American Electric Power Service Corporation v. Commonwealth of PA , 184 A.3d 1031 ( 2018 )


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  •           IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    American Electric Power Service           :
    Corporation,                              :
    Petitioner              :
    :
    v.                          :   No. 861 F.R. 2013
    :   Submitted: November 15, 2017
    Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,             :
    Respondent                :
    BEFORE:       HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge
    HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
    HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge
    HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
    HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
    HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
    HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
    OPINION
    BY PRESIDENT JUDGE LEAVITT                                       FILED: March 15, 2018
    Before the Court are exceptions filed by American Electric Power
    Service Corporation (Taxpayer)1 to an opinion and order of a three-judge panel of
    this Court dated May 4, 2017, which affirmed the Board of Finance and Revenue
    (Board). See American Electric Power Service Corporation v. Commonwealth, 
    160 A.3d 950
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (American Electric Power I). In doing so, the panel
    held that Taxpayer’s sale of electricity to the Letterkenny Industrial Development
    1
    Taxpayer files its exceptions pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1571(i),
    which states:
    Any party may file exceptions to an initial determination by the court under this
    rule within 30 days after the entry of the order to which exception is taken. Such
    timely exceptions shall have the effect, for the purposes of Rule 1701(b)(3)
    (authority of lower court or agency after appeal) of an order expressly granting
    reconsideration of the determination previously entered by the court. Issues not
    raised on exceptions are waived and cannot be raised on appeal.
    PA. R.A.P. 1571(i).
    Authority (LIDA) is subject to the gross receipts tax set forth in Section 1101(b) of
    the Tax Reform Code of 1971 (Tax Code),2 72 P.S. §8101(b), and not eligible for
    the tax exemption set forth in Section 1101(b)(1) of the Tax Code. We agree and,
    thus, overrule Taxpayer’s exceptions.
    Taxpayer, a New York corporation headquartered in Columbus, Ohio,
    sells electricity in Pennsylvania on a wholesale basis. It does not provide electricity
    to end-user customers and is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania
    Public Utility Commission (PUC). As a wholesale seller of electricity, Taxpayer is
    regulated solely by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
    LIDA was formed in 1997 by Franklin County under Pennsylvania’s
    Economic Development Financing Law3 after the closure of the Letterkenny Army
    Depot. Governed by a 15-member board of directors appointed by the Franklin
    County Commissioners, LIDA assumed control of the Army Depot’s electrical
    distribution system (EDS), which serves the Cumberland Valley Business Park
    (Business Park) and an industrial area retained by the Army. Stipulation of Facts
    Nos. 6, 8. In 2009, LIDA began to purchase electricity from Taxpayer for sale to
    the Army and customers in the Business Park. LIDA contracts with Allegheny
    Power, a Pennsylvania electric utility, to operate and maintain the EDS and bill
    LIDA’s customers.
    Taxpayer filed a gross receipts tax report for 2010 that showed gross
    receipts in the amount of $5,804,219.77 from its sale of electricity to LIDA and
    $640,705.90 from its sale to the Borough of Pitcairn (Pitcairn). Stipulation of Facts
    No. 9. Taxpayer claimed that these gross receipts were non-taxable under Section
    2
    Act of March 4, 1971, P.L. 6, as amended, 72 P.S. §§7101-10004.
    3
    Act of August 23, 1967, P.L. 251, as amended, 73 P.S. §§371-386, retitled the Economic
    Development Financing Law by Section 1 of the Act of December 17, 1993, P.L. 490.
    2
    1101(b)(1) of the Tax Code because they were derived from the sale of electricity
    for resale. Neither LIDA nor Pitcairn filed, reported, or paid gross receipts tax on
    the electric energy each purchased from Taxpayer in 2010.4 The Department of
    Revenue (Department) rejected Taxpayer’s claim of an exemption and increased
    Taxpayer’s gross receipts tax liability for 2010 from $0 to $380,546.5 Stipulation of
    Facts No. 13. Taxpayer appealed to the Department’s Board of Appeals, and it
    denied relief.
    Taxpayer then appealed to the Board of Finance and Revenue. The
    Board concluded that Taxpayer’s sales to Pitcairn should have been exempt because
    Pitcairn is a municipality. The Board held otherwise for LIDA, which is not a
    political subdivision and did not pay a gross receipts tax. The Board reduced
    Taxpayer’s total gross receipts tax liability to $342,744. Taxpayer petitioned for this
    Court’s review. On May 4, 2017, a three-judge panel affirmed the Board’s order.6
    Taxpayer timely filed the exceptions presently before this Court.7
    Taxpayer raises three issues for our consideration. It first argues that it
    is not subject to the gross receipts tax under Section 1101(b) of the Tax Code.
    4
    LIDA and Pitcairn also did not file corporate net income tax returns or capital stock tax returns
    for 2010.
    5
    Taxpayer’s total taxable gross receipts for 2010 was $6,449,926. Stipulation of Facts ¶13.
    6
    In addition, this Court vacated the portion of the Board’s order regarding penalties. That portion
    of the Board’s order is not at issue here. See American Electric Power I, 
    160 A.3d 950
    .
    7
    In tax appeals from the Board of Finance and Revenue, this Court functions as a trial court, and
    exceptions filed to its final order have the effect of an order granting reconsideration. Consolidated
    Rail Corp. v. Commonwealth, 
    679 A.2d 303
    , 304 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996). This Court reviews de novo
    the determinations of the Board. Kelleher v. Commonwealth, 
    704 A.2d 729
    , 731 (Pa. Cmwlth.
    1997). “Stipulations of fact are binding upon both the parties and the Court.” 
    Id.
     “However, this
    Court may draw its own legal conclusions.” 
    Id.
     “Our scope of review in tax appeals is … limited
    to the construction, interpretation and application of a State tax statute to a given set of facts.”
    United Services Automobile Association v. Commonwealth, 
    618 A.2d 1155
    , 1156 (Pa. Cmwlth.
    1992) (quoting Escofil v. Commonwealth, 
    406 A.2d 850
    , 852 (Pa. 1979)).
    3
    Alternatively, Taxpayer argues its gross receipts from the sales of electricity to
    LIDA are tax exempt under Section 1101(b)(1) of the Tax Code. Finally, Taxpayer
    argues that this Court improperly extended the Commonwealth’s deadline to respond
    to Taxpayer’s requests for admissions. Because the Commonwealth did not timely
    respond, it must be deemed to have admitted that Taxpayer is not subject to the gross
    receipts tax.
    In its first issue, Taxpayer argues that it is not subject to the gross
    receipts tax set forth in Section 1101(b). Section 1101 imposes a gross receipts tax
    on several categories of business. Section 1101(b)(1) is the category relevant here,
    and it states:
    (b) Electric Light, Waterpower and Hydro-electric Utilities.--
    Every electric light company, waterpower company and hydro-
    electric company now or hereafter incorporated or organized by
    or under any law of this Commonwealth, or now or hereafter
    organized or incorporated by any other state or by the United
    States or any foreign government and doing business in this
    Commonwealth, and every limited partnership, association,
    joint-stock association, copartnership, person or persons,
    engaged in electric light and power business, waterpower
    business and hydro-electric business in this Commonwealth,
    shall pay to the State Treasurer, through the Department of
    Revenue, a tax of forty-four mills upon each dollar of the gross
    receipts of the corporation, company or association, limited
    partnership, joint-stock association, copartnership, person or
    persons, received from:
    (1) the sales of electric energy within this State,
    except gross receipts derived from the sales for
    resale of electric energy to persons, partnerships,
    associations, corporations or political subdivisions
    subject to the tax imposed by this subsection upon
    gross receipts derived from such resale[.]
    4
    72 P.S. §8101(b)(1) (emphasis added). Taxpayer argues that because it is an
    interstate wholesaler of electricity regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory
    Commission and not a utility, it is not subject to the gross receipts tax. However,
    even if it were a utility regulated by the PUC, it is entitled to the tax exemption in
    subsection (1).
    In support of its construction of Section 1101(b), Taxpayer directs our
    attention to Pennsylvania’s Electricity Generation Customer Choice and
    Competition Act (Competition Act).8 The Competition Act defines an “electric
    distribution company” as a “public utility providing facilities for the jurisdictional
    transmission and distribution of electricity to retail customers….” 66 Pa. C.S. §2803
    (emphasis added). Taxpayer argues that it is not a “public utility.” Likewise, it is
    not an “electric light company” or “a person or persons engaged in the electric light
    and power business” within the meaning of Section 1101(b).
    In American Electric Power I, the panel noted that the Tax Code does
    not define the terms “electric light company” or an “electric light and power
    business.” However, Section 2810(i) of the Competition Act illuminates their
    meaning. It states that an “electric light company … as used in [S]ection 1101(b) of
    the [Tax Code] shall be deemed to include electric distribution companies and
    electric generation suppliers.” 66 Pa. C.S. §2810(i) (emphasis added). 9 Section
    2810(j) of the Competition Act further provides:
    8
    66 Pa. C.S. §§2801-2815.
    9
    The Competition Act defines “electric generation supplier” as follows:
    A person or corporation, including municipal corporations which choose to provide
    service outside their municipal limits except to the extent provided prior to the
    effective date of this chapter, brokers and marketers, aggregators or any other
    entities, that sells to end-use customers electricity or related services utilizing the
    jurisdictional transmission or distribution facilities of an electric distribution
    company or that purchases, brokers, arranges or markets electricity or related
    5
    Retail sales of electric generation, transmission, distribution or
    supply of electric energy, dispatching services, customer
    services, competitive transition charges, intangible transition
    charges and universal service and energy conservation charges
    and such other retail sales in this Commonwealth the receipts of
    which, if bundled, would have been deemed to be sales of electric
    energy prior to the effective date of this chapter shall be deemed
    sales of electric energy for purposes of section 1101 of the Tax
    Reform Code of 1971. The phrases “doing business in this
    Commonwealth” and “engaged in electric light and power
    business, waterpower business and hydroelectric business in this
    Commonwealth,” as such terms are used in section 1101(b) of
    the Tax Reform Code of 1971 and in this chapter, shall be
    construed to include the direct or indirect engaging in,
    transacting or conducting of activity in this Commonwealth for
    the purpose of establishing or maintaining a market for the sales
    of electric energy and include obtaining a license or certification
    from the commission to supply electric energy. Retail sales of
    generation shall be deemed to occur at the meter of the retail
    consumer.
    66 Pa. C.S. §2810(j) (emphasis added).
    In American Electric Power I, the panel reasoned as follows. Section
    1101(b) of the Tax Code imposes the gross receipts tax upon “every” entity that is
    “engaged in electric light and power business.” 72 P.S. §8101(b). Section 2810(j)
    of the Competition Act states that being “engaged in [an] electric light and power
    business” includes “the direct or indirect engaging in, transacting or conducting of
    activity in this Commonwealth for the purpose of establishing or maintaining a
    market for the sales of electric energy[.]” 66 Pa. C.S. §2810(j) (emphasis added).
    Reading the two statutes together, the panel concluded that the gross receipts tax
    services for sale to end-use customers utilizing the jurisdictional transmission and
    distribution facilities of an electric distribution company….
    66 Pa. C.S. §2803 (emphasis added).
    6
    must be paid on all sales of electric energy, including Taxpayer’s wholesale sales to
    its customers.
    The panel also rejected Taxpayer’s argument that because it is not a
    licensed utility regulated by the PUC, it cannot be engaged in the electric light and
    power business. This Court had previously considered, and rejected, a similar
    argument in Solar Turbines Inc. v. Commonwealth, 
    816 A.2d 362
     (Pa. Cmwlth.
    2003). In that case, an electricity generation project operator challenged its liability
    for the gross receipts tax on the theory that “electric light company” and “electric
    light and power business,” as used in Section 1101(b) of the Tax Code, refer only to
    public utilities. We reasoned that the Tax Code “identifies taxpayers by the function
    they perform, without regard to whether they are a public utility.” Solar Turbines
    Inc., 
    816 A.2d at 365
     (emphasis in original) (citing Hanley and Bird v.
    Commonwealth, 
    590 A.2d 1382
    , 1386 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991)).10                           “By its plain
    10
    In Hanley and Bird, 
    590 A.2d 1382
    , this Court held that former Section 1101(a) of the Tax Code,
    72 P.S. §8101(a), applies to entities other than public utilities, notwithstanding the presence of
    “Utilities” in the title of Section 1101(b). In that case, the petitioners, natural gas producers and
    sellers, appealed the Board’s denial of their petition for refund of the gross receipts tax. The
    petitioners asserted that the legislature intended to impose the tax only on public utilities, which
    did not include independent natural gas producers, based on the explicit words of the Tax Code.
    Article XI of the Tax Code was entitled the “Utilities Gross Receipts Tax.” Section 1101(a) of the
    Tax Code stated in relevant part as follows:
    (a) General Rule – Every railroad company, pipeline company, conduit company
    … gas company … doing business in this Commonwealth, and every limited
    partnership, … person or persons, engaged in telephone, telegraph, express, gas,
    palace car or sleeping car business … shall pay … a tax … upon each dollar of the
    gross receipts of the corporation … received … from the sales of gas, except gross
    receipts derived from … sales for resale….
    Hanley and Bird, 
    590 A.2d at
    1384-85 (citing former 72 P.S. §8101(a), as amended in 1991,
    Section 1101(a) no longer imposes the gross receipts tax on those engaged in the gas business)
    (emphasis added).
    Rejecting the petitioners’ arguments, this Court held that Section 1101(a) of the Tax Code
    identifies taxpayers by the function they perform, without regard to whether they are a public
    7
    language, [S]ection 1101(b) expressly imposes the [gross receipts tax] upon all
    entities that are ‘engaged in electric light and power business’ and receive revenue
    from ‘the sale of electric energy.’” Solar Turbines, Inc., 
    816 A.2d at 365
     (quoting
    72 P.S. §8101(b)). Stated otherwise, the fact that Taxpayer is not licensed by the
    PUC as a public utility is not determinative of whether it is engaged in the electric
    light business within the meaning of Section 1101(b) of the Tax Code.
    In American Electric Power I, the panel further observed that, in the
    Competition Act, the General Assembly adopted the revenue-neutral reconciliation
    (RNR) formula to recoup any losses caused by the restructuring of the electric
    industry so that “the Commonwealth could collect the same level of revenue that
    was collected prior to the passage of the Competition Act.” American Electric
    Power I, 160 A.3d at 955 (quoting Spectrum Arena Limited Partnership v.
    Commonwealth, 
    983 A.2d 641
    , 646 (Pa. 2009)); see also 66 Pa. C.S. §2810(a). Prior
    to deregulation, the services Taxpayer now provides to its customers could have
    been provided only by public utilities. Exempting Taxpayer from gross receipts tax
    utility. In support, this Court quoted from a publication cited by the petitioners, entitled
    Pennsylvania Taxation:
    As it appears in the Tax Reform Code, the tax is labeled a tax on utilities. However,
    the label is misleading. As discussed in §5.110, taxpayers under the act, generally
    speaking are identified by function, not by whether they are utilities according to
    any definition, much less whether they are public utilities….
    Hanley and Bird, 
    590 A.2d at 1386
     (quoting Joseph C. Bright, Jr., Pennsylvania Taxation, Section
    5.100 at 5-3). The Hanley and Bird court held that there is no ambiguity in the language of Section
    1101(a) of the Tax Code. “Although titles and preambles are accepted aids in resolving ambiguity
    in an enacting clause [of a statute], they may not be used to create ambiguity where none exists[.]”
    Hanley and Bird, 
    590 A.2d at 1387
     (quoting Barasch v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission,
    
    532 A.2d 325
    , 332 (Pa. 1987)). “It is clear from a review of Section 1101(a) of the [Tax Code]
    that although ‘utility’ is used in the title it is not controlling and the imposition of the tax applies
    to all of the enumerated entities.” Id. at 1387.
    8
    liability on its sales to LIDA would render meaningless the RNR formula set forth
    in the Competition Act.
    We discern no error in the panel’s analysis in American Electric Power
    I. Accordingly, we hold that Taxpayer is subject to the gross receipts tax by reason
    of Section 1101(b) of the Tax Code.
    In the alternative, Taxpayer argues that if it is subject to the gross
    receipts tax, its sales of electricity to LIDA are exempt from the tax under Section
    1101(b)(1) of the Tax Code. Acknowledging that LIDA is a “public instrumentality
    of the Commonwealth,” Taxpayer Brief at 15 n.2, Taxpayer maintains that LIDA
    acts in a private capacity when reselling electricity to its customers. In that regard,
    LIDA is akin to a private corporation or a municipality acting “in a private corporate
    function[;]” therefore, LIDA must pay the gross receipts tax on its resale of
    electricity. Taxpayer Brief at 15. The fact that LIDA did not report or pay gross
    receipts tax does not shift LIDA’s tax liability to Taxpayer.
    Section 1101(b)(1) of the Tax Code specifies that the tax must be paid
    on gross receipts received from
    the sales of electric energy within this State, except gross receipts
    derived from the sales for resale of electric energy to persons,
    partnerships, associations, corporations or political
    subdivisions[11] subject to the tax imposed by this subsection upon
    gross receipts derived from such resale[.]
    11
    Section 1101(f) of the Tax Code further provides:
    Application to Municipalities.--This article shall be construed to apply to
    municipalities, and to impose a tax upon the gross receipts derived from any
    municipality owned or operated public utility or from any public utility service
    furnished by any municipality, except that gross receipts shall be exempt from the
    tax, to the extent that such gross receipts are derived from business done inside the
    limits of the municipality, owning or operating the public utility or furnishing the
    public utility service.
    9
    72 P.S. §8101(b)(1) (emphasis added). In other words, for Taxpayer to qualify for
    the resale exemption in Section 1101(b)(1), LIDA must be a person, partnership,
    association, corporation, or political subdivision that is itself subject to the gross
    receipts tax on receipts derived from its resale of the electricity it purchases from
    Taxpayer.
    We reject Taxpayer’s premise that LIDA is a “corporation” within the
    meaning of Section 1101(b)(1) of the Tax Code. LIDA, which was formed by
    Franklin County under the Economic Development Financing Law, is “a public
    instrumentality of the Commonwealth and a public body corporate and politic[.]”
    Section 6(a) of the Economic Development Financing Law, 73 P.S. §376(a). A
    public instrumentality is created “for the purpose of acquiring, holding, constructing,
    improving, maintaining, owning, financing and leasing … projects.”                   Id.
    Accordingly, it is granted “all powers necessary or convenient for the carrying out
    of the aforesaid purposes,” such as acquiring property and making contracts. 73 P.S.
    §376(b). LIDA’s authorization under the statute to acquire property and enter into
    contracts does not transform it into a private corporation.
    In American Electric Power I, the panel also held that LIDA is not a
    political subdivision subject to the gross receipts tax under Section 1101(b)(1) of the
    Tax Code. Section 1991 of the Statutory Construction Act defines a political
    subdivision as “[a]ny county, city, borough, incorporated town, township, school
    district, vocational school district and county institution district.” 1 Pa. C.S. §1991.
    LIDA does not fall within that definition.          As the panel explained, while
    development authorities owe their existence to various units of government, they
    “are not considered to be part of the political subdivisions that created them.”
    72 P.S. §8101(f).
    10
    American Electric Power I, 160 A.3d at 958. Rather, an authority such as LIDA is
    “a separate and distinct entity from the entity that created it, and its function is to
    carry out the purpose set forth in its enabling act.” Id.
    In short, Taxpayer has failed to demonstrate that LIDA is one of the
    listed entities eligible for the resale exemption in Section 1101(b)(1) of the Tax
    Code. In so determining, we are mindful of the general proposition that “claims for
    exemption from taxation are to be strictly construed.” Commonwealth v. Erie
    Metropolitan Transit Authority, 
    281 A.2d 882
    , 884 (Pa. 1971).
    We discern no error in the panel’s holding in American Electric Power
    I that Taxpayer, not LIDA, has the obligation to pay the gross receipts tax.
    Finally, Taxpayer argues that this Court improperly extended the
    Commonwealth’s deadline to respond to Taxpayer’s requests for admissions, which
    requested an admission that Taxpayer is not subject to the gross receipts tax.
    Taxpayer contends that the Commonwealth’s untimely response requires us to treat
    that fact admitted by the Commonwealth. We disagree. It is well settled that a
    conclusion of law does not fall within the permissible scope of a request for
    admission under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure No. 4014.12 Dwight v.
    12
    Rule 4014 provides, in pertinent part:
    (a)     A party may serve upon any other party a written request for the admission,
    for purposes of the pending action only, of the truth of any matters within the scope
    of Rules 4003.1 through 4003.5 inclusive set forth in the request that relate to
    statements or opinions of fact or of the application of law to fact, including the
    genuineness, authenticity, correctness, execution, signing, delivery, mailing or
    receipt of any document described in the request….
    (b)     Each matter of which an admission is requested shall be separately set forth.
    The matter is admitted unless, within thirty days after service of the request, or
    within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow, the party to whom the
    request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission an answer….
    Pa. R.C.P. No. 4014(a), (b).
    11
    Girard Medical Center, 
    623 A.2d 913
    , 916 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993) (“requests for
    admissions must call for matters of fact rather than legal opinions and conclusions.”).
    Taxpayer’s argument lacks merit.
    Having reconsidered our previous opinion and reviewed Taxpayer’s
    exceptions, we reaffirm the holding and the reasoning of this Court’s opinion in
    American Electric Power I. Accordingly, we overrule Taxpayer’s exceptions.
    ______________________________________
    MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge
    12
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    American Electric Power Service      :
    Corporation,                         :
    Petitioner         :
    :
    v.                       :   No. 861 F.R. 2013
    :
    Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,        :
    Respondent           :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 15th day of March, 2018, American Electric Power
    Service Corporation’s exceptions to this Court’s May 4, 2017 opinion and order are
    OVERRULED, and the Chief Clerk is directed to enter judgment in the
    Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s favor.
    ______________________________________
    MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge