Lawhorn v. State ( 2018 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
JAMES LAWHORN, §
§ No. 572, 2017
Defendant Below- §
Appellant, §
§
v. § Court Below: Superior Court
§ of the State of Delaware
STATE OF DELAWARE, §
§ Cr. ID No. N1503000591
Plaintiff Below- §
Appellee. §
Submitted: July 13, 2018
Decided: September 13, 2018
Before STRINE; Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices
ORDER
Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record below, it appears to
the Court that:
(1) The defendant-appellant, James Lawhorn, appeals the Superior Court’s
denial of his first motion for postconviction relief. We find no merit to the appeal.
Thus, we affirm the Superior Court’s judgment.
(2) The record reflects that Lawhorn pled guilty in September 2015 to one
count each of Sex Offender Unlawful Sexual Conduct Against a Child and Unlawful
Sexual Contact in the First Degree. Because of the victim’s young age, Lawhorn
faced a sentencing range of twenty-five years, minimum mandatory, up to life in
prison.1 The Superior Court sentenced him to life imprisonment, plus a term of eight
years suspended for probation. We affirmed his convictions and sentence on direct
appeal.2 In June 2017, Lawhorn filed a motion for postconviction relief under
Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. He also filed a motion for appointment of counsel.
The Superior Court denied both motions on December 11, 2017. This appeal
followed.
(3) In his opening brief on appeal, Lawhorn contends that the Superior
Court erred in denying his Rule 61 motion because his trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to obtain a mental health evaluation, for failing to object to the State’s
recitation of his prior criminal history at sentencing, and for failing to properly
inform him of the sentencing range that he faced. He also contends that the Superior
Court erred in denying his request for the appointment of postconviction counsel.
(4) After careful consideration, we find no merit to either claim. The
Superior Court carefully considered Lawhorn’s motion, his former attorney’s
affidavit and supplemental affidavit in response, Lawhorn’s reply and supplemental
reply, as well as the record of the guilty plea and sentencing proceedings. We agree
with the Superior Court’s conclusion that Lawhorn failed to establish either cause or
prejudice to substantiate his claims that his trial counsel was ineffective.3 The record
1
11 Del. C. § 4205A(a)(2).
2
Lawhorn v. State, 2016 WL 6649222 (Del. Nov. 9, 2016).
3
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1980).
2
of the guilty plea proceeding and sentencing belies Lawhorn’s assertions of his
attorney’s ineffectiveness or of an unknowing and involuntary guilty plea.
Moreover, under the standards set forth in Rule 61(e)(3),4 we find no abuse of the
Superior Court’s discretion in denying Lawhorn’s request for the appointment of
counsel.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Leo E. Strine, Jr.
Chief Justice
4
Rule 61(e)(3) provides that, in a guilty plea case, the Superior Court may appoint counsel in
postconviction proceedings only under specific circumstances that include a “substantial claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel in relation to the plea.” Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(3)(ii).
3