Strazza Building & Construction, Inc. v. Harris ( 2021 )


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    STRAZZA BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION,
    INC. v. JENNIFER G. HARRIS,
    TRUSTEE, ET AL.
    (AC 43958)
    Moll, Alexander, and Vertefeuille, Js.
    Syllabus
    The defendants H and T appealed from the judgment of the trial court
    denying their motion for summary judgment against the plaintiff, S Co.
    H served as trustee for T, a trust that owned certain real property where
    she resided. The defendants hired S Co. as a general contractor for
    renovations to the home located on the property, and, after a dispute,
    the defendants terminated S Co. S Co. and two subcontractors, R Co.
    and I Co., filed mechanic’s liens claiming unpaid balances. H, as trustee
    for T, initiated a separate action against R Co. seeking to reduce or
    discharge R Co.’s lien. S Co. subsequently commenced this action to
    foreclose on its mechanic’s lien. The trial court in the separate action
    found that the lienable fund for S Co.’s contract was exhausted and
    concluded that R Co.’s lien was invalid. Subsequently, the court denied
    the defendants’ motion for summary judgment in the present case, con-
    cluding that there was a genuine issue of material fact with respect to
    whether there was sufficient privity between R Co. and S Co. so as to
    preclude S Co. from pursuing its claims, and this appeal followed. Held:
    1. The defendants could not prevail on their claim that the court failed to
    apply the doctrine of res judicata, thereby improperly denying their
    motion for summary judgment:
    a. The trial court correctly analyzed the issue of privity: although our
    Supreme Court concluded in Girolametti v. Michael Horton Associates,
    Inc. (
    332 Conn. 67
    ) that the presumption of privity arises from the ‘‘flow
    down’’ obligation that a general contractor owes to a subcontractor,
    there is no corresponding ‘‘flow up’’ obligation extending from a subcon-
    tractor to a general contractor, and, thus, the court improperly applied
    the presumption of privity in this case; nevertheless, the trial court, on
    the basis of certain factual findings, thoroughly analyzed the issue of
    privity and correctly concluded, under the functional relationship test,
    that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether S Co.’s interests
    were sufficiently represented in the separate action so as to warrant the
    application of res judicata.
    b. The defendants’ claim that the existence of the right of a general
    contractor to intervene in an action by a subcontractor involving a
    mechanic’s lien established privity was unavailing: the defendants’ argu-
    ment that, because S Co. had an interest in the separate action and
    would be bound by the court’s holding in that action, S Co., therefore,
    had a right to intervene in that action was circular, the defendants having
    failed to identify any case holding that general contractors have an
    automatic right to intervene in an application to discharge the mechanic’s
    lien of a subcontractor, and the defendants did not explain how or
    why a failure to intervene could establish privity for the purposes of
    res judicata.
    2. The trial court properly declined to apply the doctrine of collateral estop-
    pel: the court thoroughly analyzed the issue of privity and the question
    of whether S Co.’s interests were sufficiently represented in the separate
    action, and, on the basis of this analysis, appropriately concluded that
    a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether S Co. and R Co.
    were in privity.
    Argued May 19—officially released September 21, 2021
    Procedural History
    Action, inter alia, to foreclose on a mechanic’s lien,
    and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in
    the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, where the
    named defendant et al. filed a counterclaim; therafter,
    the court, Genuario, J., denied the motion for summary
    judgment filed by the named defendant et al., and the
    named defendant et al. appealed to this court. Affirmed.
    Bruce L. Elstein, for the appellants (named defendant
    et al.).
    Anthony J. LaBella, with whom, on the brief, was
    Deborah M. Garskof, for the appellee (plaintiff).
    Opinion
    VERTEFEUILLE, J. The defendants1 appeal from the
    judgment of the trial court denying their motion for
    summary judgment against the plaintiff, Strazza Build-
    ing & Construction, Inc. (Strazza). The defendants claim
    that the court improperly denied their motion for sum-
    mary judgment, which was predicated on a claim that
    the action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.2 In
    the alternative, the defendants claim that the court
    erred in failing to find that Strazza’s claims fail as a
    result of the application of collateral estoppel. We dis-
    agree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    The following facts, viewed in the light most favor-
    able to Strazza, and procedural history are relevant to
    this appeal. The defendant Jennifer G. Harris (Harris)
    serves as trustee of the Jennifer G. Harris Revocable
    Trust (trust), which owns real property located in
    Greenwich. On June 7, 2016, the defendants hired
    Strazza to serve as a general contractor for substantial
    renovations to a home located on the property. After a
    dispute arose over the cost and quality of the work that
    had been completed and the estimated time remaining to
    complete the project, the defendants terminated Strazza.
    Prior to its termination, Strazza had billed the defen-
    dants for $1,570,239.16 in labor and materials. Strazza
    alleges that, of that sum, $1,009,083.28 has been paid
    and that it is owed the remaining sum of $561,155.88.
    Strazza and two subcontractors, Robert Rozmus Plumb-
    ing & Heating, Inc. (Rozmus), and Interstate & Lakeland
    Lumber Corporation, then filed and served mechanic’s
    liens on the defendants claiming unpaid balances.
    Strazza thereafter commenced the present action on
    May 2, 2018, seeking to foreclose on its lien and alleging
    claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment.
    On October 23, 2017, Harris, as trustee for the trust,
    initiated a separate proceeding against Rozmus (Roz-
    mus action) pursuant to General Statutes § 49-35a3 seek-
    ing to reduce or discharge the mechanic’s lien filed by
    Rozmus. See Harris v. Robert Rozmus Plumbing &
    Heating, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Stam-
    ford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S. Rozmus’
    mechanic’s lien claimed $97,469.86 as the amount due
    to Rozmus for plumbing services and materials. A trial
    was held in the Rozmus action to resolve the validity
    of the mechanic’s lien. A principal of Strazza testified
    at the trial. Prior to trial, Strazza’s counsel filed a motion
    to file an appearance on behalf of a third-party witness.
    The court in the Rozmus action, Hernandez, J., granted
    the motion, but, because Strazza was not a party to
    the Rozmus action, the court did not permit Strazza’s
    counsel to object to any of the questions posed to the
    principal of Strazza who had testified.
    The court in the Rozmus action issued its memoran-
    dum of decision on the motion to reduce or discharge
    the mechanic’s lien held by Rozmus on July 12, 2019,
    concluding that the lien was not valid. The court in the
    Rozmus action first found that a number of the charges
    included in the lien filed by Rozmus either were for
    work that had not been completed or materials that
    had never been used, and it reduced the amount of the
    Rozmus lien to $62,040.36. The court next determined
    whether Strazza was appropriately owed funds,
    because Rozmus could recover the sum it claimed to
    be owed only to the extent that Strazza, as the general
    contractor, was still owed money. See, e.g., ProBuild
    East, LLC v. Poffenberger, 
    136 Conn. App. 184
    , 191–92,
    
    45 A.3d 654
     (2012). The court in the Rozmus action,
    therefore, reviewed the charges that were included in
    the liens held by Strazza and Rozmus and found that
    Harris was entitled to credits against the liens for many
    of the charges. For example, the court found that sev-
    eral products had been delivered, but never installed,
    and that a number of charges contained unwarranted
    upcharges and overhead. Ultimately, the court con-
    cluded that the sum total of the credits due to Harris
    was $261,194.44.
    The court then reviewed the applicable legal princi-
    ples, most importantly, the general rule that ‘‘[a] subcon-
    tractor is subrogated to the rights of the general contrac-
    tor through whom he claims, such that a subcontractor
    only can enforce a mechanic’s lien to the extent that
    there is unpaid contract debt owed to the general con-
    tractor by the owner.’’ 
    Id.,
     191–92. Additionally, ‘‘Gen-
    eral Statutes §§ 49-33 and 49-36 . . . define and delimit
    the fund to which a properly noticed mechanic’s lien
    may attach. Both of these sections start with the propo-
    sition that no mechanic’s lien may attach to any building
    or land in an amount greater than the price which the
    owner has agreed to pay to the general contractor for
    the building being erected or improved. This amount
    may be diminished to the extent that it exceeds the
    reasonable cost . . . of satisfactory completion of the
    contract plus any damages resulting from . . . default
    for which [the general contractor] might be held liable
    to the owner. . . . The amount may be diminished fur-
    ther by bona fide payments, as defined in [§] 49-36,
    made by the owner [to the general contractor] before
    receiving notice of [the mechanic’s] lien or liens.’’ (Cita-
    tion omitted; footnotes omitted; internal quotation
    marks omitted.) Rene Dry Wall Co. v. Strawberry Hill
    Associates, 
    182 Conn. 568
    , 571–72, 
    438 A.2d 774
     (1980).
    The court in the Rozmus action first concluded that the
    total lienable fund was $151,589.15, but after sub-
    tracting the credits owed to Harris, the court ultimately
    concluded that the total adjusted lienable fund was
    negative $109,605.29. Thus, because the lienable fund
    for Strazza’s contract was entirely exhausted, the lien
    held by Rozmus was invalid and ordered discharged.4
    The central finding of the Rozmus action was that
    no lienable fund existed. Subsequently, the defendants
    filed a motion for summary judgment in the present
    case, arguing that the decision in the Rozmus action
    warranted the application of res judicata as to the issue
    of whether a lienable fund exists and that such an out-
    come is mandated by our Supreme Court’s holding in
    Girolametti v. Michael Horton Associates, Inc., 
    332 Conn. 67
    , 
    208 A.3d 1223
     (2019).5 Strazza objected to the
    motion, arguing that it was not a party to the Rozmus
    action and could not be bound by a ruling in which it
    did not have an opportunity to participate and that there
    was insufficient privity between Strazza and Rozmus
    for the doctrine of res judicata to apply.
    The trial court rendered judgment on February 18,
    2020, denying the defendants’ motion for summary judg-
    ment, from which the defendants have appealed. The
    court first explained in its memorandum of decision
    that ‘‘there is no genuine issue of material fact that
    Rozmus was a subcontractor to [Strazza] and provided
    services and materials to the property owned by Harris,
    as trustee. There is no genuine issue of material fact
    that Rozmus filed a mechanic’s lien on the subject prop-
    erty and that Harris filed the application to discharge
    that mechanic’s lien, which resulted in an evidentiary
    hearing and a decision filed by the court . . . . There
    is no genuine issue of material fact that the court in the
    Rozmus [action] determined that there was no ‘lienable
    fund’ and, [therefore], discharged the Rozmus mechan-
    ic’s lien.’’ The court acknowledged that, if Strazza was
    bound by the prior ruling, such a conclusion would
    necessitate a grant of summary judgment, stating:
    ‘‘Under the applicable law regarding mechanic’s liens,
    if there is no ‘lienable fund’ there can be no enforceable
    mechanic’s lien. There is no question that, in the Roz-
    mus [action], the court found that there was no lienable
    fund. If the principles of res judicata and/or collateral
    estoppel result in the Rozmus court’s holding that there
    was no ‘lienable fund’ binding [Strazza], then summary
    judgment must enter in favor of the defendant[s], if not,
    then the [defendants’] motion for summary judgment
    must be denied. This is true even though the case at
    bar includes a breach of contract claim and an unjust
    enrichment claim, because the ultimate finding of the
    court in [the] Rozmus [action] was that [Strazza] . . .
    was not due any money as a result of credits, over-
    charges and defective work.’’
    In finding that three of the four elements of res judi-
    cata were met and, thus, that the issue of privity would
    determine the outcome of the case, the trial court
    stated: ‘‘The fundamental issue that will control the
    decision in the case at bar is whether or not the parties
    to the prior and subsequent actions were in privity with
    each other . . . .’’ In addressing this issue, the court
    then noted that Strazza’s mechanic’s lien is for a sub-
    stantially greater sum than Rozmus’ mechanic’s lien,
    and that the court in the Rozmus action considered
    many aspects of the project in which Rozmus had no
    involvement, as Rozmus was involved only in plumbing.
    Based on these facts, and because Strazza was not
    a party to the prior proceeding, the court questioned
    whether it would be equitable ‘‘to bind [Strazza] to
    findings based upon litigation involving a party subcon-
    tractor whose involvement in the project represented
    only a small portion of the work and who might not be
    in a position to defend the allegations of wrongdoing
    made against the general contractor concerning por-
    tions of the work in which the subcontractor had little
    or no involvement.’’ Ultimately, the court concluded
    that, ‘‘[w]hile it would seem intuitive that if, as a princi-
    ple of law, a subcontractor is in privity with a general
    contractor, that the general contractor must be in priv-
    ity with the subcontractor. However, because the princi-
    ple, at most, renders a rebuttable presumption, the court
    must consider the functional relationship between the
    parties to determine whether or not there is privity for
    purposes of employing res judicata or collateral estop-
    pel. As stated, while both Rozmus and [Strazza] are
    interested in the same question, to wit, whether or not
    there was a lienable fund (and therefore whether
    [Strazza] is due any money from [the defendants]), it
    is difficult to determine that a lone subcontractor’s
    interest in many of these underlying factual issues pre-
    sents such an identification of interest so as to justify
    preclusion of [Strazza] from litigating its rights to pay-
    ment. . . . For all these reasons the court concludes
    that there is a genuine issue of material fact with regard
    to the issue of whether or not there was sufficient privity
    between Rozmus and [Strazza] . . . so as to preclude
    [Strazza] from pursuing its claims against the owner,
    and for that reason the motion for summary judgment
    must be denied.’’ This appeal followed.6
    I
    The defendants first claim that the court failed to
    apply res judicata, thereby improperly denying their
    motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the defen-
    dants claim that the court (1) failed to apply the pre-
    sumption of privity appropriately and (2) failed to con-
    sider that Strazza had the right to intervene in the
    Rozmus action. In response, Strazza argues that the
    court correctly considered the presumption and deter-
    mined that Strazza had overcome the presumption, and
    that the court properly dismissed the defendants’ inter-
    vention of right argument.
    We first set forth our standard of review and the
    applicable legal principles.
    ‘‘[T]he applicability of res judicata . . . presents a
    question of law over which we employ plenary review.’’
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Girolametti v.
    Michael Horton Associates, Inc., supra, 
    332 Conn. 75
    .
    Where, however, only the element of privity is relevant,
    as in the present case, this legal question is driven by
    the factual findings of the court relative to the functional
    relationship of the parties. See 
    id., 76
    .
    ‘‘[T]he doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion,
    [provides that] a former judgment on a claim, if ren-
    dered on the merits, is an absolute bar to a subsequent
    action [between the same parties or those in privity
    with them] on the same claim. A judgment is final not
    only as to every matter which was offered to sustain
    the claim, but also as to any other admissible matter
    which might have been offered for that purpose. . . .
    The rule of claim preclusion prevents reassertion of the
    same claim regardless of what additional or different
    evidence or legal theories might be advanced in support
    of it. . . . In order for res judicata to apply, four ele-
    ments must be met: (1) the judgment must have been
    rendered on the merits by a court of competent jurisdic-
    tion; (2) the parties to the prior and subsequent actions
    must be the same or in privity; (3) there must have
    been an adequate opportunity to litigate the matter fully;
    and (4) the same underlying claim must be at issue.’’
    (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
    
    Id., 75
    . As stated previously, only the privity element
    is relevant to this appeal.
    ‘‘The following principles govern the second element
    of res judicata, privity . . . . Privity is a difficult con-
    cept to define precisely. . . . There is no prevailing
    definition of privity to be followed automatically in
    every case. It is not a matter of form or rigid labels;
    rather it is a matter of substance. In determining
    whether privity exists, we employ an analysis that
    focuses on the functional relationships of the parties.
    Privity is not established by the mere fact that persons
    may be interested in the same question or in proving
    or disproving the same set of facts. Rather it is, in
    essence, a shorthand statement for the principle that
    [preclusion] should be applied only when there exists
    such an identification in interest of one person with
    another as to represent the same legal rights so as to
    justify preclusion. . . .
    ‘‘While it is commonly recognized that privity is diffi-
    cult to define, the concept exists to ensure that the
    interests of the party against whom collateral estoppel
    [or res judicata] is being asserted have been adequately
    represented . . . . A key consideration in determining
    the existence of privity is the sharing of the same legal
    right by the parties allegedly in privity. . . .
    ‘‘Consistent with these principles, this court and
    other courts have found a variety of factors to be rele-
    vant to the privity question. These factors include the
    functional relationships between the parties, how
    closely their interests are aligned, whether they share
    the same legal rights, equitable considerations, the par-
    ties’ reasonable expectations, and whether the policies
    and rationales that underlie res judicata—achieving
    finality and repose, promoting judicial economy, and
    preventing inconsistent judgments—would be served.
    . . . [T]he crowning consideration, [however, is] that
    the interest of the party to be precluded must have been
    sufficiently represented in the prior action so that the
    application of [res judicata] is not inequitable.’’ (Cita-
    tions omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) 
    Id.,
    75–77.
    A
    The defendants first claim that the trial court failed
    to appropriately consider the presumption of privity set
    forth in Girolametti. In response, Strazza argues that
    the court correctly concluded that the presumption was
    rebutted. We conclude that the presumption does not
    apply because the facts of Girolametti are clearly distin-
    guishable from those of the present case. We further
    conclude, however, that the judgment of the court
    should be affirmed on the basis of its analysis relative
    to the issue of privity.
    We turn first to the issue of the applicability of the
    presumption of privity. Because our Supreme Court’s
    decision in Girolametti is central to the parties’ claims,
    we provide a brief summary of that case. In Girolametti,
    following the completion of a construction project, the
    owners of the property and the general contractor
    entered into arbitration to resolve various disputes. 
    Id.,
    71–72. Before the arbitration concluded, the owners
    decided to no longer participate in the arbitration hear-
    ings and failed to present their damages claims. 
    Id., 72
    . The arbitrator subsequently awarded the general
    contractor $508,597 in damages and ruled that, because
    the owners had made a conscious decision to no longer
    attend the arbitration, they either did not incur any
    damages or were unable to prove their damages. 
    Id.,
     72–
    73.
    The appeal in Girolametti concerned two actions:
    one filed during the arbitration proceedings and one
    filed thereafter, in which the owners alleged negligence
    in connection with the design and construction of the
    second floor of the building and sought damages from
    the general contractor and the subcontractors. 
    Id.
     Each
    of the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment
    on the basis of res judicata, arguing that all of the claims
    raised in the owner’s actions either had been or could
    have been raised and resolved in the arbitration. 
    Id.
    The trial court granted the motion filed by the general
    contractor but denied the motions filed by the subcon-
    tractors, concluding that the subcontractor defendants
    were not parties to the arbitration and, thus, were not
    in privity with the general contractor. 
    Id.,
     73–74. The
    subcontractor defendants appealed from the denial of
    their motions. 
    Id., 74
    .
    This court ruled that each of the subcontractor defen-
    dants was in privity with the general contractor for the
    purposes of res judicata. Girolametti v. Michael Horton
    Associates, Inc., 
    173 Conn. App. 630
    , 685, 
    164 A.3d 731
    (2017), aff’d, 
    332 Conn. 67
    , 
    208 A.3d 1223
     (2019). Our
    Supreme Court affirmed this court’s ruling, stating that
    ‘‘the Appellate Court correctly determined that when a
    property owner and a general contractor enter into
    binding, unrestricted arbitration to resolve disputes
    arising from a construction project, subcontractors are
    presumptively in privity with the general contractor
    with respect to the preclusive effects of the arbitration
    on subsequent litigation arising from the project.’’ Giro-
    lametti v. Michael Horton Associates, Inc., supra, 
    332 Conn. 87
    .
    In the present case, the defendants argue that the
    trial court effectively ignored the presumption of privity
    set forth in Girolametti. Girolametti, however, is
    clearly distinguishable from the present case because
    it involved a situation in which a property owner and a
    general contractor were engaged in previous arbitration
    proceedings. 
    Id., 71
    . This is significant because, in the
    present case, the previous action was between Harris,
    as trustee for the trust, which owned the property,
    and Rozmus, a subcontractor. This difference is crucial,
    because our Supreme Court concluded in Girolametti
    that the presumption of privity arises from the ‘‘flow
    down’’ obligation that a general contractor owes to a
    subcontractor. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 
    Id., 89
    . As the court detailed, ‘‘this rule primarily has been
    justified on the theory that subcontractors are in privity
    of contract with a general contractor, [although] some
    commentators and other legal authorities also have rea-
    soned that the parties share legal rights because general
    contractors are vicariously or derivatively liable for the
    work of their subcontractors.’’ 
    Id.,
     80–81. In light of this
    language, it is clear that the opposite is not necessarily
    true, meaning that there is no corresponding ‘‘flow up’’
    obligation that extends from a subcontractor to a gen-
    eral contractor.
    Despite there being no corresponding ‘‘flow up’’ obli-
    gation that runs from a subcontractor to a general con-
    tractor, the trial court still applied the Girolametti pre-
    sumption of privity to the facts of this case. In so doing,
    the court effectively established a ‘‘flow up’’ obligation
    that began with Rozmus—the subcontractor—and
    extended to Strazza—the general contractor. This is
    clearly beyond the scope of the applicability of the
    presumption, as detailed by our Supreme Court in Giro-
    lametti, and, for this reason we conclude that the court
    erred in applying the presumption of privity to the facts
    of this case.7
    Having reached this conclusion, we note that ‘‘[i]t is
    axiomatic that [we] may affirm a proper result of the
    trial court for a different reason.’’ (Internal quotation
    marks omitted.) Rafalko v. University of New Haven,
    
    129 Conn. App. 44
    , 51 n.3, 
    19 A.3d 215
     (2011). This
    principle guides our analysis in the present case
    because, after applying the presumption of privity, the
    court found that, because it is ‘‘at most . . . a rebutta-
    ble presumption, [it] must [still] consider the functional
    relationship between the parties to determine whether
    or not there is privity for purposes of employing res
    judicata or collateral estoppel.’’ Accordingly, the court
    still conducted a thorough analysis of the issue of priv-
    ity, despite having improperly applied the presumption.
    In conducting this analysis, the trial court accurately
    concluded that, under the functional relationship test,
    a genuine issue of material fact existed as to the ques-
    tion of whether Strazza’s interests were sufficiently rep-
    resented in the Rozmus action. After noting that the
    amount of the mechanic’s lien held by Rozmus was far
    less than Strazza’s lien, the court noted that ‘‘in litigating
    the issue of the amount of the lienable fund the [court
    in the Rozmus action] had to decide many issues relat-
    ing to work that Rozmus, a plumbing subcontractor,
    had no involvement. A review of the decision in [the]
    Rozmus [action] reveals that the basis of the court’s
    decision centered around many portions of the renova-
    tions and improvements to the subject property with
    which Rozmus had virtually no involvement. In Girola-
    metti, the opposite was true. The first action involved
    the general contractor who presumably had involve-
    ment in all aspects of the job. The holding in Girolametti
    was that the owner, who was a party to the first proceed-
    ing brought by the general contractor, was bound by
    the rulings in that case when subsequent cases were
    brought by the subcontractors because the subcontrac-
    tors were in privity with the general contractor. There
    [was] no basis for determining that it would be inequita-
    ble to preclude the owner, who had the opportunity
    to fully participate in the first proceeding, from later
    contesting findings in that first proceeding in later pro-
    ceedings between himself and certain subcontractors.
    The owner in Girolametti . . . had every opportunity
    to assert any claim that he might have against a [subcon-
    tractor] in the case against the general contractor. The
    same is not true in the [present] case . . . . [T]he . . .
    interest [of Rozmus] in the prior litigation, while not
    nominal, was less than 12 percent of the value of the
    claim of [Strazza] . . . . More importantly, Rozmus
    would not have firsthand knowledge [of] or significant
    involvement [in] many aspects of the required perfor-
    mance of other areas of necessary performance under
    the general contract.’’
    These findings demonstrate that the court conducted
    a thorough analysis with regard to the issue of privity.
    Moreover, we agree with the outcome of the court’s
    analysis, and therefore conclude that, despite having
    erroneously applied the presumption of privity, the
    court nevertheless correctly determined that there was
    a genuine issue of fact as to whether Strazza was in
    privity with Rozmus for the purpose of res judicata.
    B
    The defendants also claim that a general contractor
    has a right to intervene in an action brought by a subcon-
    tractor involving a mechanic’s lien, pursuant to General
    Statutes §§ 52-102 and 52-107,8 and that the existence
    of such a right establishes privity. Specifically, the
    defendants argue that Strazza had a right to intervene
    in the Rozmus action because Strazza had an interest
    in the action and would be bound by that action. In
    response, Strazza claims that the court thoroughly con-
    sidered, and properly rejected, the defendants’ argu-
    ment in this regard. We agree with Strazza.
    In resolving this claim, we turn to the reasoning of the
    trial court: ‘‘[T]he application to discharge a mechanic’s
    lien is a statutory right of action designed to provide a
    property owner with an expeditious process for chal-
    lenging an encumbrance placed upon his property. The
    limited relief allowed, the discharge of the subject
    mechanic’s lien, contradicts the defendants’ claim that
    Strazza had an interest in the subject matter since the
    subject matter of the case was the validity of the . . .
    mechanic’s lien [held by Rozmus] and no other. The
    defendant[s] [argue] that, because [Strazza] would be
    bound by the holding regarding the existence of a lien-
    able fund, [Strazza] had an interest in the case, and,
    therefore, would have been allowed to intervene as a
    matter of right. This, of course, is a circular argument.
    Its reasoning is that Strazza had a right to intervene
    because it would be bound by the holding and that
    because it would be bound by the holding it had a right
    to intervene.’’
    We agree with the reasoning of the court that the
    defendants’ argument is circular. Moreover, the defen-
    dants have failed to identify a single case holding that
    general contractors have an automatic right to intervene
    in an application to discharge a subcontractor’s
    mechanic’s lien. Further, beyond the bare assertion that
    ‘‘the failure to intervene cannot now bolster [Strazza’s]
    argument that res judicata does not apply,’’ the defen-
    dants have failed to explain how or why a failure to
    intervene could establish privity for the purposes of res
    judicata. In any event, if the law does not provide that
    a general contractor has a right to intervene in a subcon-
    tractor’s lien discharge case, we fail to see how it could
    possibly be equitable to later preclude a general con-
    tractor’s action for its failure to attempt to intervene.
    Accordingly, we conclude that the court properly
    rejected the defendants’ argument that Strazza should
    be bound by the holding in the Rozmus action as a
    result of its failure to intervene.
    II
    The defendants’ final claim is that the court improp-
    erly failed to find that collateral estoppel applied to
    Strazza’s claims. In response, Strazza claims that the
    application of collateral estoppel is barred because a
    genuine issue of material fact exists with regard to the
    issue of privity. We agree with Strazza.
    We set forth the applicable legal principles. ‘‘Collat-
    eral estoppel means simply that when an issue of ulti-
    mate fact has once been determined by a valid and final
    judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between
    the same parties in any future lawsuit. . . . To assert
    successfully the doctrine of issue preclusion, therefore,
    a party must establish that the issue sought to be fore-
    closed actually was litigated and determined in the prior
    action between the parties or their privies, and that the
    determination was essential to the decision in the prior
    case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Deutsche
    Bank AG v. Sebastian Holdings, Inc., 
    174 Conn. App. 573
    , 587, 
    166 A.3d 716
     (2017), aff’d, 
    331 Conn. 379
    , 
    204 A.3d 664
     (2019).
    Because the sole issue in the present case is whether
    Strazza and Rozmus were in privity, ‘‘we recognize the
    ‘crowning consideration’ in collateral estoppel cases
    and the basic requirement of privity—that the interest
    of the party to be precluded must have been sufficiently
    represented in the prior action so that the application
    of collateral estoppel is not inequitable. . . . A trial in
    which one party contests a claim against another should
    be held to estop a third person only when it is realistic
    to say that the third person was fully protected in the
    first trial.’’ (Citation omitted.) Mazziotti v. Allstate Ins.
    Co., 
    240 Conn. 799
    , 818, 
    695 A.2d 1010
     (1997).
    In resolving the defendants’ claim, we turn to our
    analysis in part I A of this opinion. As discussed in the
    context of res judicata, the court conducted a thorough
    analysis with regard to the issue of privity and the
    question of whether Strazza’s interests were sufficiently
    represented in the Rozmus action. On the basis of this
    analysis, the court appropriately reached the conclu-
    sion that a genuine issue of material fact exists with
    regard to the issue of whether Strazza and Rozmus were
    in privity. Because the privity requirement of collateral
    estoppel, when applicable, is analyzed under the same
    principles as res judicata, we conclude that the court
    also properly rejected this claim. See 
    id.
    The judgment is affirmed.
    In this opinion the other judges concurred.
    1
    This action was brought against the defendant Jennifer G. Harris, both
    in her individual capacity and as trustee of the Jennifer G. Harris Revocable
    Trust, which owns the subject real property, and the defendants Robert
    Rozmus Plumbing & Heating, Inc., and Interstate & Lakeland Lumber Corpo-
    ration, as junior lienholders to the property. The junior lienholders are not
    participating in this appeal. Accordingly, our references to the defendants
    in this opinion are to Jennifer G. Harris, both in her individual capacity and
    as trustee for the trust.
    2
    Generally, the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not appealable,
    but the denial of a motion for summary judgment predicated on the doctrine
    of res judicata is a final judgment for purposes of appeal. See Singhaviroj
    v. Board of Education, 
    124 Conn. App. 228
    , 232, 
    4 A.3d 851
     (2010).
    3
    General Statutes § 49-35a (a) provides: ‘‘Whenever one or more mechan-
    ics’ liens are placed upon any real estate pursuant to sections 49-33, 49-34,
    49-35 and 49-38, the owner of the real estate, if no action to foreclose the
    lien is then pending before any court, may make application, together with
    a proposed order and summons, to the superior court for the judicial district
    in which the lien may be foreclosed under the provisions of section 51-345,
    or to any judge thereof, that a hearing or hearings be held to determine
    whether the lien or liens should be discharged or reduced. The court or
    judge shall thereupon order reasonable notice of the application to be given
    to the lienor or lienors named therein and, if the application is not made
    by all owners of the real estate as may appear of record, shall order reason-
    able notice of the application to be given to all other such owners, and shall
    set a date or dates for the hearing or hearings to be held thereon. If the
    lienor or lienors or any owner entitled to notice is not a resident of this
    state, the notice shall be given by personal service, registered or certified
    mail, publication or such other method as the court or judge shall direct.
    At least four days’ notice shall be given to the lienor, lienors or owners
    entitled to notice prior to the date of such hearing.’’
    4
    Harris also requested the court in the Rozmus action to make a finding
    that Strazza’s behavior constituted fraud, but the court declined to do so,
    explaining that, ‘‘[w]hile the court has very serious concerns about the
    manner in which the project was undertaken, monitored and billed, Strazza
    is not a party to this action and, thus, does not have an opportunity to rebut
    [Rozmus’] claimed inferences. Moreover . . . because there is a net nega-
    tive balance in the lienable fund, the court does not need to make [a] finding
    of fraud to reach its conclusion that the instant lien is not enforceable.’’
    5
    In Girolametti, our Supreme Court held that, when a property owner and
    general contractor were previously involved in arbitration, ‘‘in the absence
    of clear evidence of contrary intent by the parties, subcontractors are pre-
    sumptively in privity with the general contractor on a construction project
    for purposes of res judicata.’’ Girolametti v. Michael Horton Associates,
    Inc., supra, 
    332 Conn. 71
    .
    6
    While this appeal was pending, the defendants filed a motion for an
    articulation of the trial court’s decision pursuant to Practice Book § 66-5.
    The court issued its articulation on July 16, 2020. The court expressed its
    belief that it had adequately addressed the defendants’ arguments as to
    privity and the application of Girolametti to the present case but, neverthe-
    less, addressed those issues in more detail. Further, the court acknowledged
    that it had not addressed the defendants’ claim, raised for the first time in
    their reply brief in support of their motion for summary judgment, that
    Strazza could have intervened as a matter of right in the Rozmus action
    pursuant to General Statutes §§ 52-102 and 52-107. In addressing and denying
    that claim in its articulation, the court noted that the defendants did not
    cite a single case holding that a general contractor can intervene as a matter
    of right in an action involving a homeowner’s application to discharge a
    mechanic’s lien of a subcontractor.
    7
    We note that a ‘‘flow up’’ obligation establishing privity could exist under
    circumstances in which a general contractor is seeking only the same funds
    that a subcontractor sought and lost in a prior action, but, in such a case, the
    property owner would not be able to rely on the Girolametti presumption.
    8
    General Statutes § 52-102 provides: ‘‘Upon motion made by any party or
    nonparty to a civil action, the person named in the party’s motion or the
    nonparty so moving, as the case may be, (1) may be made a party by the
    court if that person has or claims an interest in the controversy, or any part
    thereof, adverse to the plaintiff, or (2) shall be made a party by the court
    if that person is necessary for a complete determination or settlement of
    any question involved therein; provided no person who is immune from
    liability shall be made a defendant in the controversy.’’
    General Statutes § 52-107 provides: ‘‘The court may determine the contro-
    versy as between the parties before it, if it can do so without prejudice to
    the rights of others; but, if a complete determination cannot be had without
    the presence of other parties, the court may direct that such other parties
    be brought in. If a person not a party has an interest or title which the
    judgment will affect, the court, on his application, shall direct him to be
    made a party.’’