Marcel Maddox Bey v. Guild Mortgage Company ( 2018 )


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  •                                                                  FILED
    CUM'OF APPEALS DIV I
    STATE OF WASHIT,1TON
    2018 JAN 16 AIN: 23
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    MARCEL MADDOX BEY,
    No. 77153-1/Linked w/77154-0-I
    Appellant,
    DIVISION ONE
    V.
    GUILD MORTGAGE COMPANY,                           UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    Respondent.                  FILED: January 16, 2018
    SPEARMAN, J. — Dismissal under CR 12(b)(2) and (5) is proper only
    where, due to insufficient service of process, the trial court lacks jurisdiction over
    a person. Dismissal under CR 12(b)(6) is warranted only where no facts exist
    that would justify recovery, as when there is some insuperable bar to relief.
    Marcel Maddox Bey appeals the dismissal of his claim against Guild Mortgage
    Company (Guild). Maddox Bey, however, fails to make a prima facie showing of
    sufficient service of process. He also fails to state a claim upon which relief may
    be granted. We affirm.
    FACTS
    Maddox Bey defaulted on a home loan and the lender, Guild, recorded a
    notice of trustee's sale. The sale was scheduled for July 22, 2016. On July 20,
    Maddox Bey filed this action seeking to quiet title, naming Guild as a defendant.
    Maddox Bey declared that he rescinded his signature on the deed of trust and
    No. 77153-1-I/Linked w/ No. 77154-0-1/2
    was no longer liable for any debt arising from the deed. He also filed documents
    proclaiming that, as a Moorish-American, he was immune from taxation as well
    as criminal and civil jurisdiction of the United States.
    Maddox Bey's complaint did not seek to enjoin the trustee's sale. The sale
    took place as scheduled on July 22 and DWA Investments, LLC, purchased the
    property.1
    Guild moved to dismiss Maddox Bey's suit on the grounds that Maddox
    Bey failed to conduct personal service of process and the trial court thus lacked
    personal jurisdiction over Guild. CP at 339-40. Guild also asserted that Maddox
    Bey's complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
    Maddox Bey did not respond to Guild's motion or attend the hearing. The
    trial court found that Maddox Bey failed to properly serve Guild and his complaint
    failed to state a claim. The court granted Guild's motion to dismiss. Maddox Bey
    appeals.
    DISCUSSION
    We review de novo the trial court's conclusions that service was
    insufficient and that Maddox Bey failed to state a claim upon which relief may be
    granted. Scanlan v. Townsend, 
    181 Wash. 2d 838
    , 847, 336 P.3d 1155(2014);
    Cutler v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 
    124 Wash. 2d 749
    , 755, 881 P.2d 216(1994)
    (citing Hoffer v. State, 
    110 Wash. 2d 415
    , 421, 755 P2d 781 (1988)).
    1 In a related appeal, Maddox Bey challenges the trial court's issuance of a writ of
    restitution to DWA. See DWA Investments, LLC v. Marcel Maddox, No. 77154-0.
    2
    No. 77153-1-I/Linked w/ No. 77154-0-1/3
    Maddox Bey appeals the trial court's grant of Guild's motion to dismiss. He
    does not, however, address the trial court's ruling on this motion. Instead,
    Maddox Bey raises several arguments to challenge the trustee's sale. He asserts
    that Guild failed to prove that it was the holder of the promissory note. Maddox
    Bey alleges that any contract between him and Guild is unenforceable due to
    duress and fraud. He contends Guild had unclean hands. He asserts that the
    trustee's sale was void and the trial court had the duty to vacate the void
    judgment. Maddox Bey also contends corporations and governments are
    fictitious persons that have no jurisdiction over natural humans. He appears to
    contend that he is not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or the State
    of Washington and he has rescinded all contractual obligations. We decline to
    reach these arguments as beyond the scope of review and unsupported.2
    The trial court granted Guild's motion to dismiss on two grounds. First, the
    trial court found that Maddox Bey failed to properly serve Guild with the
    summons and complaint. A plaintiff accomplishes personal service on a
    corporation by serving the head of the corporation, the company's registered
    agent, the corporate secretary, cashier, or managing agent. Weber v. Associated
    Surgeons, P.S., 
    166 Wash. 2d 161
    , 163, 
    206 P.3d 671
    (2009)(citing RCW
    4.28.080(9)). Where a defendant challenges the sufficiency of service, the
    plaintiff has the initial burden of making a prima facie showing of proper service.
    2 The authority Maddox Bey cites, including the United States Constitution, the Bill of
    Rights, and the Washington State Constitution, provides no support for his claims that he is
    beyond the reach of the law and has not agreed to submit to the State's jurisdiction.
    3
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    Scanlan v. Townsend, 
    181 Wash. 2d 838
    , 847, 336 P.3d 1155(2014)(citing
    Streeter-Dvbdahl v. Nquvet Huynh, 
    157 Wash. App. 408
    , 412, 
    236 P.3d 986
    (2010)). A plaintiff may meet this burden by producing an affidavit of service. 
    Id. at 847-48.
    The burden then shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that the
    service was insufficient. 
    Id. at 847.
    In this case, Guild challenged the sufficiency of service. Maddox Bey did
    not respond. Maddox Bey failed to make a prima facie showing that service was
    properly carried out and, on this appeal, Maddox Bey points to no evidence that
    he properly served Guild.3 The trial court did not err in granting Guild's motion to
    dismiss based on insufficient service of process.
    The trial court also granted Guild's motion to dismiss based on Maddox
    Bey's failure to state a claim. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
    should only be granted where the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts that
    would justify recovery. 
    Cutler, 124 Wash. 2d at 755
    . This is the case where the
    complaint demonstrates "'some insuperable bar to relief." 
    Id. (quoting Hoffer,
    110
    Wn.2d at 421).
    Maddox Bey's complaint seeks to quiet title on the grounds that he
    rescinded the deed of trust. An action to quiet title is designed to resolve
    competing claims of ownership. Walker v. Quality Loan Service Corp., 176 Wn.
    App. 294, 322, 308 P.3d 716(2013)(citing Kobza v. Tripp, 
    105 Wash. App. 90
    , 95,
    3 The record contains evidence that Maddox Bey served Guild's attorney. Maddox Bey
    points to no authority that personal service on a corporation may be accomplished by serving the
    corporation's attorney. See 
    Weber, 166 Wash. 2d at 163
    (citing ROW 4.28.080(9)).
    4
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    18 P.3d 621
    (2001)). A plaintiff may only succeed on the strength of his own title,
    not on the weakness of his adversary. Bavand v. OneWest Bank, F.S.B., 
    176 Wash. App. 475
    , 502, 309 P.3d 636(2013)(citing Desimone v. Spence, 
    51 Wash. 2d 412
    , 415, 318 P.2d 959(1957)). A borrower bringing a quiet title action against a
    lender must allege that he has satisfied loan obligations. 
    Walker, 176 Wash. App. at 321-22
    ; 
    Bavand, 176 Wash. App. at 502
    .
    In this case, Maddox Bey does not allege that he satisfied the loan
    obligations. He thus fails to assert a claim based upon the strength of his own
    title. Instead, he asks the court to declare the deed of trust void based on his
    unilateral rescission of his signature. He cites no authority recognizing unilateral
    rescission of signature as a ground to quiet title in a borrower against a lender.
    In addition, Maddox Bey's complaint to quiet title essentially asks the court
    to set aside the foreclosure sale. But this relief is not available to a borrower who
    did not bring an action to enjoin the foreclosure sale. RCW 61.24.127. The
    borrower's failure to bring such an action waives any claim affecting the "the
    validity or finality of the foreclosure sale" if the borrower (1) received notice of the
    right to enjoin the sale;(2) had actual or constructive knowledge of a defense to
    foreclosure prior to the sale; and (3)failed to bring an action to enjoin the sale.
    (Citing RCW 61.24.127(2)(c); Frizzell v. Murray, 
    179 Wash. 2d 301
    , 306-07, 313
    P.3d 1171(2013);(quoting Plein v. Lackey, 
    149 Wash. 2d 214
    , 227,67 P.3d 1061
    (2003)).
    Here, the record establishes that Maddox Bey received notice of the right
    to enjoin the sale. Maddox Bey's alleged defense to foreclosure, the rescission of
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    his signature, occurred before the sale took place. It is undisputed that Maddox
    Bey failed to bring an action to enjoin the foreclosure sale. Maddox Bey waived
    his right to contest the sale.
    Maddox Bey's quiet title complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief
    may be granted because he fails to allege superior title to the property and
    because, by statute, he has no right to bring a postsale challenge to the
    foreclosure sale. The trial court did not err in granting Guild's motion to dismiss.
    Affirmed.
    WE CONCUR:
    6