costs for new entrants ...
    [that may] impede entry by competing local providers and
    delay competition" cannot be used by the FCC to overcome
    statutory terms in the Telecommunications Act of 
    1996. 525 U.S. at 389-90
    .
    We therefore vacate the Collocation Order insofar as it
    embraces the aforecited sweeping rules on physical colloca-
    tion in paragraph 42.  On remand, the FCC will have an
    opportunity to refine its regulatory requirements to tie the
    rules to the statutory standard, which only mandates physical
    collocation as "necessary for interconnection or access to
    unbundled network elements at the premises of the local
    exchange carrier."  47 U.S.C. s 251(c)(6).  Even counsel for
    the Commission seemed unwilling to embrace an expansive
    view of paragraph 42:  He suggested that LECs should be
    allowed to choose the collocation space;  he also suggested
    that the LECs should be allowed to segregate collocation
    space from the rest of a LEC's property.  If counsel's
    interpretation is correct, the FCC must make that clear.  In
    any event, paragraph 42, as presently written, does not
    withstand scrutiny under step two of Chevron.
    D.   The FCC's Cost Allocation Rule
    The final issue before the court is petitioners' challenge to
    the FCC's cost allocation rule.  The Collocation Order pro-
    vides that LECs
    must allocate space preparation, security measures, and
    other collocation charges on a pro-rated basis so the first
    collocator in a particular incumbent premises will not be
    responsible for the entire cost of site preparation....
    In order to ensure that the first entrant into an incum-
    bent's premises does not bear the entire cost of site
    preparation, the incumbent must develop a system of
    partitioning the cost by comparing, for example, the
    amount of conditioned space actually occupied by the new
    entrant with the overall space conditioning expenses.
    Collocation Order, 14 FCC Rcd at 4789 p 51.  State commis-
    sions are charged to oversee this process "to ensure that
    incumbent LECs properly allocate site preparation costs
    among new entrants."  
    Id. at 4790
    p 51.
    Petitioners claim that the new rule is arbitrary and capri-
    cious, because it forces LECs to bear the risk of unoccupied
    space.  On this score, petitioners argue that "[i]t is bad
    enough that the incumbent must prepare space so that its
    competitors can take its property;  it is beyond the pale that
    the Commission would make incumbents pay to do so."  Br.
    of Petitioners at 32.  This argument is specious.
    The approach adopted by the Commission is fully justified
    as a reasonable way to ensure that LECs do not impose
    prohibitive requirements on new competitors and thus kill
    competition before it ever gets started.  As the Government
    pointed out in its brief in support of the FCC,
    new entrants asserted that incumbent LEC pricing prac-
    tices with respect to the preparation of collocation space
    acted as an unreasonable barrier to competitive entry.
    In particular, they assailed the practice of many [LECs]
    of charging the first collocator up front for the entire
    cost of preparing new collocation space (e.g., air condi-
    tioning and power generation upgrades), even if that
    collocator was only going to use a small portion of the
    available central office space.
    See Br. of Respondents at 16.  Petitioners do not seriously
    challenge this assertion.
    Petitioners nonetheless contend that the Commission's cost
    allocation rules fail to give them any reasonable mechanism to
    recover their costs for space that is not fully or permanently
    occupied.  Petitioners' complaints are based, however, upon
    an apparent misreading of the Collocation Order.  The Order
    does not define the contours of a recovery mechanism, but it
    clearly does not foreclose mechanisms for the recovery of
    LECs' prudently incurred costs.  Rather, the Order simply
    notes that state commissions are charged with the responsi-
    bility of "determin[ing] the proper pricing methodology,"
    which undoubtedly may include recovery mechanisms for
    legitimate costs.  Collocation Order, 14 FCC Rcd at 4789-90
    p 51;  see also Br. for Respondents at 51 ("[T]he Order, fairly
    read, contemplates mechanisms for the recovery of [a LEC's]
    prudently incurred costs.").  The FCC's cost allocation rule
    thus withstands judicial scrutiny, because it is neither arbi-
    trary nor capricious.
    III. Conclusion
    Consistent with the foregoing opinion, we grant the peti-
    tions for review in part and hereby vacate the challenged
    Collocation Order insofar as it embraces unduly broad defini-
    tions of "necessary" and "physical collocation."  The case will
    be remanded for further consideration by the FCC with
    respect to these two points.  On all other points, the petition
    for review is denied.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 99-1176

Filed Date: 3/17/2000

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/21/2014

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