Robert Dinkins v. Correctional Medical Services , 743 F.3d 633 ( 2014 )


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  •                   United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 12-2127
    ___________________________
    Robert Dinkins
    lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant
    v.
    Correctional Medical Services; John Does, Medical Doctors; State of Missouri;
    Missouri Department of Corrections; Phillip Lange; Morgan Logan
    lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Western District of Missouri - Jefferson City
    ____________
    Submitted: December 10, 2013
    Filed: February 25, 2014
    [Published]
    ____________
    Before MURPHY, GRUENDER, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    PER CURIAM.
    Missouri inmate Robert O. Dinkins appeals the district court’s dismissal of his
    action. This court affirms in part, reverses in part, and remands for further
    proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    Dinkins sued the State of Missouri, the Missouri Department of Corrections
    (MDOC), Correctional Medical Services (CMS), unnamed medical doctors, and
    Jefferson City Correctional Center officers Philip Lange and Morris Logan in their
    official and individual capacities. Dinkins asserted that defendants violated section
    504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (RA) and Title II of the Americans with
    Disabilities Act (ADA). Liberally construing the complaint, Dinkins alleged that in
    late 2004 he started experiencing blackouts, weakness and difficulty walking. Despite
    his written medical requests, MDOC and CMS did not properly examine him for six
    months. Before he was eventually diagnosed with pernicious anemia, CMS and
    MDOC failed to use medication to slow the disease. Dinkins was paralyzed from the
    waist down by April 2006. His condition continued to deteriorate as of 2010. He
    was denied assignment to the Transitional Care Unit. He was placed in administrative
    segregation without a wheelchair or handicap access, forcing him to crawl and to eat
    meals on the floor. He requested other accommodations that were not granted by
    defendants–such as someone to push his wheelchair, a handicapped-accessible cell,
    medically prescribed physical therapy, preventative treatment, examination by an
    outside specialist, wheelchair accessories, and exemption from activities requiring
    exposure to cold. The lack of accommodations caused him to miss meals, fall several
    times in his cell, be placed on strip-cell status, and be unable to move around his cell
    without hitting the toilet or walls.
    This court affirms the dismissal of the individual-capacity claims against Lange
    and Logan. They cannot be sued in their individual capacities under the ADA or the
    RA. See Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Scis. Ctr. of Brooklyn, 
    280 F.3d 98
    , 107 (2d Cir.
    2001) (RA); Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 
    184 F.3d 999
    , 1005 n.8 (8th Cir. 1999) (en
    banc) (ADA). This court also affirms the dismissal of the claims against the medical
    doctors and CMS, as those claims were based on medical treatment
    decisions–including not properly diagnosing and treating Dinkins’s pernicious
    anemia–which cannot form the basis of a claim under the RA or the ADA. See Burger
    v. Bloomberg, 
    418 F.3d 882
    , 883 (8th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
    -2-
    Some of Dinkins’s claims, however, do not appear to be based on medical
    treatment decisions. His alleged denials of meals and adequate housing by reason of
    his disability can form the basis for viable ADA and RA claims. See Pa. Dep’t of
    Corr. v. Yeskey, 
    524 U.S. 206
    , 210 (1998) (recreational activities, medical services,
    and educational and vocational programs at state prisons are benefits within the
    meaning of ADA); Jaros v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 
    684 F.3d 667
    , 672 (7th Cir. 2012)
    (meals and showers made available to inmates are programs or activities under the
    RA). His allegation that he was denied physical therapy could form the basis for a
    viable claim if the therapy was medically prescribed. Thus, this court reverses the
    dismissal of claims for injunctive relief against Lange, Logan, the State of Missouri
    and MDOC that were not based on medical treatment decisions. See Hafer v. Melo,
    
    502 U.S. 21
    , 25 (1991) (official-capacity claims are just another way of pleading the
    action against the State); Randolph v. Rogers, 
    253 F.3d 342
    , 348 (8th Cir. 2001)
    (permitting claims for prospective injunctive relief against a state official sued in
    official capacity under ADA and RA); 
    42 U.S.C. § 12202
     (ADA statute abrogating
    state sovereign immunity provides that “remedies (including remedies both at law and
    in equity) are available”); 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(2) (same for RA).1
    As to the request for damages, the MDOC waives sovereign immunity under
    the RA by accepting federal funds. See Jim C. v. United States, 
    235 F.3d 1079
    , 1080
    (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Title II of the ADA abrogates both the State of Missouri’s
    and the MDOC’s immunity for conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth
    1
    Because the State of Missouri and the MDOC failed to argue whether the
    ADA’s and the RA’s abrogation of state sovereign immunity in a lawsuit for
    injunctive relief is constitutional under the Eleventh Amendment, this court does not
    address the issue. See Klingler v. Dir., Dep’t of Rev., 
    433 F.3d 1078
    , 1080 (8th Cir.
    2006) (permitting injunctive relief against the state of Missouri while explaining that
    “Missouri, having abandoned its constitutional arguments, advances only one defense
    to plaintiffs’ claims”).
    -3-
    Amendment. See United States v. Georgia, 
    546 U.S. 151
    , 159 (2006) (Fourteenth
    Amendment Due Process Clause incorporates Eighth Amendment guarantee against
    cruel and unusual punishment). The damages claims against the State of Missouri and
    the MDOC under the ADA, and against the MDOC under the RA are remanded also
    because some of defendants’ alleged behavior could violate the Eighth and Fourteenth
    Amendments. See, e.g., Simmons v. Cook, 
    154 F.3d 805
    , 807-09 (8th Cir. 1998)
    (upholding damages award for Eighth Amendment violation where paraplegic inmates
    missed four consecutive meals because their wheelchairs could not maneuver to door
    where food tray was placed, and were unable to eliminate bodily waste because they
    were denied necessary assistance); LaFaut v. Smith, 
    834 F.2d 389
    , 392-94 (4th Cir.
    1987) (failure to ensure that mobility-impaired inmate had accessible toilet facilities
    and physical therapy violated Eighth Amendment).
    This court affirms the district court’s dismissal of the unnamed medical doctors
    and CMS, and the individual-capacity claims against Lange and Logan; reverses the
    dismissal of the injunctive claims against the state defendants that were not based on
    medical treatment decisions; reverses the dismissal of damages claims against the
    State of Missouri and the MDOC; and remands for further proceedings consistent
    with this opinion. Dinkins’s appellate motions are denied.
    ______________________________
    -4-